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THIRD SERIES—NO. VII.

SEPTEMBER, 1836.

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THE
CHRISTIAN EXAMINER.

Nº. LXXVI.

THIRD SERIES—Nº. VII.

SEPTEMBER, 1836.

ART. 1.—*The Character and Institutions of Moses, considered with particular Reference to their Bearing on the Science of Government and Civil Liberty.*

WHEN we see it stated, that some of the early colonists of New England determined to govern themselves for a time by the Hebrew laws, many are strongly tempted to smile at their simplicity. But the colonists knew what they were doing. They were right, in supposing that the Hebrew institutions were intended for a state of affairs very similar to their own. Some parts of the ancient code, some of its local provisions, would not answer for modern times; but with some abatement, principally, however, of laws which could not possibly be brought into use and action, the Hebrew constitution was as well suited, as any that could be devised, for the infant colonies of our country. Those who ridicule the measure, are probably not aware, that the Hebrews lived under a government of laws and not of men. It was the *spirit of freedom* which ran through those institutions, that recommended them to the strong hearts of our fathers. *They* saw, what many others who read the Bible never saw, that it was the constitution of a free people.

A government of laws and not of men! How much the institutions of the United States have been admired because these words describe them! The friends of freedom, in all the civilized world, are looking upon us with deep and anxious interest, because they believe that our government is the

only one on the face of the earth, to which those words will apply. It is thought, that such a government has been wrought out by the experience and wisdom of ages. The world, after ten thousand trials, has come to certain conclusions; and these results, practically applied to our social system, have given it the excellence which it is allowed to possess. And so hard is it to reconcile liberty with order, to allow the utmost freedom to the individual and at the same time to secure the greatest peace and welfare of the whole, that no thoughtful man wonders, that so many ages passed, before the world discovered how a people could be self-governed and yet governed,—how men could be kept in order, and still be free.

If such is the slow process by which the world arrives at such results as this, what shall we say of the Hebrew constitution, which gave, to those who lived under it, as much freedom as ours? Was it not a brilliant discovery, in an age of barbarism, which thus anticipated the best wisdom of modern times? Is it not a most surprising thing, that the Hebrew lawgivers should thus have solved the problem, of reconciling liberty with order, which the gifted minds of succeeding ages have till lately attempted in vain? Those who doubt the divine legation of Moses, will find an argument here, to which it is not easy to reply.

Perhaps, however, many are not aware of the true character of the Hebrew constitution. The hard name of Theocracy has disguised it. This name is given to it, because it recognised God as their national king. And yet this, if understood, is the exact description of a *republic*. A republic is a government, which has God, and God alone, for its king. By the Hebrew constitution, every individual was held directly responsible to God, and to God alone, for the use of his political privileges and powers; so it is in *our* republic. The Hebrews, as a people, acknowledged no human power above them; the same is true of us. The Hebrew constitution allowed no one to injure or oppress another; as respected their civil rights, all were equal, and all free. The Hebrew constitution allowed no privileged orders. The case of the priesthood may seem an exception to this remark; but it was not so in reality, for they were *not* a privileged order; they were rather a disfranchised body. They had no means of gaining wealth, influence, or power. As to wealth, they were restrict-

ed to a fixed income, and constant and laborious duties. As to influence, they had no means of gaining it, since they had no personal intercourse with the people. Their services were not required or permitted at marriages or funerals; they dwelt apart in their own cities, associating only with each other, and were thus deprived of all temptation to gain power which could never be used. Since it was necessary to have a national religion, a priesthood could not be dispensed with; but it was guarded with provisions, which, so long as they were observed, made it perfectly impossible for it ever to endanger the liberties of the country.

As an evidence of the general inattention to the true character and provisions of the Hebrew law, one or two particulars may be mentioned; and, if there is a prevailing mistake as to details, it can hardly be expected that general views of the character and spirit of the law should be sound and just. We remember to have been informed by a clergyman, that he was dismissed from his charge for refusing to marry a man to the sister of his deceased wife. On our asking why he refused, he said that such connexions were forbidden by the Hebrew law. Probably he had not read the law, but had acted upon his impressions. Had he read it, he would have seen that Moses prohibited marrying a wife's sister only when the wife was living, and gave as a reason the rivalry which it would occasion between the two. Many, to this day, believe that the marriage of first-cousins was also forbidden; forbidden by the Canon law it was, but the law of Moses contains no such prohibition. It would be easy to produce many other examples to show, how little some of those who profess to pay most respect to the Hebrew law, are acquainted with its provisions; and, this being the case, we could hardly expect to find them taking just views of the spirit and tendency of its institutions.

Before remarking upon those institutions, we will give some account of their illustrious founder, and the remarkable manner in which divine Providence prepared him for his difficult and important duty.

From his childhood he was designated to the high trust which he afterwards fulfilled; and with his infancy commenced his education for the part he was to sustain. The Hebrews, when God determined to separate them as a peculiar people to keep alive the knowledge of himself in the midst of an idolatrous world, were thrown by a succession of events, all

bearing upon this purpose, into the very heart of Egypt, the very place to which they would have gone to learn the arts, sciences, and general improvement, in the highest perfection in which they then existed. Egypt was the fountain of intellectual light to the ancient world. The intellectual men of Greece, her philosophers and historians, always travelled to Egypt in search of instruction; in truth, it was their boast that they sprang from Egypt, Danaus, the founder of Greece, being, tradition says, the brother of Egyptus, the Egyptian king. Possibly it was by birthright that Greece inherited that beautiful and perfect taste, which made her the glory of ancient times. That Egypt was able to give improvement in the arts, is attested by her architectural monuments, which still bid defiance to the waste of time and the elements, and even to man, the most barbarous of all destroyers. After the land has been ravaged by Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, and Romans, and in modern times by Saladin and Napoleon, her temples are upright and firm as in the day when Cambyzes halted his brazen chariot to gaze on their majestic walls. It was to this land that Providence conducted the descendants of the patriarchs, that they might learn the arts and employments which they would require, when they were changed from wandering shepherds into a fixed and industrious people. The circumstance that they were in bondage there, was favorable to this kind of improvement; and how independent of other nations this discipline made them, appears from the description of the tabernacle or pavilion which they constructed in the wilderness;—a work of splendor and skill that could not be exceeded in that day.

But while the Hebrew people, any or all, could learn the arts and employments of Egypt, her learning and intellectual improvement were less accessible. They were all in the hands of the priests, who confined them jealously to their own order, and never suffered any one who was not of their *caste* to receive the least portion of instruction. And their attainments were such as to give them a commanding title to respect. They were the surgeons and physicians of the day; they were also the astronomers, and traced, with surprising accuracy, the movements of the heavens; they were also geometricians by profession, and surveyed the land every year, after the inundation of the Nile had swept all the landmarks and boundaries away; in short, they knew all that was then to be known, and

not the least of their accomplishments was the art of alphabetical writing, which was then new to the world. These were all attainments which it was important for the founder of a state to possess; and it is interesting to observe the order of Providence by which he is made master of them all. The Egyptian Pharaoh,—the common name of her kings,—had issued an order, like that of Herod, to destroy the Hebrew children, in order to reduce the numbers of a people who were growing powerful and impatient of bondage. When Moses was born, his parents, in order to save him from destruction, hid him in the rushes on the banks of the Nile. There he was found by the daughter of the king, who, struck with the child's beauty, saved his life, and had him brought up in the palace as her own adopted son. Now, by the law of Egypt, all of royal race, whether by blood or adoption, belonged to the caste of the priests. The young princes were instructed in every thing which the most accomplished priests could teach them; and thus Moses, who otherwise would have had as little intellectual cultivation as the rest of his people, had the opportunity of acquiring all the learning of the Egyptians, which was then all the learning of the world. While he was so fortunately situated for this purpose, he was not cut off from intercourse with his own race. By a harmless stratagem, his mother is employed as his nurse; and thus, perhaps, the earliest words he heard, were the story of the wrongs and sorrows of his people.

Unbelievers have objected to the Old Testament history, on the ground that Moses could not have *written* the law in so early an age. But the researches of Champollion have supplied an answer to this objection. That ingenious and fortunate discoverer, so early lost to the world, found manuscripts in Egyptian catacombs of an earlier date than that of Moses, and thus set the question at rest; since it is certain, that, if the art of writing was then known, Moses would have learned it among the other accomplishments of the priesthood. Champollion also ascertained that the temples and columns, which now astonish the traveller by the beauty of their finish and the grandeur of their proportions, were constructed while the Israelites were slaves in Egypt. They, probably, as Josephus tells us, aided in their construction. Moses was so situated as to know how great was the oppression which they endured,

and the result shows what feelings it inspired in his generous heart.

This naturally leads to some examination of his character, which was even more important than his attainments for the duty he was to perform. And the very circumstance just mentioned, that he dwelt in a palace, in the sunshine of royal favor, surrounded by the comforts and luxuries of life, and that *there* his heart was all engaged with the sufferings of his people, is a sufficient proof of moral greatness. For to be governed by a generous sentiment,—to have a generous sentiment act upon the heart with such power as to make a man indifferent to personal comfort and indulgence,—to have that sentiment of patriotism and philanthropy, which in most men's hearts is cold as a winter moon-beam, kindling up into a flame that animates all within,—this, if any thing, is moral greatness. No one whose heart is right, can help admiring this inmate of a palace, whose whole soul is bent on the restoration of his people, and who, so far from being tempted to become a renegade, deliberately rejected all prospects of wealth and rank, choosing, as was said of him by an Apostle whose heart beat with similar emotions, to renounce the pleasures of sin and to suffer affliction with the people of God.

There are many, whose generosity is equal to a single great act of self-devotion,—who could make gigantic sacrifices while under the immediate impulse of strong feeling, but the feeling will not last; when it meets with ingratitude, it dies away, and leaves the heart colder than ever. It was not so with him. Though he met with no grateful return, though he heard not one word of thankfulness to a million of complaint and upbraiding, his spirit of self-sacrifice endured to the last; and those, who know any thing of the heart, will confess, that the crown of the living is more honorable than that of the dying martyr; it is easier to die, than to live as he did, for men. His post was not one that common ambition would have desired. It brought no superiority of comfort or luxury; it was a laborious, thankless, and self-denying station; it brought no other reward than the approbation of his conscience and his God.

The only stain upon his character was his haste of temper, which sometimes caused him to offend; but human infirmity will always be associated with human greatness. All who have ever accomplished great things in this world, have had a

vast deal of slumbering fire within ; witness our Washington, whose natural temper was harder to govern than his army. It would seem as if, without this warmth, they could not sustain themselves through all their labors and trials. When the Israelites at Meribah called on him to supply them with water, forgetting the divine promise, he reprov'd them for asking an impossibility, — that he should supply them with water among those burning rocks and sands. It was of the utmost importance that he should manifest a perfect confidence in the Almighty, and, standing as he did in the highest station, his example of unbelief might have proved fatal ; the crime under the circumstances was such, that it deprived him of the glory of entering the promised land. But, instead of repining or imploring to be spared, he prayed that God would raise up another in his stead, who would be equally devoted to his people.

Indeed, it was this very devotion to the welfare of his people, which sometimes caused his offending. When he had dashed in pieces the tables of stone, in his wrath at witnessing their relapse into Egyptian idolatry, the moment God threatens the people, his whole feeling changes, and he says, passionately and without reverence, "If thou wilt, forgive their sin ; and if not, blot me out of the book which thou hast written." There is nothing in the Scripture more calmly majestic than the divine reply, "Whosoever hath sinned against me, him will I blot out of my book." It should be remembered that there was never the least taint of selfishness in his passion ; from the time when he slew the Egyptian, in his anger at seeing a countryman basely oppressed, there were several such instances of impatience ; but it was always for others, not for himself, that he encountered the divine displeasure.

In the great work which Moses was to do, moral energy was at least as important as intellectual power ; but in this gift also he abounded. His historical writings have always been admired for their simplicity ; much is said in few words ; and a perfect idea is given of all the ground which philosophical history ought to cover, including not only the course of events, but of society, manners, government, and religion, which prevailed in the early ages. His poetical talent, which in its perfection is one of the noblest gifts of God, is one of the best proofs of his mental superiority. Read the noble lyric ode in which he celebrates the passage of the Red Sea ; or

the one, more powerful yet, in which he blest the people and bade them a last farewell. Among the Psalms, the plaintive elegy, beginning "Lord! thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations," is ascribed to him; and no one of the whole number exceeds it in mournful and affecting beauty.

And yet, after all, the work which he accomplished was the greatest in which intellect can possibly be exerted. He had determined to redeem his people from the most powerful of all nations. The Hebrews were slaves, feeble, unwarlike, and spirit-broken by their bondage; he was to brace them up to bold and decisive action, to force their way through the desert and seize the land of promise, and, what was still more, to subdue their ungovernable spirits to the peace and order required by the law. He had the mental gifts which eloquence requires, because he was a poet, and dealt in the living images and passionate sentiment, which fire the hearts of thousands at once; but an imperfection in his speech deprived him of this means of influence; in addressing the people, he was obliged to employ the peaceful oratory of his brother. He pretended to no military skill, the talent most dazzling in the eyes of an uncultivated people; but he had a clear and powerful understanding to plan, and a mighty heart to bear him through, the enterprise, which was perhaps the most difficult ever undertaken by man. And it was planned and executed by him, not when the fire of youth was burning within him, but when eighty years had passed over and whitened his head.

But, without saying more at present of the difficulty of that enterprise, we will take a survey of the principles of that Constitution by which he hoped to secure the happiness of his people.

It was the opinion of Mr. Jefferson,—we believe it is a general opinion,—that the pursuit of agriculture is the best foundation for the safety and happiness of a free people. Such was the judgment of the Hebrew statesman. Such was the employment by which he designed to support the great body of the people. He knew that commerce would only tend to make the nation a temptation and a prey to invaders, while it would destroy the spirit which would enable the Hebrews to resist them. Therefore it was, that he took so much pains to impress upon his people, that their country was most favorable to these pursuits, and that these pursuits were most favorable to the prosperity and happiness of the country. It

was a land of rivers and fountains,—a land of valleys and hills, —a land which drank liberally of the rain of heaven, and the blessing of God was upon it from the beginning to the end of the year. As for commerce, they could have all its benefits without engaging in it themselves. The great Phenician cities, Tyre and Sidon, were on their borders, and ready to supply them with all they wanted in return for their agricultural productions; the rich caravans of the desert continually swept along their borders, so that, if they chose, they could enjoy the benefit of the enterprise of other nations without expense to themselves. He endeavoured then to make them content under their vines and fig-trees, and to convince them, that, in these unambitious cares, they might not find wealth nor fame indeed, but they would find the best happiness which this world could bestow.

We would ask now if he was not right in his judgment both as to private happiness and public security? Is it not the impression of the most enlightened statesmen of the present day, not that commerce should be discouraged indeed, but that agriculture is the best pursuit for the great body of a free people? The circumstances of the world are altered now; our country is more favorably situated than his, because our rampart is the sea, while his was exposed on every side; and yet it is admitted that this maxim of political wisdom will apply to every free nation at the present day. It is true that his hopes were disappointed; this unaspiring pursuit was too quiet for the taste of his countrymen, when war was the business of all the rest of the world. But the event proved the truth of his principles and predictions. We find that some of the tribes were constantly engaged in commercial pursuits. Solomon laid Ophir and Tarshish,—the East and West Indies of the day,—indeed he laid all the known world, under contribution; he had his harbours in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea; he built Tadmor in the desert,—now a marble waste,—as a station for his caravans. Wealth flowed in through a thousand channels, and, as the prophetic eye of Moses foresaw, it proved the ruin of the country; it became a golden weight which ground its free institutions to the dust.

The second great principle of the Hebrew constitution was the discouragement, and the exclusion as far as possible of a military taste among the people; we mean a taste for conquest, and all the passions which it implies and inspires.

Here, too, there is something wonderful in his discernment of the true elements of prosperity in a commonwealth. He lived in an age when war was the business and delight of man ; when hardly any thing was respected in nations, or in men, in comparison with military fame ; when public virtue and civil wisdom dwindled into nothing before the splendid sins of war. In such an age he saw the hollowness of such glory ; he saw, and the verdict of our republic has confirmed his wisdom, that the greatness of a nation consisted not in its memorable victories, or its extended bounds, but in the amount of individual prosperity and happiness spread through the dwellings and hearts of the land.

His object was to make all citizens soldiers sufficiently trained for all purposes of defensive war, and he anticipated no other. This militia system was more efficient in his age than it is in ours, for then every man had more or less of the hardy qualifications of the soldier. These were to be drawn out by an impartial system of conscription, and thus a force could be gathered at once upon any point exposed to invasion. His principle in these respects was the same with ours. But all his calculations were defeated, as the best designs are often defeated, by those whom they were meant to serve. He conducted the Israelites in a direct path to the promised land, intending to take peaceable possession, if possible, of the land of their fathers. But the spirit of the nation had sunk so low during their long period of bondage, that they dared not enter the land ; and, had they entered it, would not have had vigor and virtue enough to be free. He was compelled to withdraw them in disappointment and sorrow ; and to wait till a generation had been formed by the hardships of the wilderness, energetic enough to enter and take possession of the land. But the very process by which they were prepared for this service, unfitted them in about the same proportion for the arts of peace, which were essential to their prosperity in the land when they had once possessed it.

Much fault has been found with the treatment of the Canaanites under his directions, and with the severity of his war laws. They were not his ; they were the customs of the age, to which every statesman must of necessity conform. Suppose that a Christian statesman feels obliged, under all the circumstances, to consent to a declaration of war. What shall he do ? Shall he order the troops to strike soft in battle, and be care-

ful not to hurt any body with their arms? The idea of conducting such operations in a mild and pleasant manner, — such as shall be agreeable to all parties, — is absurd. The least reflection on the subject shows, that, whatever a statesman's private feelings may be, his military operations must be carried on after the fashion of the day. He did not consider the vagrant tribes, who happened to be upon the soil, as established tenants of the country. It does not appear that he ever meant to dislodge them; for it is certain that many Canaanites remained and were protected long after the Hebrews took possession. Whenever he had occasion, in his wanderings, to pass through a settled country, he asked permission; if it was not granted, he took some other way, except in cases of great insult and outrage, and then for the sake of example he avenged his wrongs. These things were forced upon him; any one can see, that they were against his policy, against his maxims of civil wisdom. He saw, that when a taste for conquest gained possession of a republic, that moment it was undone; it had no longer any claim to existence. If the merchant vessel becomes a pirate, she cannot founder or become a wreck too soon. He foresaw all that actually happened in succeeding times. David, a gallant and successful warrior, extended his dominions from the Euphrates to the Red Sea, and bound all the subject nations into as firm and vigorous an empire as the world ever saw. But it could only be ruled by a hand as vigorous as his own; and its fate was like that of the Roman Empire. The oppressed barbarians rose at last, and not only reclaimed their own, but bore down and overwhelmed their masters. Moreover, while it existed, the property of individuals was sacrificed to the glory of the whole; the empire was great, but no member of it was happy. It was an unnatural state; and, by a common retribution, no one suffered more than he whose ambition overthrew the institutions of that wise statesman, who thought that an hour of freedom was worth an eternity of fame.

Another maxim of his policy was that of giving every citizen a right and interest in the soil. Nobles and landlords there were none; every other country had its privileged orders; but in order to give to his commonwealth as proper a character as was possible, he made every man a landholder. When the soil of Canaan was first appropriated, it was parcelled out among the families of every tribe; genealogies and

registers were kept with the most sacred regard. When a man died, his property was divided among his sons; not all given to the eldest, though respect for the patriarchal feelings of the day compelled him to give the eldest son, the presumptive head of the family, two parts, where each of the others had one. This arrangement secured to every man an interest in the soil, by assigning him either a field, a vineyard, an olive-yard, or a garden. Thus local attachment, the feeling on which patriotism so much depends, was formed among the Jews. It was a great undertaking thus to change the whole social system,—to make those who had been wandering shepherds, going wherever they pleased, content with institutions that restricted them, each to a narrow enclosure; but he knew it could be done, and it was done. These wanderers became afterwards renowned for the deep devotion of their attachment to their own land; witness their lament under the weeping willows of Babylon. Their feeling is expressed in all its strength and beauty by one of their prophets, speaking of their exile: "Weep not for the dead. Oh no, weep not for him; but weep sore for him that goeth away; for he shall never return; he shall never again behold his native country."

In order still further to secure this equality in the condition of the people, Moses provided, that, every fiftieth year, all the lands which had been sold should revert to the original owner or his heirs. This was in fact rendering lands inalienable; since the lands reverted on the year of Jubilee, it was evident that all which the owner could really part with was the produce of the soil for a term of years, longer or shorter according to the time when the next Jubilee was to come. The effect of this arrangement was to render it impossible for any man to be miserably poor; he or his heirs always retained their claim to the land of their fathers. They could raise money upon it if they were in want; but they could neither part with nor lose their right, since the registry, kept by the scribes, would always show to whom the land belonged. It rendered it impossible, also, for any man to become a great proprietor, and thus to gain the influence which a feudal lord possesses over his tenants at will. In that day, when the great were so apt to be usurpers, and the small to be slavish in their feeling, the power of great proprietors of land would have endangered the

public liberties, in a thousand times greater proportion than would be possible now.

The objection which would suggest itself to this arrangement is, that the land would soon be so much subdivided as to render the hereditary estate too small to support its proprietor. But this statesman, when he determined that every rood of ground should support its man, was not embarrassed by any popular system of political economy. Moses evidently believed, that, with a favorable social system, the soil would support all who came upon it:—not by its own products perhaps;—nor was this necessary, since commerce with foreigners was not prohibited within the bounds of Palestine. He evidently calculated also, that the means of subsistence would grow with the population, since enterprise, art, and industry would be developed so as to increase the resources of the country full as fast as they were wanted. So it always will be in every well-governed state,—every state that gives man a fair field, secures him the profits of his labor, and then leaves the race to the swift and the battle to the strong. The little province of Palestine supported its millions, and it seldom became necessary to apply the remedy of famine to keep down their numbers.

Such were some of the maxims upon which his institutions were founded. We will now look at the frame-work of his government; and it will be enough to show its free character, to point out its general resemblance to our own.

In the first place, it was a union of separate tribes, differing in many respects of position, habits, manners, and feelings; each with its own government to conduct its internal concerns, the municipal arrangements of every tribe being left entirely in its own hands. He did not attempt to bind together these separate states by a confederacy; such a government, even if it would have held them together, would not have been vigorous and decided enough in its action. He therefore drew up a Constitution, which applied not to each tribe as a body, but to the individuals in the tribe. He made it bear on every individual in every tribe; thus giving each one a personal interest in the national concerns, making him as much a member of the nation as he was of his own tribe. There was a strong feeling of ambition, and sometimes of rivalry, in each separate tribe. Judah, the ancient dominion, found the superiority which it assumed, more than once warmly contested;

but, while each Hebrew was strongly concerned to maintain the honor of his tribe, the Constitution of the general government gave him an almost equal interest in the honor of his country.

Situated as the Hebrews were, with marauding tribes upon their borders, it was not possible in all cases to wait for all to unite in a declaration of war. Wherever invasion came, it must be resisted; and thus it happened that sometimes one or two tribes would carry on a war, in which the nation had no concern. But this concession to the separate tribes did not extend so far as to allow them to conduct their own foreign relations. All were bound to unite against the common enemy; and so strong was the national feeling, that, instead of complaining that they were summoned to fight the battles of the nation, the tribes rather felt aggrieved and insulted when they were not called upon to aid the common cause. Indeed this was a neglect by which their harmony was more than once endangered, since, in the hurry of military preparations, the forms of public intercourse were sometimes disregarded.

This political organization was not without its disturbing forces. The tribes occasionally magnified their reserved rights, and betrayed a strong disposition to nullify the laws of the land. But it was understood, that in such cases the tribe did it at its peril, and the history of an act of nullification on the part of Benjamin showed, that there needed no force-bill there to sustain the authority of the national law. That tribe was prophetically described as a ravening wolf, — a figure very descriptive of its warlike and savage fierceness. A Levite, in travelling peaceably through, had one member of his family abused in such a manner as to cause her death. He made his appeal for retribution to all the other tribes. They assembled at once in convention at Mizpeh, heard the appeal to their justice, and sent a summons to the tribe of Benjamin to deliver up the delinquents according to the law. That tribe refused, and determined rather to dissolve the union, than to submit to the dictation of the majority. The rest of the tribes declared them in a state of rebellion, and proceeded against them accordingly. So stubborn and unbending was the spirit of the nullifying tribe, that the national army was twice defeated; but, in the third battle, Benjamin was routed with the loss of twenty-five thousand men. And there was no danger of the offence being repeated; for the offending city

was levelled with the ground, the country was made a wilderness, and six hundred men, posted on the inaccessible rock of Rimmon, were all that remained of the contumacious tribe.

With respect to the various departments of the national government, they were arranged in such a manner as to secure the liberty and prosperity of the people, their republican character depending upon their spirit, rather than on any given forms. There was no need of legislative action; since a code had been prepared, suited to all public and private relations then existing, and all which would be likely ever to arise. The social and domestic part of this law is, as has been suggested, extremely well suited to infant agricultural colonies, like those of our fathers, so far as they could apply. There were cases in which directions were given respecting divorce, vengeance for blood, and some other things, which would not answer for modern times; but it will be observed, that these practices are not enjoined by his law. They were practices then existing and common, which he introduced into his law only to limit and discourage them, with a view to their final abolition. So there were local regulations with respect to clothing and provisions, so clearly limited to their climate and people, that no other would think of adopting that portion of the law. Neither would the sanguinary penalties of his law answer for modern and more gentle times; death was his common punishment, because in all Israel there was but one prison, and that was—the grave.

But while there was no need of a Congress for the purpose of making laws, conventions were often required and often assembled for other public purposes; and these were attended by the *notables*, or renowned men of the congregation,—more properly those who were used to attend. It does not appear that delegates were elected by the people; but there were those who by prescription represented the people, and to whom, without any formal act, they looked in all matters of public concern. They were more like an assembly of ‘notables,’ than like the members of our public bodies; but the people evidently considered them as representing their interests, and their acts in turn were binding upon the people.

The judicial department was organized in such a manner as to insure the administration of justice without delay. The Hebrew statesman considered this trust so important, that he

intended to retain it in his own hands. But he soon found, that no human strength was equal to the labor; he therefore appointed others, and, at last, there were judges in almost every city. Not, however, those who bear that name in the Old Testament. Most of the Judges, as they are unappropriately called, were persons of no civil authority; some were mere partisan officers; there was but one, Samuel, who in any respect resembled a President of our Union.

With respect to the Executive department, it was the object of the founder of Israel to do, if possible, without one. Knowing how difficult it was to control power once intrusted to the hands of an individual, he wished to have executive purposes answered without setting apart a single person for that tempting distinction, trusting that, on emergencies, men would appear, who could discharge the duty required by the occasion, without any other commission than their own qualifications, acknowledged by the public voice. Such were the persons recorded in the book of Judges,—persons wholly without authority, starting up whenever and wherever they were needed, doing whatever was necessary, and then sinking back into the great body of the people, whence they sprang.

But he foresaw that this arrangement would not always be satisfactory to the Hebrews; indeed, that it might not always be adequate to public purposes; and that his people, too unenlightened to relish republican simplicity, would be misled by the example of surrounding nations, and would at last demand a king. He therefore made provision for this exigency in case it should arise, and, after solemn warnings of the danger of despotism, proceeded to enact, that, if they insisted upon having a king, he should be a king only in name, and nothing more than a popular magistrate in power. No king was ever to ascend the throne against the will of the people. When Saul, by acclamation, was called to this high station, Samuel prepared a writing, and deposited it in the sanctuary, where reference might afterwards be made to it, in case of royal usurpation. And when Saul was set aside, in consequence of mental derangement, David did not ascend the throne till he was called to it by the popular voice. For some time, he was acknowledged only as king of Judah, nor did he think of extending his authority over the other tribes, till their consent had been formally given; and even after the revolt of Absalom was suppressed, a new election on the part of the nation was

thought necessary, before David could re-ascend the throne. The king was restricted as to the public treasures. He was forbidden to keep a force of cavalry, since they were not wanted for defence, and would only be employed in foreign invasions. The words and spirit of the law enjoined upon the king to consider himself as one of the people, — never to suffer his heart to be lifted up above his brethren; thus the office was made as consistent as possible with republicanism and popular rights; and by a wise foresight, which conceded to the people what he knew they would require, he guarded at once against the dangers of despotism, and saved his institutions from being overthrown.

If this concession seem inconsistent with republicanism on the part of the Hebrew statesman, it must be remembered that it was equally inconsistent with his own views of what was best for the people. It was forced upon him, as some other things were, by a tendency of popular feeling, which there was no resisting. The spirit of his law was wholly against it; all who afterwards maintained the spirit of his law, were equally strong against it. This was the case with Samuel, — that perfect example of a popular magistrate, — who remonstrated solemnly and eloquently with the people against their rash determination to have a king. He might have secured the throne for himself and his children; but this he disdained to do. He told the people that they were fastening upon themselves an Oriental despotism; that their kings would rule them with a rod of iron, and they would repent when it was too late. The scene, where he resigns his own authority to the convention of the people, and calls on each man who had been injured by his public acts, to step forward and accuse him, is one of the finest scenes in history. They all reply, with one voice, "Thou hast injured, oppressed, and defrauded none."

The truth was, that all who followed the maxims of the founder of the state, set their faces against usurpation, and maintained the rights of the people at all hazards, and in the most disastrous times. When Saul, his head turned by success, undertook to unite the sacerdotal with the royal power, a step unconstitutional in itself, and dangerous to freedom, the republican spirit of the nation took the alarm at once. From that moment, Samuel and other friends of liberty felt, that he was not the man to govern a free people. We have seen how cautiously David, who was a better politician, proceeded, never

attempting to claim the royal authority till it was freely conceded by the people, who were also induced by his forbearance to give him the right of naming his own successor. The reign of Solomon was full of public discontent, occasioned by taxation, and his life was made wretched by the curses both loud and deep which followed him to the grave. When his son came forward in his stead, only Judah and Benjamin acknowledged him. The rest of the tribes offered to do it on conditions which were not accepted. They then, not rebelliously, but in the exercise of an undoubted right, rejected him, chose their own sovereign, and established a separate kingdom. All this was the action of the republican spirit, and that spirit was inspired, cherished, and sanctioned by the constitution. Who, then, can doubt whether it was a constitution intended for the free?

If any doubt remained upon the subject, it would be removed by an express provision in the constitution itself, that it was not to be considered in force till it had been submitted to the people, and formally accepted by them all. The place and manner, in which it should be accepted, were also pointed out. When they were come into the land of promise, they were to be assembled in an amphitheatre formed by two mountains,—Ebal, a bleak, frowning rock towering on one side, and Gerizim, springing up covered with verdure and beauty on the other. The one height was a prophetic monument of the prosperity and loveliness, which would follow the observance of those institutions: the other was expressive of the barrenness and desolation, which a disregard of their constitution would inevitably bring upon their country; which indeed it has brought, so that, even to this day, the traveller finds the land of promise, through all its borders, as dreary and sterile as the peak of that dismal rock. There the tribes were ranged in order to hear its provisions, and there they signified their acceptance, by an act of free choice, which was binding on themselves and their children. Every seven years it was publicly read over, and a new oath of allegiance was taken by the people.

Thus we see that the Hebrew law, in its substance and in its forms, was not only republican, but that it bore in its leading features a striking resemblance to our own. And again we ask, if it is not wonderful, that, in the midst of barbarism and darkness, surrounded by examples of slavery and oppression, hearing no sounds but those of violence, and seeing no

soil that was not stained with blood, a legislator should have founded a government on principles of peace, humanity, and social order, carried out as far as in the freest government now existing in this world.

But it may be said, these institutions did not secure the prosperity of the Hebrew nation; on the contrary, their whole history is a record of degeneracy, and the suffering which followed it. But were his institutions to blame for this? He told them, that it would be so. He told them, that, the moment his constitution was violated, they would begin their downward march to ruin. So long as it was maintained, they prospered; when they disregarded his directions, they began to fall. Now, to make him responsible for this, is as unfair as the way in which some reproach the Christian religion. They say, "Look at the disputes, the passions, the corruption of Christians." What of it? Is it Christianity which makes them quarrel and sin? So far from it, Christianity positively forbids all those offences; and if they only regarded it, these things would be done away. There is not one principle,—one text or one letter of Christianity, which leads to these things; all, on the contrary, if regarded, tend to prevent these things; and yet there are those, who accuse Christianity as the cause and author of all that it forbids. And they are the persons who charge the Hebrew institutions as the cause of the degeneracy and ruin of the Jews.

But they did fall; and why?—Because the people were not good enough for their institutions. There was not among them that degree of intelligence and virtue, which was necessary in order to keep such institutions in successful operation. For these institutions do not exist independent of the people. The people, in every free country, are the state. If they are corrupt, the state is corrupt; and, when this is once found to be the case, the fate of the nation is sealed. It is gone, past all mercy and redemption, nor can any temporary expedients prevent its ultimate fall. In the dome of St. Peter's at Rome, which Michael Angelo boasted that he had suspended in the clouds, certain fissures have been discovered; to save this glory of architecture, they have bound it with a vast iron chain. Such is the way with republics. When they begin to fall, they are upheld for a season, as Rome was by Cæsar, by some strong hand, which binds them with a mighty chain; but, when the

first small chasm begins to creep along the wall, it is a sign,—an unfailing sign, that their days are numbered.

Such has been the fate of other republics; who shall assure us that it will not be so with ours? It is not despotism,—it is not the iron chain, that we have reason to dread. No, it is rather the unsoundness in the fabric, which renders it necessary to use that chain,—without which no one would ever think of using it. Despotism is only the strong hand, which comes to hold together for a season decaying institutions, which are already tumbling to their fall. There are some who think they can trace such crevices in the walls of our republic;—there are some who think at times, that they hear hollow sounds in its foundations, as if the stones were beginning to burst asunder. There is hope,—there is reason to hope for better things; but, if it should be so, our fall will be owing to the same cause with that of the Hebrew republic,—that we are not worthy to be free. The glorious gift of freedom must be reserved in the treasuries of Heaven for some other race, more enlightened and virtuous, and therefore more blessed, than ours.

And now let me ask, What other legislator of ancient times is still exerting any influence upon the world? What philosopher, what statesman of ancient times, can boast a single disciple now? What other voice comes down to us, over the stormy waves of time? But this man is at this day,—at this hour,—exerting a mighty influence over millions; the whole Hebrew nation do homage to his illustrious name. Though the daily sacrifice has ceased, and the distinction of the tribes is lost,—though the temple has not left one stone upon another, and the altar-fires have been extinguished long ago,—still wherever a Jew is found,—and they are found wherever the foot of an adventurer travels,—he is a living monument of the power which the great Hebrew statesman still has over the minds and hearts of his countrymen.

And now let us take one glance at the death of this prophet,—the close of a life so laborious and honored. Up to his one hundred and twentieth year, his eye was not dim, nor had his strength abated. But now,—when he stands almost on the edge of the promised land, his last hour of mortal life is come. To conduct his people to that land had been his daily effort, and his nightly dream; and yet he is not permitted to enter it, though it would never have been the home of Israel,

but for him. He ascends a mountain to die, and there the land of promise spreads out its romantic landscape at his feet. There is Gilead, with its deep valleys and forest-covered hills ; there are the rich plains and pastures of Dan ; there is Judah with its rocky heights, and Jericho with its palm-trees and rose-gardens ; there is the Jordan, seen from Lebanon, downward winding over its yellow sands ; the long blue line of the Mediterranean can be seen over the mountain battlements of the west. On this magnificent death-bed, the Statesman of Israel breathed his last. Lest the gratitude which so often follows the dead, though denied to the living, should pay him divine honors, they buried him in darkness and silence, and no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day.

W. B. O. P.

ART. II.—*Report on the State of Education in Bengal.*
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8vo. pp. 137.

THE English government has been turning its attention for some time towards the establishment of a system of national education, to be applied, with the necessary modifications, at home and in the Colonies ; and, as a preliminary step, it is taking the proper measures for ascertaining what is already done to supply this want, by the people themselves, or by benevolent societies or foundations. The Report before us, which is intended to give the information required respecting the existing state of education in Bengal, was drawn up by Mr. Adam, whose name is familiar to most of our readers as having been a Unitarian Missionary for some time at Calcutta. If, in his efforts in connexion with the Board of Education, he succeeds in determining the government to the adoption of some wise plan of general instruction and civilization in British India, he will do more, though indirectly, for the ultimate diffusion of pure Christianity in that country, than all the missionaries put together. We think, moreover, that he is right in the general principle, that the plan adopted by the government for the improvement of the morals and intellect of the native population,

should be, as far as practicable, based upon and accommodated to the indigenous institutions for this purpose, closely interwoven as these are with the habits of the people, and the customs of the country, and all other peculiarities of climate and physical and mental constitution, and, we may add, by no means so few or contemptible in themselves, as we had supposed.

Mr. Adam divides the existing educational institutions of India into four classes. 1. *Indigenous Elementary Schools*, or schools in which the elements of knowledge are taught, and which owe their existence to, and are supported by the natives themselves, in contradistinction to those that are supported by religious or philanthropic societies. 2. *Elementary Schools, not Indigenous*, or schools for elementary instruction, attended by the native children, but supported by, and entirely under the control of foreign residents or benevolent associations. 3. *Indigenous Schools of Learning*, or colleges in which the higher branches of an Oriental education are provided for at the expense and under the sole direction of natives. 4. *English Colleges and Schools*, including all those institutions, both of a higher and lower grade, one of whose principal objects is to teach the English language, and through that medium European science and literature.

We have been most interested in the accounts given in the Report of the Indigenous Elementary Schools, from which it appears, as Mr. Adam says, that the system of village schools has long been extensively prevalent in Bengal, and that the design to give education to their male children must be deeply seated in the minds of parents, even of the humblest classes.

“A distinguished member of the General Committee of Public Instruction in a minute on the subject expressed the opinion, that if one rupee *per mensem* were expended on each existing village school in the Lower Provinces, the amount would probably fall little short of 12 lakhs of rupees per annum. This supposes that there are 100,000 such schools in Bengal and Behar; and, assuming the population of those two provinces to be 40,000,000, there would be a village school for every 400 persons. There are no *data* in this country known to me by which to determine, out of this number, the proportion of school-going children, or of children capable of going to school, or of children of the age at which, according to the custom of the country, it is usual to go to school. In Prussia it has been ascertained by actual census, that, in a population of 12,256,725, there were 4,487,461 children under fourteen years of age, which gives 366 children for every 1,000 inhabitants,

or about eleven-thirtieths of the nation. Of this entire population of children it is calculated that three-sevenths are of an age to go to school, admitting education in the schools to begin at the age of seven years complete, and there is thus in the entire Prussian monarchy the number of 1,823,200 children capable of receiving the benefits of education. These proportions will not strictly apply to the juvenile population of this country, because the usual age for going to school is from five to six, and the usual age for leaving school is from ten to twelve instead of fourteen. There are thus two sources of discrepancy. The school-going age is shorter in India than in Prussia, which must have the effect of diminishing the total number of school-going children; while, on the other hand, that diminished number is not exposed to the causes of mortality to which the total school-going population of Prussia is liable from the age of twelve to fourteen. In want of more precise *data*, let us suppose that these two contrary discrepancies balance each other, and we shall then be at liberty to apply the Prussian proportions to this country. Taking therefore eleven-thirtieths of the above-mentioned 400 persons, and three-sevenths of the result, it will follow that in Bengal and Behar there is on an average a village school for every sixty-three children of the school-going age. These children, however, include girls as well as boys; and, as there are no indigenous girls' schools, if we take the male and female children to be in equal or nearly equal proportions, there will appear to be an indigenous elementary school for every thirty-one or thirty-two boys." — pp. 8, 9.

But lest our readers should form too high an opinion of the state of elementary education in these countries, it will be proper to make them acquainted with the quantity and quality of instruction given in these seminaries.

"The education of the Bengalee children, as has been just stated, generally commences when they are five or six years old and terminates in five years, before the mind can be fully awakened to a sense of the advantages of knowledge or the reason sufficiently matured to acquire it. The teachers depend entirely upon their scholars for subsistence, and, being little respected and poorly rewarded, there is no encouragement for persons of character, talent, or learning to engage in the occupation. These schools are generally held in the houses of some of the most respectable native inhabitants or very near them. All the children of the family are educated in the vernacular language of the country; and in order to increase the emoluments of the teachers, they are allowed to introduce, as pupils, as many respectable children as they can procure in the neighbourhood. The scholars begin with tracing the vowels and consonants with the finger on a sand-board and afterwards on the floor

with a pencil of steatite or white crayon ; and this exercise is continued for eight or ten days. They are next instructed to write on the palm-leaf with a reed-pen held in the fist, not with the fingers, and with ink made of charcoal which rubs out, joining vowels to the consonants, forming compound letters, syllables, and words, and learning tables of numeration, money, weight, and measure, and the correct mode of writing the distinctive names of persons, castes, and places. This is continued about a year. The iron style is now used only by the teacher in sketching on the palm-leaf the letters which the scholars are required to trace with ink. They are next advanced to the study of arithmetic and the use of the plantain-leaf in writing with ink made of lamp-black, which is continued about six months, during which they are taught addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division, and the simplest cases of the mensuration of land and commercial and agricultural accounts, together with the modes of address proper in writing letters to different persons. The last stage of this limited course of instruction is that in which the scholars are taught to write with lamp-black ink on paper, and are further instructed in agricultural and commercial accounts and in the composition of letters. In country places, the rules of arithmetic are principally applied to agricultural, and in towns to commercial accounts ; but in both town and country schools the instruction is superficial and defective. It may be safely affirmed, that, in no instance whatever, is the orthography of the language of the country acquired in those schools ; for, although in some of them two or three of the more advanced boys write out small portions of the most popular poetical compositions of the country, yet the manuscript copy itself is so inaccurate, that they only become confirmed in a most vitiated manner of spelling, which the imperfect qualifications of the teacher do not enable him to correct. The scholars are entirely without instruction, both literary and oral, regarding the personal virtues and domestic and social duties. The teacher, in virtue of his character or in the way of advice or reproof, exercises no moral influence on the character of his pupils. For the sake of pay, he performs a menial service in the spirit of a menial. On the other hand, there is no text or school-book used containing any moral truths or liberal knowledge ; so that education, being limited entirely to accounts, tends rather to narrow the mind and confine its attention to sordid gain, than to improve the heart and enlarge the understanding. This description applies, as far as I at present know, to all indigenous elementary schools throughout Bengal." — pp. 10, 11.

In treating particularly of the District of Hooghly, the Report says :

"The indigenous elementary schools amongst Hindoos in this

district are numerous, and they are divisible into two classes; first, those which derive their principal support from the patronage of a single wealthy family; and secondly, those which are destitute of such special patronage, and are dependent upon the general support of the native community in the town or village in which they are established. The former are the most numerous, there being scarcely a village without one or more of them. The primary object is the education of the children of the opulent Hindoos by whom they are chiefly supported; but as the teacher seldom receives more than three rupees a month from that source, he is allowed to collect from the neighbourhood as many additional pupils as he can obtain or conveniently manage. These pay him at the rate of two to eight annas per month, in addition to which each pupil gives him such a quantity of rice, pulse, oil, salt, and vegetables at the end of each month as will suffice for one day's maintenance. Sometimes the teacher, in addition to the salary he receives, is fed and clothed by his patron. Such schools have seldom any house built or exclusively appropriated for the use of the teacher and his pupils. The second class of schools is not so numerous as the former, but they afford a better maintenance to the teacher. In general the pupils pay him from four to eight annas per month while they write upon leaves, and from eight annas to one rupee, according to their means, when they write upon paper; in addition to which he also receives one day's maintenance per month from each pupil. Another perquisite of the teacher is a piece of cloth from each scholar on promotion to a higher class; but this is not one of the conditions of admission, and depends upon the liberality of the parents. The number of scholars in each school of either description averages thirty, some schools in populous towns having more, and others in small villages having less. The teachers are either Brahmans or Sudras. If the former are respectable and learned, they gain a comfortable subsistence; but the majority of them do not take sufficient pains to write a neat hand, and they have in general only a superficial acquaintance with arithmetic and accounts. Books are not in use in this class of elementary schools. The instruction comprises writing on the palm-leaf and on Bengalee paper, and arithmetic. As soon as the scholar is able to write a tolerable hand and has acquired some knowledge of accounts, he in general leaves school. In this district they enter school usually at the age of six and remain four or five years." — pp. 61, 62.

Some important reforms, we are happy to find, have lately been introduced into schools of this description, particularly in Calcutta, through the exertions of the Calcutta School Society.

“Printed, instead of manuscript, school-books are now in common use. The branches formerly taught are now taught more thoroughly; and instruction is extended to subjects formerly neglected, viz., the orthography of the Bengalee language, geography, and moral truths and obligations. The mode of instruction has been improved. Formerly the pupils were arranged in different divisions according as they were learning to write on the ground with chalk, on the palm-leaf, on the plantain-leaf, and on paper, respectively; and each boy was taught separately by the school-master in a distinct lesson. The system of teaching with the assistance of monitors and of arranging the boys in classes, formed with reference to similarity of ability or proficiency, has been adopted; and as in some instances it has enabled the teachers to increase the number of their pupils very considerably, and thereby their own emoluments, it is hoped that it will ultimately have the effect of encouraging men of superior acquirements to undertake the duties of instructors of youth.” — p. 12.

From the statistics given in the Report respecting the indigenous schools for the higher branches of learning, it is plain that the class of men in Bengal who either have received, or are engaged in giving or receiving a Hindoo collegiate education, is large and influential. “The principle,” we are told, “which secures the perpetuation of these institutions, as long as the Hindoo religion subsists, and is professed by the mass of the people, and by a majority of the wealthy and powerful, is, that it is deemed an act of religious merit to acquire a knowledge of the Hindoo *shastras*, or to extend the knowledge of them either by direct instruction, or by pecuniary support or assistance, given either to scholars or teachers.” But the following description of the Hindoo colleges, is not such as to authorize us to expect that they will do much to help onward civilization. After stating that the buildings are generally constructed of clay, the Report goes on :

“Sometimes three or five rooms are erected, and in others nine or eleven, with a reading-room which is also of clay. These huts are frequently erected at the expense of the teacher, who not only solicits alms to raise the building but also to feed his pupils. In some cases rent is paid for the ground; but the ground is commonly, and in particular instances both the ground and the expenses of the building are a gift. After a school-room and lodging-rooms have been thus built, to secure the success of the school the teacher invites a few Brahmans and respectable inhabitants to an entertainment, at the close of which the Brahmans are dismissed with

some trifling presents. If the teacher finds a difficulty in obtaining scholars, he begins the college with a few junior relatives, and by instructing them and distinguishing himself in the disputations that take place on public occasions, he establishes his reputation. The school opens early every morning by the teacher and pupils assembling in the open reading-room, when the different classes read in turn. Study is continued till towards mid-day, after which three hours are devoted to bathing, worship, eating, and sleep; and at three they resume their studies which are continued till twilight. Nearly two hours are then devoted to evening worship, eating, smoking, and relaxation, and the studies are again resumed and continued till ten or eleven at night. The evening studies consist of a revision of the lessons already learned, in order that what the pupils have read may be impressed more distinctly on the memory. These studies are frequently pursued, especially by the students of logic, till two or three o'clock in the morning.

“There are three kinds of colleges in Bengal, one in which chiefly grammar, general literature, and rhetoric, and occasionally the great mythological poems and law are taught; a second in which chiefly law and sometimes the mythological poems are studied; and a third in which logic is made the principal object of attention. In all these colleges select works are read and their meaning explained; but instruction is not conveyed in the form of lectures. In the first class of colleges, the pupils repeat assigned lessons from the grammar used in each college, and the teacher communicates the meaning of the lessons after they have been committed to memory. In the others, the pupils are divided into classes according to their progress. The pupils of each class having one or more books before them, seat themselves in the presence of the teacher, when the best reader of the class reads aloud, and the teacher gives the meaning as often as asked, and thus they proceed from day to day till the work is completed. The study of grammar is pursued during two, three, or six years, and where the work of Panini is studied not less than ten, and sometimes twelve years are devoted to it. As soon as a student has obtained such a knowledge of grammar as to be able to read and understand a poem, a law book, or a work on philosophy, he may commence his course of reading also, and carry on at the same time the remainder of his grammar studies. Those who study law or logic continue reading either at one college or another for six, eight, or even ten years. When a person has obtained all the knowledge possessed by one teacher, he makes some respectful excuse to his guide and avails himself of the instructions of another.”— pp. 20, 21.

It would also seem that in the matter of college vacations, and the bestowment of literary honors, no extraordinary degree

of sagacity, or enlargement of mind, is evinced. We copy again from the Report.

“The colleges are invariably closed and all study suspended on the eighth day of the waxing or waning of the moon; on the day in which it may happen to thunder; whenever a person or animal passes between the teacher and pupil while reading; when an honorable person arrives, or a guest; at the festival of Saraswati during three days; in some parts during the whole of the rainy season or at least during two months, which include the Durga, the Kali, and other festivals, and at many other times. When a student is about to commence the study of law or of logic, his fellow-students with the concurrence and approbation of the teacher, bestow on him an honorary title descriptive of the nature of his pursuit, and always differing from any title enjoyed by any of his learned ancestors. In some parts of the country, the title is bestowed by an assembly of pundits convened for the purpose; and in others the assembly is held in the presence of a Raja or Zamindar who may be desirous of encouraging learning, and who at the same time bestows a dress of honor on the student and places a mark on his forehead. When the student finally leaves college and enters on the business of life, he is commonly addressed by that title.” — p. 22.

The Hindoo colleges in the District of Nuddea are among those in the highest repute. In 1829, they were twenty-five in number.

“These are called *tols*, and consist of a thatched chamber for the pundit and the class, and two or three ranges of mud-hovels in which the students reside. The pundit does not live on the spot, but comes to the *tol* every day on which study is lawful at an early hour, and remains till sunset. The huts are built and kept in repair at his expense, and he not only gives instruction gratuitously, but assists to feed and clothe his class, his means of so doing being derived from former grants by the raja of Nuddea, and presents made to him by the zemindars in the neighbourhood at religious festivals, the value of which much depends on his celebrity as a teacher. The students are all full-grown men, some of them old men. The usual number in a *tol* is about twenty or twenty-five, but in some places, where the pundit is of high repute, there are from fifty to sixty. The whole number is said to be between 500 and 600. The greater proportion consists of natives of Bengal, but there are many from remote parts of India, especially from the south. There are some from Nepaul and Assam, and many from the eastern districts, especially Tirhoot. Few if any have means of subsistence of their own. Their dwelling they obtain from their teacher, and their clothes and food in presents from him and the

shopkeepers and landholders in the town or neighbourhood. At the principal festivals they disperse for a few days in quest of alms, when they collect enough to sustain them till the next interval of leisure. The chief study at Nuddea is nyayu or logic, there are also some establishments for tuition in law, chiefly in the works of Raghunanda, a celebrated Nuddea pundit, and in one or two places grammar is taught. Some of the students, particularly several from the Dekhin, speak Sanscrit with great fluency and correctness."— pp. 85, 86.

Of the means employed by the Mohammadan population of Bengal, to preserve the appropriate learning of their faith and race, it is impossible, according to the Report, to speak with much distinctness or confidence, partly because these means are less systematic and organized than those adopted by the Hindoos, and partly because less inquiry has been made, and less information is possessed respecting them, by the officers of government.

"It is believed, however," says Mr. Adam, "that in the Lower, as well as the Western Provinces there are many private Mohammadan schools, begun and conducted by individuals of studious habits who have made the cultivation of letters the chief occupation of their lives, and by whom the profession of learning is followed, not merely as a means of livelihood, but as a meritorious work productive of moral and religious benefit to themselves and their fellow creatures. Few accordingly give instruction for any stipulated pecuniary remuneration, and what they may receive is both tendered and accepted as an interchange of kindness and civility between the master and his disciple. The number of those who thus resort to the private instructions of masters is not great. Their attendance and application are guided by the mutual convenience and inclination of both parties, neither of whom is placed under any system or particular rule of conduct. The success and progress of the scholar depend entirely on his own assiduity. The least dispute or disagreement puts an end to study, no check being imposed on either party, and no tie subsisting between them beyond that of casual reciprocal advantages which a thousand accidents may weaken or dissolve. The number of pupils seldom exceeds six. They are sometimes permanent residents under the roof of their masters, and in other instances live in their own families; and in the former case, if Musalmans, they are supported at the teacher's expense. In return, they are required to carry messages, buy articles in the bazar, and perform menial services in the house. The scholars in consequence often change their teachers, learning the alphabet and the other introductory parts of the

Persian language of one, the Pandnameh of a second, the Gulistan of a third, and so on from one place to another, till they are able to write a tolerable letter and think they have learned enough to assume the title of Munshi, when they look out for some permanent means of subsistence as hangers-on at the Company's Courts. The chief aim is the attainment of such a proficiency in the Persian language as may enable the student to earn a livelihood; but not unfrequently the Arabic is also studied, its grammar, literature, theology, and law. A proper estimate of such a desultory and capricious mode of education is impossible." — pp. 23, 24.

The elementary schools, not indigenous, have had to contend with many obstacles growing out of the prejudices of the natives, their want of confidence in the foreign residents by whom these schools have been established and are controlled, and the narrow and short-sighted policy in which the schools themselves have, in some cases, been conceived and governed. A large proportion of them have been opened in the neighbourhood of the missionary stations, and are under the superintendence of the missionaries. It is to be hoped that these gentlemen have had experience enough to convince them, that, if they would make these schools extensively useful, it must be by conducting them on the most liberal plan, by confining them almost entirely to the children of the poor, and by adapting them, rather to improve by serving as models, then to supersede the indigenous institutions. We also hope, that their efforts will not be unavailing to do away the misconceptions, which lead native parents utterly to neglect the education of their daughters.

The growing desire, amounting even to a passion, on the part of the natives in some places, to give their sons, and their countrymen generally, the advantages of English instruction, and the efforts and sacrifices they have made and are making among themselves for this object, far exceed the common belief, and will be hailed by all as a most favorable omen. The more so, when it is understood from the author of the Report, that within his own knowledge, fifteen years ago, a European of reputed talents and acquirements, resident in Calcutta, in vain sought to obtain a humble livelihood by opening an English school for the Bengalese. The following extract relates exclusively to English schools established and supported by natives in a single District, that to which Calcutta belongs.

"The first English school of this kind is situated at Bhowani-

pore, and is called the Union School, in consequence of its having been formed by the union of two such schools respectively established at Bhowanipore and Kidderpore. They were established without any communication with Europeans by native gentlemen for the instruction of Hindoo children in English, and were at first supported by voluntary subscription. In May, 1829, they were placed upon an improved footing; and in the management of them, Europeans and natives were then first associated. They were opened to pay-scholars, and the Calcutta School Society made them a monthly grant towards their support; but, that resource not proving adequate to their wants, they applied to the General Committee of Public Instruction for assistance. Their immediate wants extended only to about 500 rupees for the necessary school-furniture; but the General Committee placed 1,000 rupees at the disposal of the School Society for the use of each school, considering it to be 'a great object to establish schools of this description which might in time serve as preparatory steps to the Hindoo college, and relieve that institution of part of the duty of elementary tuition.' The united school is supported partly by public subscriptions and partly by the fees of the scholars, of whom there are at present about 150. This is a day-school, instruction being given every day of the week from ten to three except on Sundays.

"Another English school of this description is situated at Simliya, and has about 70 scholars. It is exclusively a pay-school, having no other resources except the fees paid by the scholars. There are three teachers, one Englishman and two Hindoos.

"A third school of this kind is situated in Upper Circular Road, and has 30 or 40 scholars. It is a pay-school, and the proprietor is a Christian, who supports himself by teaching.

"A fourth pay-school is situated in Burra Bazar, and has 30 or 40 scholars taught by a native.

"The most popular school of this description is situated at Sobha Bazar, and has about 300 scholars. The proprietors are a Christian and a native, who employ several assistant teachers under them. This is also a pay-school, and the charge is four rupees per month for each scholar; in some the charge is three rupees per month, and in others it is not more than two rupees.

"Besides these pay-schools, there are native free-schools for the gratuitous instruction of native youth in English, supported either by public subscription or private benevolence.

"The principal one of these is called the Hindoo Free School, and is situated at Arpooly. It has five Hindoo teachers who instruct 150 scholars. The limited resources of the school do not enable the managers to command the services of the teachers except in the morning between six and nine o'clock, to which hours their instructions are confined.

"Another school of this kind is called the Hindoo Benevolent Institution, and is entirely supported by two benevolent native gentlemen. Three or four native teachers instruct about 100 scholars in English. It is a morning school.

"Another school of this description is situated at Chor Bagan, and is also supported by two native gentlemen. Four native teachers instruct about 60 scholars in English in the morning hours." — pp. 39–41.

Besides these, there are English schools in almost every District, designed chiefly for the instruction of children of Christian parents, but from which natives are not excluded. There are also two English colleges: Bishop's College at Calcutta, and Serampore College, in a Danish settlement of that name. The funds of the former have been derived, for the most part, from the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, and other societies and individuals in the Church of England, and the whole constitution and government are under Episcopal influence and discipline. Those of the latter are dependent, for the most part, on subscriptions and contributions collected among the liberal and munificent friends of the missionary cause, in England, Scotland and the United States, the college itself, we believe, not being pledged to any denomination of Christians, though it has been built up mainly by the Baptists, and the instruction is chiefly in the hands of their missionaries at that station. Both have been in operation about fifteen years. The following is given as the most recent authentic report of the condition of the institution at Serampore.

"On the 31st December, 1834, there were in the college 10 European and East-Indian students; 48 native Christian students; and 34 native students not Christian. The European and East-Indian students are taught Hebrew, Greek, Latin, Bengalee, and mathematics, and attend lectures on mental philosophy, chemistry, and ancient and ecclesiastical history. The native Christian students and the native students not Christian are taught Sanscrit, Bengalee, and English, and they pursue their studies together in no classification except what is required from the difference of their attainments. The non-Christian students are the sons of Brahmans and other natives residing in Serampore and its vicinity, who neither board in the college nor do any thing that may compromise their caste, but attend daily for instruction on their tutors, and at the lectures delivered in the college. In Latin — Cicero, Horace, and Juvenal are read; and in Greek — Homer, Xenophon, and Demosthenes. The Bengalee language is sedulously cultivated,

and the chemical studies are grounded on a treatise drawn up by Professor Mack as a text-book. The logical course includes a summary of the inductive or Baconian system, as well as an analysis of the ancient or Aristotelian method, and an explanation of the nature, the varieties, and the laws of evidence; while the divinity course comprehends a series of lectures on some book of Scripture read in the original language, and on the principles of biblical interpretation." — pp. 70, 71.

The Report contains a full, interesting, and on the whole, encouraging account of the origin, history, and policy of these institutions; though it is impossible to conceal the fact, that they have not, as yet, accomplished any thing like so much as might reasonably have been expected from so large an expenditure of money, labor, and good intention. But those who have the management of them are growing wiser every day. Without losing sight of the primary purpose of the East-Indian colleges, as connected with the dissemination of Christianity, they are continually adopting a more liberal course in regard to notions not Christian, and making more and more account of the bearings and influence which these institutions ought to have on the general interests of education. In this point of view, we regard them as destined to prove a great and universal blessing to Bengal, by making literature conspire with religion in becoming the vehicle of European civilization.

ED.

ART. III. — 1. *Introduction to the History of Philosophy.*

By VICTOR COUSIN, Professor of Philosophy of the Faculty of Literature at Paris. Translated from the French. By H. G. LINBERG. Boston. 1832.

2. *Elements of Psychology, included in a critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding.* By the Same. Translated from the French, with an Introduction, Notes, and Additions; by C. S. HENRY: Hartford, (Ct.) 1834.

3. *Fragmens Philosophiques.* By the Same. 2d edition. Paris. 1833.

WHOEVER would see the American people as remarkable for their philosophy as they are for their industry, enterprise,

and political freedom, must be gratified that these works have already attracted considerable attention among us, and are beginning to exert no little influence on our philosophical speculations. It is a proof that our philosophical speculations are taking a wholesome direction, and especially that the great problems of mental and moral science are assuming in our eyes a new importance, and calling to their solution a greater and an increasing amount of mind. We are, in fact, turning our attention to matters of deeper interest, than those which relate merely to the physical well-being of humanity. We are beginning to perceive that Providence, in the peculiar circumstances in which it has placed us, in the free institutions it has given us, has made it our duty to bring out the ideal man, and to prove, by a practical demonstration, what the human race may be, when and where it has free scope for the full and harmonious developement of all its faculties. In proportion as we perceive and comprehend this duty, we cannot fail to inquire for a sound philosophy, one which will enumerate and characterize all the faculties of the human soul, and determine the proper order and most efficient means of their developement.

These works will, we think, afford us important aid in rescuing the Church, and religious matters in general, from their present lamentable condition. Religion subsists among us, and always will, for it has its seat in the human heart; but to a great extent it has lost its hold upon the understanding. Men are no longer satisfied with the arguments by which it has heretofore been defended; the old forms, in which it has been clothed, fail to meet the new wants which time and events have developed, and there is everywhere, in a greater or less degree, a tendency to doubt, unbelief, indifference, infidelity. We have outgrown tradition, and authority no longer seems to us a valid argument. We demand conviction. We do not, as in the middle ages, go to religion to prove our philosophy, but to our philosophy to prove our religion. This may or may not be an evil, but it is unavoidable. We must accept and conform to it. Henceforth religion must, if sustained at all, except as a vague, intangible sentiment, be sustained by philosophy. To doubt this, is to prove ourselves ignorant of the age in which we live.

But the philosophy, which has hitherto prevailed, and whose results now control our reasonings, cannot sustain religion.

Everybody knows, that our religion and our philosophy are at war. We are religious only at the expense of our logic. This accounts for the fact, that, on the one hand, we disclaim logic, unchurch philosophy, and pronounce it a dangerous thing to reason; while, on the other, we reject religion, declaim against the clergy, and represent it exceedingly foolish to believe. This opposition cannot be concealed. It is found not only in the same community, but to a great extent in the same individual. The result cannot be doubtful. Philosophy will gain the victory. The friends of religion may seek to prevent it, labor to divert men's minds from inquiry by engaging them in vast associations for practical benevolence, or to frighten them from philosophizing by powerful appeals to hopes and fears; but the desire to philosophize, to account to ourselves for what we believe, cannot be suppressed. Instead, then, of quarrelling with this state of things, instead of denouncing the religious as do professed free inquirers, or the philosophizers, as is the case with too many of the friends of religion, we should reëxamine our philosophy, and inquire if there be not a philosophy true to human nature, and able to explain and verify, instead of destroying, the religious belief of mankind? We evidently need such a philosophy; such a philosophy we believe there is, and we know of no works so well fitted to assist us in finding it, as those of M. Cousin.

We welcome the appearance of M. Cousin's works, also, as indications, perhaps we should say, results, of a revolution which, within a few years, has been effected in French philosophy. As Americans, we cannot be indifferent to France. She is associated with what is most soul-stirring in our national history, and with much that is most hallowed in our memories. She has exerted by her opinions, her literature, and especially by her philosophy, and must long continue to exert, a great influence on our destiny. Aside, then, from the general concern which we take in what affects our race for good or for evil, and the deep sympathy we feel with man wherever and whatever we find him, we cannot but take a very great interest in every thing which relates to France; and we consider it of vast importance to ourselves, the future welfare of our own country, that she has renounced that chilling materialism, which was preached with such fervent and fanatical zeal by her philosophers of the last century.

What has been known, and what is now considered by

many, in an especial sense, as French philosophy, is sensualism, so called from its professing to trace back all the facts of consciousness to sensation. France was ready for this philosophy when Voltaire introduced it to her acquaintance, from England, where he had borrowed it from Locke and his disciples. Condillac simplified it, gave it systematic unity, constructed its logic, and fitted it for empire, which it obtained and held for nearly a century, without contradiction and without example in the whole history of philosophy. It penetrated everywhere, into the court and saloons, into literature, the sacred desk, and, as the most decisive proof of its popularity, even into all the branches of instruction.* The Revolution, in 1789, came to swallow it up for a time, as it did every thing else but unchained passion, exalted enthusiasm, and terrible energy in action; but, as soon as the storm abated and there was a momentary calm, under the Directory, it reappeared and resumed its dominion. No one thought of questioning its legitimacy. That brilliant *coterie* who philosophized with so much éclat at the close of the last century and during the first days of the present, among whom were Cabanis, Destutt de Tracy, Volney, Degerando, and Laromiguière, however they might differ among themselves on some minor points, all received sensualism, systematized and perfected by Condillac, as the last word of philosophy. In their opinion, so far as its essential principles are concerned, Condillac had finished philosophy, and left nothing for future workmen but to illustrate and adorn it. Even down to the last moments of the Empire, sensualism was philosophy *par excellence*, and scarcely a scientific voice above a whisper was heard against it.

But its reign is now ended, and its glory departed. The works before us, together with their popularity in France, and that of their author, are sufficient proof of it. Providence, doubtless, assigned it an important mission; but that mission ended with the destruction of the old Catholic Church and the feudal monarchy, and, though it continued to reign some time after, it was as a tradition rather than as a living system.

* See Damiron's *Essai sur l'Histoire de la Philosophie en France du XIXe Siècle*, in 2 vols., 8vo. A work we can recommend without reserve, to all who would become acquainted with French philosophy during the present century. We think we have seen a third edition of it. Ours is the second: Paris, 1828.

It indeed maintained nearly the same extent of territory, exhibited the usual emblems, and preserved the customary forms of authority ; but its internal power was much weakened and its vital energy nearly exhausted. Napoleon disliked it, — not because it was sensualism, but because its most zealous adherents were the friends of liberty, and the firm but orderly opponents of the despotism he established, — and the weight of his displeasure, together with the fact that he exerted the whole energy of his government to make soldiers instead of philosophers, could not fail to hasten its downfall. Some of its friends, especially Laromiguière, in order to improve it and facilitate its defence, departed from some of its essential principles, and aided in destroying, while intending to preserve it. Several individuals, without having any clear perceptions of a different system, opposed it by their strong instinctive tendency to spiritualism. Among these were Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Chateaubriand, and Madame de Staël, who by their love and praise of nature, their sense of the beautiful, their enthusiasm, their appeals to the heart, the moral and religious sentiments and regrets which they awakened, prepared the way for a sounder philosophy, one loftier in its conceptions and truer to human nature. In 1811, M. Royer-Collard, a disciple of the Scotch school, was raised to the chair of philosophy, from which, up to 1814, he attacked sensualism without scruple and without mercy. It was not able to survive his blows. Dr. Broussais, in 1828, published a work on *Irritation et Folie*, in its defence ; but he did little more than show himself *irritated* at the general disrespect with which it was treated, and the extreme *folly* of undertaking to restore it to power. In 1815, M. Victor Cousin, whose attention had been drawn to philosophy by the instruction of M. Laromiguière, and who had been taught to analyze the will by M. de Biran, and converted by M. Royer-Collard from sensualism, was made professor of philosophy in the Normal School and the Faculty of Literature. Young, ardent, penetrating, and eloquent, he soon produced a powerful movement, completed the revolution commenced by M. Royer-Collard, and prepared for France a new philosophical future. If he have not, as some may believe, given to France the philosophy which must reign during that future, he has at least given the method for its creation, and rendered the return to sensualism impossible.

M. Cousin calls the system of philosophy which he and his

friends profess and advocate, **ECLECTICISM**; because it recognises the leading principles of all the great schools into which the philosophical world has been divided, and attempts to mould them into one grand whole, which shall include them all, and yet be itself unlike any of them. It went into power with the King of the Barricades, and will undoubtedly preside over the new system of schools and instruction which the government is preparing for France. We already see it in the most popular French journals, and in many of the most fashionable literary productions; and we can hardly persuade ourselves but that (in these and other ways) its influence on the destinies of France is at present, and must be for the future, very great. But without going into any speculations on the influence and prospects of this philosophy, we proceed to give our readers as clear and as satisfactory a statement of what it is, as we can within the limits to which we are necessarily restricted. In doing this we shall draw liberally from the Preface to the second edition of the *Philosophical Fragments*, the third work on our list, in which the author has given us a summary of his system, together with answers to some objections which are raised against it, and some account of its formation and growth in his own mind. We shall arrange what we have to offer under the heads of, 1. Method; 2. Application of Method to Psychology; 3. Passage from Psychology to Ontology; 4. Passage from God to Nature, and 5. General Views on the History of Philosophy.

I. The adoption of a method decides the destinies of a philosophy; for any given system of philosophy is only the developement and application of a given method. The method of all sound philosophy is that of observation and induction. Our first step is to study human nature, by observation to ascertain what is in the consciousness; our next and last step is to draw from observation by induction, by reasoning, all the consequences contained in the facts it has collected. Philosophy is the science of facts, and also the science of reasoning. It begins with observation, but it ends only with the limits of the reason itself. It observes and it reasons. In physical science we begin with observation of facts, but we do not end with it; we rise from observation, by reasoning, to general laws and to the system of the world. We should pursue the same method in mental and moral science. If we receive as true whatever legitimately follows from the facts of the external

world, which we have observed, we should do the same with whatever legitimately follows from the facts of the internal world, which we have scrupulously observed and profoundly analyzed.

In philosophizing, we must guard against rushing too precipitately, from hasty and incomplete observation, to hazardous inductions; and also against confining ourselves, in spite of all the craving of our nature, to mere observation, against never venturing upon an induction, a synthesis of the facts observed. To neglect observation is to fall into hypothesis; to restrict ourselves to mere observation is, whether we know it or not, to place philosophy on the road to skepticism. Skepticism and hypothesis are the two rocks, which philosophy must study to avoid. True method avoids them both. It does not end at the beginning; it does not begin at the end. It acknowledges no limits to induction but those of the reason itself, but it supports induction on a sufficient observation. Reserving to itself the right to the ulterior employment of the faculties of the understanding, philosophy cannot observe too scrupulously. It can no more than physical science, proclaim too loudly, insist too earnestly, that observation is its necessary point of departure. There is, in fact, no difference between philosophy and physical science, except in the nature of the phenomena to be observed. The proper phenomena of physical science are those of external nature, of that vast world of which man makes so small a part; the proper phenomena of philosophy are those of internal nature, of that world which each man carries within himself, and which is observed by that inward light called consciousness, in like manner as the other is observed by the senses.

Philosophy begins by observing the phenomena of the world within us. A mere glimpse of those phenomena is not observation. They are as truly open to our inspection as those of the world without us; but they appear and disappear so rapidly, that the consciousness perceives and loses sight of them almost at the same instant. To merely glance at them as they are passing over the varying theatre of consciousness, is not enough; we must retain them as long a time as possible, recall them from the darkness into which they vanish, demand them anew of the memory, reproduce them, that we may examine them at our leisure, vary the lights in which we observe them, survey each one under all its aspects, that we may embrace

each one in its entirety. We must reflect; not only listen to nature, but question her; not only observe, but make experiments. Whatever be the objects to which it is applied, experience has the same conditions and rules; and it is only by following them, in the science of man as in that of nature, that we can arrive at exact classifications.

These classifications, when their subject is human nature, the human soul, are called psychology. Psychology, an exact classification of the mental phenomena, is the first part, the foundation, but not the whole of philosophy. This is a point of great importance. The principal peculiarity of M. Cousin's system results from the fact, that he makes psychology the foundation, but not the superstructure, the beginning, but not the end of philosophy. By making psychology the basis of philosophy, he connects his philosophical enterprise with modern philosophy itself, which from Descartes, Bacon, and Locke, tolerates only the experimental method. In this he does not dissent from the philosophy which reigned in France during the last century. That philosophy was indeed sensualism, but it was also experimental; as experimental M. Cousin accepts, and though he modifies, continues it. This deserves the especial notice of those, who have supposed that he rejects experience and ought to be confounded with the hypothesis-constructing Germans. In method, he is as free from hypothesis as he is from skepticism. By beginning with psychology, making it the only door of entrance into the temple of philosophy, he not only connects himself with the old French, but separates himself from the new German school. The new German school, represented by Schelling and Hegel, begins where he ends, and ends where he begins. It begins by an hypothesis, rises at once without means, or by means of which it takes no account, to the Absolute, to the Being of beings, and attempts to reach nature and humanity through ontology. When we have once placed ourselves in ontology, in absolute being, the passage to the phenomenal, to nature and humanity, is without difficulty; psychology may most assuredly be found in ontology; but how can we attain to ontology? How shall we place ourselves in the Absolute as our point of observation? We must attain the summit by a slow and toilsome ascent from the valley, where is our starting-point, not by dropping from the heavens. Our only true method is to begin by ascertaining what is; from what is, the actual, we may pass to its origin,

from that to its legitimacy, and thus attain the Absolute. Should we adopt the method of the new German school, and by some lucky devination obtain the truth, which M. Cousin considers to be the case with the school in question, the truth thus obtained, not having been scientifically obtained, would be without any scientific validity.

II. But if M. Cousin separates himself, so far as it concerns method, from the new German school and approaches the old French school, he separates also from this last, as soon as he proceeds to the application of his method to psychology. Their method is the same, but the French school is not true to it. It applies it with the prejudices of a system. It observes, but it observes only what suits its convenience. It mutilates the consciousness, and observes only the facts of the sensibility. Its analysis is, therefore, necessarily too narrow for its generalizations.

There is, undoubtedly, a class or order of phenomena in the consciousness, which may be traced back to sensation. That this class exists, and is of large extent, is incontestable. The manner in which the phenomena it includes, are generated, although somewhat complicated, is easily comprehended; and they have the advantage of reposing on a primitive fact, which, by connecting them with the physical sciences, seems to vouch for their reality. This fact is, that of the impression produced on the organs of sensation and reproduced by the brain in the consciousness. The illusion of believing that this order includes all the phenomena of which we can be conscious, was therefore very natural. If there be only a single order of phenomena in the consciousness, there can be only a single faculty to which we can refer those phenomena, and which in its transformations must produce all the others. This faculty is that of sensation, or, if we may adopt the etymological instead of the common meaning of the word, the sensibility; but if sensibility be the root of all our intellectual faculties, it must be the root of all our moral faculties. This reduces man to a mere creature of sensation. He can then know nothing which is not cognizable by some one or all of his five senses. Our senses can take cognizance of only material objects; if other objects exist we cannot know them; they are for us as though they were not. When we recognise only material existences, thought itself becomes materialized; painting, sculpture, poetry, all the fine arts, take a tinge of materiality,

cease to reveal the infinite, and merely represent some small portions of the finite. All our notions of God, of the soul, of the Beautiful, the Right, inasmuch as they are not copies of outward material objects, which are observed alike by the senses, are illusions, mere fantasies, no more to be trusted than the dreams which disturb our nightly slumbers; religion withers into a mere form, hardens into a petrification, or entirely disappears; or, at least, can be retained only as an inconsequence or as an instrument; morality freezes into selfishness; pleasure and pain become the synonymes of right and wrong; and that alone which gives pleasure, — not to the soul but to the senses, — can be dignified with the name of *good*; the soul, having no longer any employment, takes its departure, and the man sinks in the animal, recognising and laboring only for animal wants. This is the unavoidable result of recognising in the consciousness the phenomena of the sensibility alone, and of reducing the whole nature of man to the faculty of receiving a sensation. The history of France in the last century proves this. She began with Condillac, who reduced the soul to sensation, and ended with Helvetius, who reduced morality to the simple maxim, "Seek pleasure, fly pain," with D'Holbach, who raved for materialism and atheism as a fanatic, and Lamettrie, who discoursed eloquently of the Man-Machine and the Man-Plant. But is this a true account of man? Who does not find in himself the ideas of the just and the unjust, the beautiful and its opposite, the holy and the unholy, the true, the true in itself? An impartial observation refutes both the principle and the system which is deduced from it, by making it appear that there are in the consciousness phenomena which no effort can legitimately trace back to sensation, — numerous ideas, ideas which are perfectly real, both in human life and in language, which sensation cannot explain. After having been struck with the relations of the human faculties, we are struck also with their differences, and a rigorous method enlarges the field of psychology.

M. Cousin recognises in the consciousness three classes of phenomena, which result from the great elementary faculties which comprehend and explain all the rest. These faculties are Sensibility, Activity, and Reason. They are never found isolated one from another. Yet they are essentially distinct, and a scrupulous analysis distinguishes them in the complex phenomena of intellectual life without dividing them. To

sensibility belong all the internal phenomena, which are derived from sensation, through our senses, from the external world; to the activity belong those, which we are conscious that we ourselves produce; and under the head of reason must be arranged all our ideas of the Absolute, the Supersensible, and all the internal facts which are purely intellectual, which we know we do not produce, and which cannot be derived through sensation from external nature. The activity is developed only by sensation. Activity and sensibility can generate no idea without the reason; and without sensibility and activity the reason would have no office. This psychology destroys sensualism, and leads to a philosophy of a totally different character. The philosophy to which it leads has already made some progress. It is represented on the theatre of the nineteenth century by the Scotch school, but more especially by the Kantian school, which, professing the same method as the Scotch, applies it with a very different rigor and extent. This school has enriched psychology by so many ingenious and profound observations, and is above all so distinguished by the beauty and grandeur of its morality, that it must always be held in deserved honor.

The Sensualist school admits and studies with great success the facts of the sensibility; but overlooking those of the activity and the reason, or not making a sufficient account of them, it mutilates the soul, and becomes false in its inductions. The Scotch school avoids this error; it distinguishes between the reason and sensibility, but without much scientific precision. The Kantian school has done it with more care and accuracy; it has also described with great clearness and precision the laws of the reason, but it has not discerned with sufficient exactness the distinction between the reason and the activity. This deficiency has ruined the school. The activity is personal. *We* are in the activity; that alone is our *self*. To confound the reason with the activity, as Kant and his followers do, is to make the reason personal, and to deprive it of all but a subjective authority; that is, to make it of no authority except in relation to the individual in whom it is developed. To deprive the reason of all but a subjective authority, to allow it no validity out of the sphere of our own personality, is to deprive it of all legitimate authority, and to place philosophy on the route to a new and original skepticism. If the reason have no authority out of the sphere of the personal-

ity, out of the individual consciousness in which its phenomena appear, it can reveal to us no existences which lie beyond ourselves. Such may be the laws of our nature, that we cannot help believing that we are, that there is an external world, and God; but our belief can repose on no scientific basis. There is nothing to assure us, that it is not a mere illusion; nothing can demonstrate to us, that any thing really exists to respond to it. All certainty resolves itself into a mere personal affection. To this conclusion all are driven who assert the subjectivity of the reason. This may be seen by going from Kant, the circumspect master, to Fichte, the audacious disciple, who shrinks from no logical results, and even ventures to represent the external world, and God himself, as productions of that mysterious something we mean, when we say, *I, Me!*

To avoid this extravagance, we must distinguish between the reason and the activity, and show that, though intimately connected, they are nevertheless fundamentally distinct. The reason, though appearing in us, is not our *self*. It is independent of us, and in no sense subject to our personality. If it depended on our personality, or if it constituted our personality, we could control its conceptions, prescribe its laws, and compel it to speak according to our pleasure. Its conceptions would be ours, as much and in the same sense, as our intentions; its revelations would be our revelations, that is, revelations of ourselves, and its truths would be our truths. Who is prepared to admit such a conclusion? We may say, "my actions, my crimes, my virtues," for we consider ourselves very justly as their cause; we may even say, "my error," for our errors are in some degree attributable to ourselves; but who dare say "*my truth*"? Who does not feel, who does not know, that the truth is not his, — is nobody's, but independent of everybody? If, then, we are conscious that the conceptions of the reason are not ours, that the truths it reveals are not our truths, are not truths which are in any sense dependent on us, we must admit that the reason is independent of us, and, though appearing in us, is not ours, is not our *self*.

Nobody doubts the independence of the reason in the consciousness itself. Who doubts the reality of the mental phenomena of which we are directly conscious, — who doubts the apperceptions of consciousness, apperceptions on which is founded the knowledge of our own existence? No skeptic doubts these, for no skeptic doubts that he doubts. But not to

doubt that we doubt, is to know that we doubt, is to know something, is, in fine, *to know*. Now, what is it that *knows*? What is that inward light we call consciousness, which has these apperceptions in which we confide, which knows in any degree, — which knows at all? Is it not the reason? If the reason may be trusted in one case, why not in another? If the knowledge, which the reason gives us of what is passing within us, be undeniable, why shall not all other knowledge, which the same reason gives, be considered equally certain? The reason is the same in all its degrees, and we have no right arbitrarily to restrict or extend its limits.

III. The reason, once established in its true nature and independence, becomes a legitimate authority for whatever it reveals. A true analysis of it shows, that, instead of being imprisoned in the consciousness and compelled to turn for ever within the sphere of the subjective, it extends far beyond, and attains to beings as well as to phenomena. It reveals to us God and the world on precisely the same authority as our own existence, or the slightest modification of it. Ontology thus becomes as legitimate as psychology; since it is psychology, which, by disclosing to us the true nature of the reason, conducts of itself to ontology.

We suppose that few, comparatively speaking, feel much interest in, or have any very clear conceptions of the precise problems, which it is the object of the higher metaphysics to solve. There are but few who wish to pass from the subjective to the objective, from psychology to ontology. Once convinced that man is determined by a law of his nature to believe in an external world and in God, most men are satisfied without seeking any thing farther. But there are those who would have the legitimacy, as well as the existence, of that law established. This was the case with Hume. He saw very clearly that man was determined by his nature to believe in an external world and in God; but, as this determination was no result of experience, he counted it of no scientific value, and asserted that the existence neither of the world nor of God, could be proved, and, though every man in his senses must believe in the existence of both, that philosophy must for ever remain in relation to them a skeptic. The Scotch school, honorable for its good intentions, undertook to refute him; but, incapable of comprehending him, it alleged against him the very fact which

he admitted, and which he acknowledged that no man in his senses could deny. It alleged as a proof of God and the external world, that we were compelled to believe in them by a law, a first, a constituent principle of our nature. So said Hume. But what is the authority of that principle? What is its legitimacy? What vouches for its veracity? The Scotch school answered only by a paralogism. The Kantian school advances not a step beyond Hume. It describes the conditions on which the belief is formed; but it denies that we can know the Absolute, that we can, in relation to God and the world, have any thing more than an irresistible belief, founded on the subjective laws of our own nature. Schelling and his school assume, by a bold hypothesis, the Absolute, the objective, and give us a magnificent poem, which we believe to be mainly true, but which is nevertheless no philosophy, and can in no degree solve the difficulty stated by Hume. The psychological truth of God and the world, we think, has been demonstrated over and over again, in a manner that must be satisfactory to the most skeptical, who are not ignorant of the demonstrations which have been given; but no philosopher, with whom we are acquainted, unless it be M. Cousin, has demonstrated their ontological truth. M. Cousin professes to have demonstrated, that we not only have the belief, and cannot help having it, but that it is well founded, that there is something out of us to respond to it. This he supposes he has done by establishing the independence of the reason; by proving that the reason is objective in relation to our personality, he thinks he has obtained a legitimate witness of the objective; and since this witness unquestionably deposes to the existence of God and of the world, he thinks he has proved their validity.

He asserts that the reason,—the only faculty in us which knows, the only principle of all certainty, the only rule of the true and the false, of the right and the wrong, which alone perceives its own aberrations, disabuses itself when deceived, recovers its path when led astray, accuses, acquits, or condemns itself,—the reason gives us ontology, the science of being, the knowledge of our own personal existence, and of the existence of external nature and of God, by precisely the same title as the least knowledge which we possess, and gives it too without waiting for any long developements, immediately, wholly and in each of its parts, in every fact of consciousness, in the first as well as in the last. It is on psychology that he

supports himself in this assertion, but on a psychology to which only a profound reflection can attain.

Can there be any fact of consciousness without some attention? Our thoughts, if we do not attend to them, become confused, fall into indistinct reveries, very soon vanish away, and become for us as though they were not. Even the perceptions of our senses, without attention, degenerate into mere organic impressions. An organ is struck, and even with force, but the mind, if engaged elsewhere, does not perceive it; there is then no sensation, and, if no sensation, of course no consciousness. In every fact of the consciousness, therefore, the attention does and must intervene.

Now is not every act of the attention more or less voluntary? Is not every voluntary act marked with this character, that we consider ourselves its cause? And is it not this cause, whose effects may vary while it remains itself unvaried, this power, which its acts alone reveal to us, and which its acts do not exhaust, — is it not this cause, power, force, that we call *I*, *me*, our individuality, our personality, that personality of which we never doubt, which we never confound with any other, because we never refer to any other: the voluntary acts which give us an intimate sentiment and an unalterable conviction of it? The *I*, the personality, is then given us in every fact of consciousness. There can be no fact of consciousness without a conception of our own existence.

We find *ourselves* then, in the fact of consciousness, and we find ourselves a cause, a creative force. This is the radical idea which we have of ourselves. We know ourselves under no other character than that of a cause, and we exist for ourselves no farther than we are a cause. The bounds of our causality are the bounds of our existence. Can this cause, which we are, do whatever it will? Meets it no resistance, no obstacles? It does, at every step, and of every kind. To the sentiment of our strength is ever added that of our weakness. Thousands of impressions from without continually assail us. If we do not attend to them, they come not to the consciousness; but, as soon as we attend to them, sensation begins. Now, here is the intervention of a new element. We refer to ourselves the act of attending to the impressions made upon our organs of sense, but we do not, and we cannot, refer to ourselves, as their cause, the impressions to which we attend. We receive sensations, we do not cause them. But, if we

cannot refer them to ourselves as their cause, we cannot help referring them to some cause, and necessarily to a cause which is out of us, exterior. The existence of this exterior cause is as certain to us as our own existence; for the phenomenon,—sensation,—which suggests it, is as certain to us, as the phenomenon,—act of attention,—which suggests to us our existence. Both too, are given together, in the same phenomenon. There is then, in every fact of consciousness, not only a conception of our own existence, of our personality, but also a conception of something which is not ourselves, something independent of our personality and exterior to it,—external nature.

If any one should doubt this, he is required to conceive of himself without also conceiving of that which is not himself, or of that which is not himself without conceiving of himself. I cannot have a clear conception of myself without distinguishing myself from all other existences.—To assert that I exist, is to assert that I am, and that I am myself and not another. In the complex phenomena of consciousness, we have seen there necessarily intervene activity and sensibility. There are the impressions from a cause which we are not, and attention, which is our act, applied to those impressions, giving us a consciousness of them. These two causes, one of which we are, the other of which we are not, external nature, are then unquestionable in every fact of consciousness, and both equally certain. But with what characters do we find these two causes? Certainly they appear as relative, imperfect, bounded, finite. The cause, which we are, meets resistance, obstacles, bounds, in that variety of causes to which we refer the phenomena of which we are conscious, which we do not produce and which are purely affective and involuntary; and these causes themselves are limited and bounded by that voluntary cause which we are. We resist them as they resist us, and, to a certain extent, limit their action as they limit ours. It is only in the meeting, the clashing of the two causes, it is only in their conflict, that either is revealed to us. There is no question that we always conceive of them, and cannot help conceiving of them, as relative and as finite causes. Now, what is it to conceive of these two causes, as relative and finite? It is to distinguish them in our minds as such; it is to assert that they are not absolute, infinite causes, but relative and finite causes. If, then, whenever these two causes are in the consciousness, they are there as relative, as finite, they must be

there as contrasted with the infinite, the absolute. But they cannot be contrasted with, or distinguished from, the infinite and the absolute, without a conception of the infinite and the absolute; and, without being so contrasted or distinguished, they cannot be conceived as relative and finite. In every fact of consciousness, then, there is a conception of ourselves, or of personality, and of something which is not ourselves, external nature, both as relative, finite causes; and of the infinite, the absolute, to which they are by the reason necessarily referred, and with which they must be contrasted in order to be conceived.

The reason, which is developed in the consciousness, and which perceives there at the same time attention and sensation, as soon as it has the apperception of them, makes us conceive immediately of the two sorts of distinct, but correlative and reciprocally finite causes to which they are referred. But the reason does not stop here. The notion of finite and limited causes once given, we cannot help conceiving of a superior, absolute, and infinite cause, which is itself the first and last cause of all causes. The internal and personal cause which we are, and the exterior causes which we call nature, are undeniably causes in relation to their own effects; but the same reason which gives them as causes, giving them as relative and limited causes, prevents us from stopping with them as causes which are sufficient for themselves, and forces us to refer them to a supreme Cause, which produces and sustains them, which is relatively to them what they are relatively to their own phenomena, and which, being the Cause of all cause, and Being of all being, is sufficient for itself, and for the reason which seeks nothing and finds nothing beyond.

If this analysis of a fact of consciousness be accurate, we are authorized to say that no fact of consciousness is possible without the conception of our own existence, the existence of the world, and that of God. The ideas, of ourselves as a free personality, of nature, and of God as the substance, the cause, of both us and nature, constitute a single fact of the consciousness, are its inseparable elements, and without them consciousness is impossible. Ourselves, nature, and God are, then, necessarily asserted in every word, in every affirmation, in every thought. The skeptic who professes to doubt their existence, in that he can assert that he doubts, asserts that

they exist. Atheism is, then, impossible; some men may want the term, the word, but all men believe in God.

The world and ourselves are found in the fact of consciousness as causes, and God is also found in the same fact, as a cause, the infinite, the absolute cause, which is the cause and substance of the relative and finite causes which we and nature are. God, then, exists to us under the character of a cause. A little reflection soon discovers the identity of cause and substance. We call ourselves and the world substances for the simple reason that they are causes, and in our conception the limits of their causality are the limits of their substantiality. God, being absolute cause, is absolute substance. If absolute, he must be one, for two absolutes are an absurdity. The relative, free, intentional causality, personality, which we are, implies absolute intentional causality, absolute personality; and, as the absolute can be found only in the absolute, it follows that God is not a blind, fatal causality, but a free, intentional cause, that is, a person. Descending again into the reason, we find there the absolute principles of the Just and the Beautiful. These principles, being absolute, belong to the absolute. Hence, from the absolute principles of Causality, Substance, Unity, Intentionality, the Just, and the Beautiful, we obtain the absolute God, Cause of causes, Being of beings, substance of substances, unity of unities, intentionality of intentionalities, morally just, beautiful, righteous, — our Father.

It should be remarked, that we do not *infer* the Absolute from the relative, the Infinite from the finite, God from nature and humanity. The Absolute is no logical creation, no production of reasoning. It could not be deduced from the relative. No dialectic skill has ever yet been able to draw the infinite from the finite, the unconditioned from the conditioned. Both terms are given together, both are primitive *data*, without which no reasoning could possibly take place. Remove from man the idea of the infinite, or of the finite, and he would be incapable of a single intellectual act. A man, to reason, must assert something, and must assert that something to be either infinite or finite. But no man can say that a thing is finite without having at the same time the conception of the infinite; or that a thing is infinite without at the same time conceiving the finite. Neither, then, can be deduced from the other; both coexist in the intelligence as its fundamental elements, and not only coexist, but coexist as cause and effect. Hence the ideas of

the infinite, the finite and their relation, not of mere coexistence but as cause and effect, are inseparable and essential elements of all intellection. This being true, all three, embracing all existence, ourselves, God, and the world, must have existed in the understanding, before ever an intelligent act was possible. They are, then, so far from being inferred, some from the others, that all then must exist before an inference is possible. They are the primitive *data* of the intellect, the starting-points of all reasoning. That is, when they are considered in relation to their logical origin, though in point of fact they are not developed in the understanding, till the understanding begins to act. All three, however, are developed simultaneously in the first fact of the intellectual life.

But if the absolute logically precedes the relative, and if the conceptions of the infinite, the finite, and their relation be indispensable conditions of all reasoning, it follows of course that our belief in God, in nature, in our own existence, is the result of no reasoning. When we first turned our minds inward in the act of reflection, we found that belief. We had it, and every man has it, from the first dawn of the intellect. It does not proceed then from reflection; and, as reflection is the only intellectual act in which we have any agency, it follows that it does not exist in consequence of any thing we have willed or done. It is prior to *our* action, and independent of it. Whence then its origin? It must be a primitive, spontaneous belief, the result of the spontaneity of the reason. The reason sees by its own light, is itself active; and, being in relation with the objective and the absolute, it can and does of itself reveal to the consciousness God and the world, giving by its own vigor the belief in question. The reason, being in its nature independent, and in its spontaneity acting independently of us, and though developing itself in us, is a good and legitimate witness for what lies beyond us, and exists independent of us.

Is this a legitimate passage from the subjective to the objective, from psychology to ontology, from the phenomenon to being, from the relative to the absolute, from the conditioned to the unconditioned? Is there here a verification of that law of our nature, which determines us to believe in God and an external world? Is there here a proof, that our belief in the existence of the world and of God has any objective reality to respond to it? The reason is independent, it is objective; therefore,

it is a legitimate authority for the objective. The reason is objective, it is absolute, and therefore a sufficient witness for the absolute. The reason reveals the absolute, therefore the absolute exists. This conclusion, which we believe to be correct, rests upon an assumption of the credibility of the reason. The reason may declare itself to be independent, absolute, but how can we prove that it is not a law of thought, a mere mode of intellectual activity? It is true we may so define personality as to make the reason objective in relation to what we are pleased to term *ourselves*, but a definition is not a demonstration. We have only the reason with which to prove the reason's independence; consequently, we have only its own word that it is not subjective. We attain the objective on the faith of the reason, but we have no voucher for that faith.

We dissent from M. Cousin with no little distrust of ourselves; but we confess that we are unable to conceive the possibility of absolutely demonstrating, logically proving, the objective, till we can obtain an independent witness to vouch for the independence and veracity of the reason. This witness we have not, and cannot have. If such a witness could be supposed, he could give his testimony to us only through the reason, and we should still have only the reason's authority for it. We must take the reason's word that the reason has correctly reported what the witness has testified. But at the same time that we deny the possibility of demonstrating the objectivity of the reason in relation to *man*, though we may do it in relation to the *will*, we contend that there is no need of doing it. The reason sees, and knows, and truly reveals the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, the spiritual world, — God. It sees and reveals the spiritual world, the world of reality, by its own light and energy; and this is the highest degree of certainty we ever have, the highest we ever ask, for none of us have ever asked that the reason be proved reasonable. M. Cousin, we think, has demonstrated all that he was required to demonstrate. He has shown beyond a question, that the reason, which is our only light, gives us the Absolute, God, and external nature, as positively and on the same authority as our own existence or the apperceptions of consciousness. We have no authority for either but the reason, and that is given as decidedly for one as the other. We may be as certain, then, that there is a God as that we exist. But we cannot prove it. We cannot prove that we exist, because, in

every attempt to prove our existence, we are obliged to assume it, and because we have nothing more evident than our existence with which to prove it. But are we less certain that we exist on this account? That which we best know, is least susceptible of being proved. The proof must be more certain than that which is to be proved. When, therefore, the proposition in question is one of those which have the highest degree of certainty, it of course cannot be proved. But it is certain without being proved. The Deity knows all things; but could he, if he would, prove to himself this fact? With what should he prove it? What is more evident to him than the fact that he knows all things? We are now engaged in writing, we know what we are doing, but we should be at a loss to prove to ourselves that we are writing. But, to our very great relief, we discover no necessity of having it proved. So, in relation to ontology, we know it, but cannot prove it. With what shall we prove it? The reason is the only eye with which we see it, and we have no witness but the reason to bring to prove that the reason's eye really sees it. But as the deposition of the reason is always all the proof we ask, we need no other witness.

The whole matter, then, turns on the credit due the reason. Grant reason tells the truth, we know the Absolute, the Unconditioned, — God. Deny the reason, or declare the reason unworthy to be believed, and we neither know God, the world, ourselves, nor any thing else. We are reduced to a worse strait than to "doubt that doubt itself be doubting," a strait in which we cannot possibly remain even in thought so long as it takes to name it. Thus much, we think, M. Cousin has done, and, we believe, it is all that he considers himself as having done, though he calls it a demonstration, which we contend it is not. The demonstration would require him to prove the credibility of the reason, a thing which he cannot do, because he has only the reason with which to establish the truth of the reason. But this is no cause of regret. We want no higher authority than the reason. The reason in all its essential elements is in every man. It is the light, "the true light that lighteneth every man that cometh into the world." As it reveals spontaneously, in every man's consciousness, the vast world of reality, the absolute God, the cause and substance of all that APPEARS, it follows that every man has the witness of the spiritual world, of the Absolute, the Infinite, God, in himself.

IV. The reason can reveal nothing which it has not in itself. If it reveal the absolute, it must itself be absolute. If absolute, it must be the Being of beings, God himself. The elements of the reason are then the elements of God. An analysis of the reason gives, as its elements, the ideas of the infinite, the finite, and their relation as cause and effect. Then these ideas are the elements of all thought, of thought in itself, of God. God then, is thought, reason, intelligence in itself. An intelligence which does not manifest itself, is a dead intelligence, a dead thought; but a dead thought, a dead intelligence, is inconceivable. To live, to exist, intelligence must manifest itself. God, being thought, intelligence in itself, must necessarily manifest himself. To manifest himself is to create, and his manifestation is creation.

In going from humanity and nature to God, we found him a cause. If he be a cause, he must create, that is, cause something. A cause which does not create is no cause at all. Creation then is necessary. God ceases to exist to us in exact proportion as he ceases to be a creator. But out of what can God create? Not out of nothing as is easily shown. The hypothesis of the independent existence of matter is also inadmissible. If matter can exist independent of God, then it is sufficient for itself; if sufficient for itself, it is almighty, absolute. There would then be two absolutes. Two independent existences,—matter on the one side, and God on the other,—would be a gross absurdity. God, then, can create only out of himself; that is, by developing, manifesting, himself.

But God can manifest only what is in himself. He is thought, intelligence itself. Consequently there is in creation nothing but thought, intelligence. In nature, as in humanity, the supreme Reason is manifested, and there, where we had fancied all was dead and without thought, we are now enabled to see all living and essentially intellectual. There is no dead matter, there are no fatal causes; nature is thought, and God is its personality. This enables us to see God in nature, in a new and striking sense, and gives a sublime meaning to the words of Paul: "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world, even his eternal power and Godhead, are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made." Well may we study nature, for, as a whole and in the minutest of its parts, it is a manifestation of the Infinite, the Absolute,

the Everlasting, the Perfect, the universal Reason, — God. It should be loved, should be revered, not merely as a piece of mechanism, but as a glorious shining out of the Infinite and the Perfect. How much more, however, should we study, love, reverence and stand in awe of humanity, the still brighter manifestation, more perfect type, image of the supreme Intelligence, the true God, — our Father !

This idea of creation is suggested and explained by what is continually passing in ourselves. We will to raise an arm. It may be paralytic, and consequently does not move. Nevertheless we have created something, we have created an intention. Here is the type of creation. God wills; the universe is; he speaks, and it stands fast. It is but God's volition, his intention. This gives us an affecting view of our dependence on God. We are his volition, as dependent on him as our volitions are dependent on us. We will to raise our arm, the volition to raise it exists; we cease to will, and our volition is gone, is — nothing. God wills, we are, — ceases to will, and we are not. How truly was it said, "In him we live, and move, and have our being!"

If this view of creation be admissible, that notion which presents the Deity waking from the sleep of an eternity, putting forth for a moment his omnipotent energy, creating, arranging, and adorning the world, assigning it certain laws by which to govern itself, setting its machinery in motion, and then returning to his sleep, or departing to form new world-machines, world-automata, or seating himself on a solitary throne far back from and above his creation, and contemplating his works in eternal silence, — this notion of God, we say, must be for ever abandoned. "God is at once true and real, substance and cause, always substance, always cause, being substance in that he is a cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, individuality and totality, beginning, middle, and end, alike infinite and finite at the summit and at the lowest round of existence." God is above, over and in all, cause and substance, life and reality of all.

This is not Pantheism. Pantheism considers the universe as God; but this presents God as the cause, and the universe as the effect. God is as inseparable from the universe as the cause is inseparable from the effect; but no one who can discern any distinction between an appearance and that which appears, between the phenomenon and being, the manifestation

and that which is manifested, can ever confound him with the universe. The cause is always in the effect. I am in my intention, but I am not my intention. All there is in the intention is of me, but it does not exhaust me. I create an intention, and I remain with all my creative energy. So of God. The universe is his intention. It is what he wills, and he is in it, the substance of his volition; it is what he speaks, and he is in it, as a man is in his words; but he is distinct from it, by all the distinction there is between the energy that wills, and that which is willed, between him who speaks, and the words he utters.

The reason, taken absolutely, we have said is identical with God. The consequences of this are numerous and grand. The reason is God; it appears in us, therefore God appears in us. The light of reason, the light by which we see and know all that we do see and know, is truly the light of God. The voice of the spontaneous reason is the voice of God; those who speak by its authority, speak by the authority of God, and what they utter is a real revelation. This explains inspiration, accounts for the origin of prophecies, pontificates, and religious rites, and justifies the human race for having believed that some men had been the confidants and interpreters of God. He in whom the spontaneous reason was more active than in his fellow beings, had a closer communion with God, could better interpret him than they, and was rightly termed the inspired, for he was inspired; — not indeed in a sense different from the rest of mankind, but in a different, a special, degree.

This idea that God really appears in us, that it is by his light that we see, though it may be an approach to the "vision in God" of Malebranche, is one that we value for its religious as well as its philosophical bearing. It has some affinity with Fichte's doctrine of a twofold personality, one phenomenal, individual, the other absolute, real. We are, as individuals, only *APPEARANCES*. Our real being is in God. Back of us and through us, there is always shining out something which is not phenomenal, relative, but absolute, substantial, which may be called person in itself. Person in itself is God. God then, is our higher, our absolute personality. This explains the mystery of the incarnation, of the two natures in Jesus, and shows how Jesus was, and how we may be, one with the Father. Jesus was one with the Father, —

"God manifest in the flesh," if one chooses, — because his phenomenal personality was absorbed in the absolute, his individual will was lost in the Divine, the absolute will. The Divine, the God in man, was conspicuous in Jesus above the human. In proportion as our will, our lower, phenomenal personality, becomes lost in our higher, our absolute personality, we approach God, become one with him, pass from the phenomenal to real being, from death to life, from the mortal to the immortal, from the corruptible to the incorruptible, — from earth to Heaven. We cannot proceed ; but, if we do not deceive ourselves, we have indicated here a train of thought which may lead to grand results, and throw a new, a clear, and a strong light on some of the darkest passages in our religion.

V. Man's intellectual life begins with the spontaneous reason. We believe, we confide before we reflect. In the infancy of the individual and of the race, God himself, as a tender father, is the guide and teacher. The child a little advanced, wishes to go alone, to be guided by his own light, to follow his own will, and rely on his own strength. A dangerous wish ! but one which must be gratified, if the child is ever to become a man. After a while man finds he has believed, and he desires to know why he has believed, to account to himself for the phenomena he discovers. There is now a new element developed within him, the reflective reason ; and henceforth, instead of confiding, he must reflect, and instead of faith he must have philosophy. No more repose, no more careless glee of the child ; active life begins : its cares, its burdens, its duties must be met and borne and performed. The father gives the child his blessing, his counsel, and sends him, at his request, forth into the world to seek his fortune as best he may.

Philosophy begins, the day that man begins to reflect ; it is the creation of reflection, and, since reflection is our act, it is our creation. It is to humanity, what nature and humanity are to God. As there can be nothing in nature and humanity which is not in God, so there can be nothing in philosophy which is not in humanity. He who comprehends humanity, comprehends not only true philosophy, but all systems of philosophy which have heretofore obtained, or which can obtain hereafter. He who comprehends all the systems of philosophy which have been, comprehends humanity as far as it is now developed. The study of human nature then, throws

light on the history of philosophy, and the study of the history of philosophy in return, throws light on human nature. Since all the systems of philosophy which have been, embrace the entire developement of humanity in the past, it follows that he who should comprehend those systems, would comprehend thus far the whole history of our race. History in general, as throwing light on humanity, the history of philosophy in particular, as enlightening all other branches of history, and as the practical, the experimental test of a philosophy, should be ranked among the very highest objects of human study.

There can be nothing in philosophy which is not in humanity. There is nothing in humanity but intelligence. Philosophy then is a developement of intelligence. But it is a developement only of the human intelligence, which is itself only a fragment of the absolute Intelligence. It cannot, therefore, embrace intelligence in itself. The human intelligence being itself defective, incomplete, the most perfect developement of it, can be only an imperfect development of truth. To be incomplete, imperfect, consequently more or less erroneous in its creations, is the inevitable lot of humanity. No system of philosophy, then, can be obtained, however clear and far-reaching its vision, that will take in the whole horizon of truth. The most perfect system attainable must always be incomplete, leaving out vast, undefined regions of the true. But as all philosophy is a developement, more or less complete, of intelligence; and, as intelligence in all its degrees is true, an absolutely false philosophy is impossible.

Although there can be nothing in philosophy which is not in humanity, there may be much in humanity which is not in philosophy. A philosophy which does not embrace the whole of human nature is false, not only in relation to the Absolute, but in relation to man, and false because it is defective, and in its defectiveness. All that is in our past history is but a developement of human nature, and, in that it is a developement of human nature, it is true. All systems, all creeds, all events, in that they have been, are true, true as far as they go, though by no means the whole truth. It is necessary then to accept them all. Now, if our philosophy exclude any portion of them, if it cannot find in each an element of truth, if it do not explain them all, and find itself in all, it is itself defective, and, in that it is defective, false. In this way history becomes a test of a philosophy. A philosophy which accepts the entire

history of humanity, and which finds in itself precisely the same number of elements as in that history, excluding nothing, owning and enlightening all, may be pronounced the true philosophy, that which exactly represents the developement of humanity. No philosophy does this, except that which finds in each system, creed, event, an element of the True, which it extracts and brings together into one vast, harmonious whole. This philosophy is **ECLECTICISM**. Every sound philosopher, then, must be an Eclectic.

Three ideas constitute the human as the Divine intelligence; the idea of the infinite, the idea of the finite, and the idea of their relation. These three ideas must be found in every philosophy, but they may be found in different degrees of developement; sometimes one and sometimes another may be predominant. The predominance of one or another makes the different epochs of humanity, and of philosophy. The number of these ideas determine the number of philosophical systems which are possible. These ideas are represented in the consciousness by three great faculties, the reason, activity, sensibility. The reason represents the infinite, the sensibility the finite, the activity the relation of the two. Attention, reflection, may be directed exclusively to the facts of the sensibility; it will then overlook, or see but in the back-ground, the facts of the reason and the activity, and refer all the mental phenomena to sensation. Hence **SENSUALISM**, which is true in relation to the facts of the sensibility, the only ones it analyzes; but it is not true of a larger number which are as really in the consciousness as those derived from sensation.

We may direct our attention exclusively to reflection, the reflective reason, which represents the activity in the world of philosophy, and which is purely personal. Plunged into ourselves, we there overlook the facts of the spontaneous reason and of the sensibility, and refer to ourselves, to the energy of our own thoughts, all the phenomena which we observe. Hence **IDEALISM**, which, being unable to come out of the consciousness, denies an external world, in like manner as sensualism denies the existence of whatever is not observable by the senses.

A sober-minded man may be disgusted by the contentions of these two schools, and led to question, not only the truth of both, but the truth of the reason itself;—that is, the possibility of knowing at all. Hence **SKEPTICISM**, which is

sometimes needed to check the rage of dogmatism, to bring back system-makers to common sense, and to compel them to examine anew their means of construction, their premises, and the logic by which they have attained their conclusions.

In fine, disgusted with the perpetual wranglings of sensualism and idealism, wearied with the endless doubt and perplexity of skepticism, unable to resist the cravings of the soul to believe, we take refuge in a primitive fact, hitherto overlooked, and, rejecting reflection, repose on the spontaneous reason. Hence **MYSTICISM**, a philosophy which is founded on a real element of our nature, and consequently true, but, taken exclusively, like all the others becomes the occasion of more or less error.

Each of these schools has a truth, and embraces and explains a certain number of the phenomena of our nature; but neither embraces and explains them all. Transport now either of these schools into history, and it will do what it does in psychology; it will mutilate history, as it has mutilated consciousness. It will either give no account of the facts which do not suit its purpose, or it will pervert them, give a false account of them. It will at once declare war against three fourths of history. Now in this fact, each proves itself inadequate to the explanation of the history of philosophy. Each then, is false as a whole, though it may be true as a part. These four schools embrace all the phenomena of consciousness, the whole of humanity; consequently embrace the whole history of humanity. A philosophy then, which embraces and explains the principles of these four schools is proved by history to be the true philosophy. Thus history and psychology reciprocally prove each other. By psychology we determine the number of elements which there can be in history, and by history the number there can be in psychology. When the number is the same in both cases, we may be sure that we are right. Erudition and criticism on the one hand, and profound psychological analysis on the other, are the instruments of a sound philosophy.

The four schools designated are found in all the philosophical epochs of the human race. They have all appeared on the stage of modern philosophy; each has played its part, accomplished its mission, and exhausted itself. Neither school has any longer any thing to do. All it can do as an exclusive school has been done, and is now known. What then remains

for philosophy? Either to take shelter under the ægis of authority, cease to be, or become an eclectic. The first is impossible. With Des Cartes it broke away from the ecclesiastical authority which ruled in the middle ages, declared itself independent, and its subjection is henceforth impossible. To say that it will cease to be, that the human race will no longer seek to render an account to itself of what it is, believes, and does, is to declare one's self ignorant of the wants of the human soul, that intelligence will cease to develop itself, that thought is dead, the human race extinct. Nothing, then, but the last remains as possible. Eclecticism is then the philosophy of our age.

We must be eclectics, excluding no element of humanity, but accepting and melting all into one vast system, which will be a true representative of humanity so far as it as yet developed. We must take broad and liberal views, expect truth and find it in all schools, in all creeds, in all ages, and in all countries. The great mission of our age is to unite the infinite and the finite. Union, harmony, whence proceed peace and love, are the points to be aimed at. We of the nineteenth century appear in the world as mediators. In philosophy, theology, government, art, industry, we are to conciliate hostile feelings, and harmonize conflicting principles and interests. We must bind together the past and the future, reconcile progress and immobility, by preserving what is good and studying to advance, that is, by meliorating instead of destroying; enable philosophy and theology to walk together in peace and love, by yielding to theology the authority of the spontaneous reason, — inspiration, — and vindicating for philosophy the absolute freedom of reflection.

Such is a very imperfect outline of M. Cousin's philosophy. As he has nowhere, to our knowledge, published a systematic developement of his entire system, it is very possible that we have not correctly seized it in all its parts, and consequently may have in some instances misconceived it in relation to the points on which we have touched. We can only say, that our respect for M. Cousin himself, and our general approbation of his philosophy, if not our love of truth, must have preserved us from all voluntary misconceptions. It was our intention to notice some objections to his system; but we have exceeded all reasonable limits already, and must therefore refer the reader to the *Preface* to the second edition of the

Fragmens Philosophiques ; and we must refer him also to the same source, together with Mr. Henry's introduction to his translation of the "Criticism on Locke," for some personal details which we intended to offer, and which will be found sufficiently interesting.

M. Cousin has been charged with a want of originality. It were, perhaps, presumptuous for us to attempt to discuss a charge of this nature. He himself replies to it in some degree in the Preface referred to. He acknowledges that he has had masters, and hopes that he shall have many more. He avows himself indebted to Laromiguière, De Biran, Royer-Collard, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel. He says he has borrowed much from Schelling and Hegel, which he thinks it need not demand much humility on his part to acknowledge. He does not claim originality. He has, he informs us, always sought, and he still seeks truth, first to nourish and penetrate himself, and afterwards to communicate to his fellow-beings. The several parts of his system, it is very possible, may be found elsewhere ; but we confess we know not where else to find it as a whole. We should claim for him originality in his reduction of the elements of the reason to the ideas of the infinite, the finite, and their relation, in his development of the distinction between the spontaneous and reflective reason, and, consequently, in the manner in which he reaches the Objective and the Absolute ; though we must confess we can find elsewhere some things from which we can, now that we know his views on these points, derive something like them, although it may be very doubtful whether we could have done it without the aid he has furnished us. Once in the Absolute, he does not differ essentially from the new German school. He follows Schelling and Hegel very nearly, in going from God to nature and humanity, and in his march through history. But his method, as has already been observed, is wholly different from theirs. He begins with the study of human nature ; they, with a flight more admirable for its loftiness than its science, soar at once to the Absolute. But after all, the great question, and the only one which it becomes us to ask is, not, Is this philosophy original ? but, Is it true ?

We have no room to discuss this question. Our opinion may have been already gathered. We approve his Method ; it is the only true method. It is simply, What is in the consciousness ? How did it come there ? What is its legitimacy ? In psychology, he applies his method with singular sagacity and

success. He describes the actual consciousness with great acuteness and precision, and treats the primitive, the origin of our ideas, in a manner to merit our confidence; as is evinced by his "Criticism on Locke," translated by Mr. Henry, the production of a consummate metaphysician, and beyond question, one of the finest pieces of philosophical criticism in the world. That he has really thrown a bridge over the gulf which separates ontology from psychology, we have above disputed; but, after what he has shown us on the nature and developement of the reason, we believe we can leap it, and consequently dispense with the bridge. In erudition, in eloquence, as a writer and a lecturer, his merit cannot be easily exaggerated. His publications make an epoch in philosophical literature. The French language in his hands, poor and deficient as Englishmen suppose it, becomes equal to the profoundest thought, the warmest emotion, and the nicest metaphysical distinctions. We wish some one would appear to do a similar service to our own language, which, though possessed of ample resources, is now, in consequence of the loose manner in which it is used, and the repugnance to abstraction which characterizes those who use it, so vague, so equivocal in its philosophical department, that the metaphysician is sure to be baffled even in his most strenuous efforts to make himself intelligible, or at least to express himself without ambiguity. Mr. Linberg and Mr. Henry have had to contend with this difficulty in translating M. Cousin; but their success has been such as to do them great credit.

In the application of his system to War and European politics, perhaps it is no want of charity to M. Cousin, to believe that the Frenchman got the better of the philosopher. However that may be, though we are decidedly opposed to war, we believe what some call his defence of it, and for which they condemn him, is substantially correct; and, till men become wise enough and good enough to tolerate individual and national differences of opinion, the shock of ideas will issue in bloodshed. But, should it be found that in the application of his system he is not always correct, it would not lessen him in our opinion. We want no man to apply his system for us. Let him give us his method and his premises; we will do the rest for ourselves. We wish there were less judging a man by the applications which he makes of his system himself, and more attention directed to its principles.

We cannot conclude without thanking M. Cousin for the sympathy he uniformly expresses with humanity. He does not tell the truth with a sneer like Gibbon, with a cold regard to obtaining mere power over man with Machiavelli, nor with a malignant scowl at man's weakness with Hobbes. He feels himself a man, is penetrated with what the French happily call the sentiment of humanity. He contemplates the progress of the race with delight, and stands in awe before the dignity of human nature, which unveils itself before the light of his philosophy. So long have we been accustomed to see man's weaknesses paraded with a sort of savage exultation, to have our hopes damped, our noblest energies repressed, by eternal declamations against human depravity, that we hold him our personal friend and benefactor for having vindicated humanity, and showed that he feels it no disgrace to be a MAN.

In conclusion we would commend the study of his works to every one who would know himself; and especially to every young man whose soul burns to take an active part in the scenes around him, and to leave his trace on the age in which he lives. He who would hereafter become a great and good man, must be a great philosopher. We know there are those, who will contradict this assertion; we know there are those, who think very meanly of philosophy, and continually exclaim, "Give us practical men, not theorizers; actions, not systems"; but, without meaning to be discourteous, we bid all such persons go and study history. The mere actor passes off, is forgotten, and there remains no trace of his actions; but the philosopher, the mere theorizer, as he is contemptuously called, by the force of a few ideas which he throws out into the mass of thought, putteth down or setteth up kings, and prepares a new future for the human race. He who best comprehends and best developes ideas, is Earth's mightiest sovereign. A Sesostris, a Cyrus, an Alexander, may be gathered to their fathers, and their empires be forgotten; a Moses, a Socrates, a Plato, live and reign for ever.

O. A. B.

ART. IV.—*History of the Town of Plymouth, from its first Settlement in 1620 to the Present Time; with a Concise History of the Aborigines, &c.* By JAMES THACHER. Second Edition. Boston: Marsh, Capen, & Lyon. 1835.

THE rapid circulation of the former edition of the work, if not a sure test of its merit, was an indication, we think, both of the interest taken in the subject-matter by the public, and of the opinion they entertained of the author's ability to do it justice. And there were good reasons, we need not say, for the opinion, as well as for the interest. The contributions which Dr. Thacher had made to our historical *matériel*, not less than to other departments of our literature, authorized the expectation that the annals of his own Town,—and such a town, too, as it has been,—would, in his hands, be wrought into a volume of substantial and permanent value. We are rejoiced to see this expectation realized, especially in the issuing of the edition before us, with the very considerable improvements on the first, which several years of revision might be supposed to suggest. Its appearance must be a source of more than ordinary satisfaction to historical readers,—to most students, particularly, of our own peculiar history,—to all, who are anxious, as at least all Americans should be, to appreciate, and see appreciated, as it deserves, both the character of the Pilgrims, and that of the great enterprise by which their names are chiefly known.

Nor do we feel the necessity of apologizing for venturing to congratulate the venerable Chronicler himself on the completion of this latest (we hope not *last*) public labor of the more than four-score years, of which so large a portion has been devoted to his country's service. No idle employment is it for even years like these, to bestow them on the "noble task" of rendering this tribute to the generations which have gone before us. He who performs such a work well, deserves the privilege he secures, of connecting his own memory with *theirs*. Next, in these cases, to the doing a good thing, is the recording it fitly; and if, indeed, the good men do is worthy to survive them,—if its value involves its influence as an example, on Shakspeare's principle, that

"One good deed dying tongueless,
Slaughters a thousand hanging upon that,"

then is the "bene-dicere" not so much the preservation, as it is the sequel, of the "bene-facere" of the act. The historian consummates, more than he celebrates, the career of his heroes. He coins the bullion which they leave in rude obscurity, and gives it currency with the race. This is the "*clarum fieri, vel pace, vel bello.*" No wonder if "*et qui fecêre, et qui facta aliorum scripsêre, multi laudantur.*"

This is no time for going again over the old ground of the character of the extraordinary men who are commemorated in this volume; nor need we attempt a new disquisition on the mighty consequences, which have followed, and may follow, from the equally extraordinary events they were principally active in producing. All, however, will concur in the desirableness of preserving whatever *data* may be still collected. Philosophy, and theory, and poetry, we had before. These we can have at any time,—almost as well without *data* as with them,—sometimes a great deal better; but now we wanted facts. Let us have these, while they may yet be had; and the more of them, the better. The inferences may pretty safely be left to themselves.

A large proportion of this *matériel*, in some shape or other, has of course seen the light before. The art of inventing facts is an accomplishment as little to be desired, with the historian, as the art of suppressing them, or as the somewhat popular system of bringing them up, and putting them down, and turning them round about, after the fashion of a puppet-show, and according to the particular effect which the showman wishes to produce. We do not want showmen in history, but workmen. We do not want effects, but facts. We want no machinery, nor theory, but the truth; and the more of this, as we said before, the better.

On these principles, we do not at all object to our author's informing us how much the Town agreed "to pay the French Doctor for curing Hunter's wife." We are deeply interested in the affecting story of the loves of Captain Miles Standish and Miss Priscilla Mullins, of Cape Cod; not omitting how Alden managed to get the "damages" for himself, instead of his gallant friend, whose messenger he should have been; nor how, when he went to marry her, that famous journey was performed. Governor Winslow, too, we admire more than ever in his new capacity as *Skipper* of a corn-craft,—with some others of the old "standards" for a crew,—on a peddling expedition down

to the Kennebec. We would not spare a single one of all the particulars of his two days' walk through the wilderness, forty miles, to the royal hut of Massasoit, when with his mixture of sassafras-roots and strawberry-leaves he cured that Monarch of his ails, and so on; especially when we find that his Excellency's right-hand man in this humble errand was possibly a personage still more illustrious finally than himself, and none other than Hampden, the renowned Patriot, destined so early afterwards to commence in his own country the overthrow of the monarchy, in "the first daring attempt (as Mr. Baylies calls it, in his *Memoir of Plymouth*,) for a free constitution in England." Well is it added, little did he think, when wandering in this manner along the banks of Taunton River, of the fate which awaited him. For ourselves, however, we confess our doubts about this statement.

Again, no gorgeous picture of the most splendid modern coronation could have an interest for us, compared with the simple sketch, which our annalist has borrowed from Mr. Winthrop's *Journal*, of a visit paid by that gentleman, with the Rev. Mr. Wilson of Boston, and a few other friends, to some of the dignitaries of Plymouth.

We like to know precisely how much of the journey was achieved by water, and how much on foot; and what was the time consumed each way; and how the company were entertained on their arrival; what were the ceremonies of the Sabbath, and of the sacrament, especially, which they partook of; how Mr. Roger Williams "prophesied," and then propounded a question for discussion; and how, after the Boston gentry had spoken to this in turn, Deacon Fuller put the congregation in mind of the *contribution*, "upon which the Governor and all the rest went down to the Deacon's seat, and put into the bag, and then"—"returned." It seems, when they went home, the Wednesday after, "*the Lieutenant*," Holmes, was one of their escort. There was no mistaking this functionary, evidently, for any other man. The title was a distinction, and a great honor,—as the office it indicated, and the circumstances of the times, demanded that it should be. These titles were never given for nothing. The "Captain's Mount," in Duxbury, and the "Coronet's Rocks" in Scituate, are monuments to this day of the feeling with which they were regarded; (the former named, we take it, after Standish, who lived in Duxbury some years, and died

there, and the latter after Cornet Robert Stetson, of the first troop of light-horse raised in the Colony, and lineal ancestor of the six or seven generations, of his own name, who have ever since tenanted the neighbouring estate.)

All this, indeed, may be the gossip of history. Yet who would be willing to part with it? Who does not see that it pours a flood of light on the character of the men, and on the condition of the times? Who does not perceive, that it is the multitude of trifles, like these, which make up the life of the volume? Would there were more of them! How should we rejoice over the discovery of the private journal of Standish, for example, — had that worthy been so obliging as to keep one; or of Elder Brewster, or the handsome John Alden himself. How should we riot in even the log-book of honest Tom Clark, the master's-mate of the *May-Flower*?

What fresh interest, too, might gather about the glorious old Compact itself, signed in that vessel's cabin, could all the countless little circumstances of its execution, — of the controversy, the ceremony, the long, solemn, solitary discussions which occurred in connexion with it, — be restored to their old proximity with the words of the Instrument and the names attached to it. That would be a history, indeed, of the origin of our government. The system of American Republicanism would be laid bare to its roots. The character which has been the vitality of all the Pilgrim institutions, great and small, from that day to this, might then be subjected to a scrutiny almost as rigid as a chemical analysis. We should see men and things, — worth seeing, — as they were, and are. And this, we repeat, is what we need. This is history, as it should be. The nearer we can get to it, the better.

These remarks apply with peculiar emphasis to the case of Plymouth. There was the commencement of the colonization of New England, and here is the account of it. There was the first actual American government, — the first pure democracy in the world, — established; the model of most which have followed it. Here were the legitimate appurtenances, and consequences belonging to it, — all the systems of minor institutions, — developed; and its true principles, in all their application to practice, set forth in theory, and in operation. Here were the lives of the founders of the Republic passed. Here, in the midst of them, at the fountain-head of the great stream, must be gathered, if gathered at all, the true philosophy

of those vast phenomena of after-days, and of ours, which, as the sequel of the sublime labor of the Pilgrims, have placed them in the first rank of the champions of the race.

As a town, merely, the annals of Plymouth are of rare value. From first to last, it has seen perhaps as much, as any other, of the various fortunes, which, as they have given interest to the experience, ought in proportion to impart spirit to the annals of the country. Its share in the trials of the settlement, — its connexion with the natives, and especially its part in Philip's War, — its various experiments in civil, social, and religious polity, from time to time, — are indices, as characteristic as can be anywhere found, of the several great subject-matters and the successive stages of history, to which they correspond. They are distinctive specimens of those states and stages, — disinterments of the *strata* of the past. No local annals could give a better notion of the history of the country at large.

The part taken by the town (one hundred years after the deadly struggle of King Philip) in the Revolution of 1775, was such, that it seems to have been but a slight accident, in our historian's opinion, which prevented the first battle being fought at "Plymouth instead of Lexington," [Concord]. The men of the Old Colony were in the whole service of the war, on land and sea. It was the gallant Sampson who received from our Provincial Congress, the appointment of one of the first naval captains in the defence of the country.* It was James Warren, (a lineal descendant of the Richard Warren who came over in the May-Flower,) who had the credit of originating, with Samuel Adams, the famous plan of general correspondence and Committees of Safety, which did so much for the public welfare; and who, as a member of the Provincial Congress, on the death of Joseph Warren, was appointed to succeed him as the President of that body. James Otis was here also for a time. General Peleg Wadsworth, whose adventures in Maine alone have afforded President Dwight *matériel* for a chapter of romance in real life, and the brave Scammel, who fell at Yorktown, were teachers of the town's youth about the same period. The names of Chauncy,

* There is an anecdote, in the text, of Admiral Nelson, who at one time cruised off the harbour, and was visited from town. He was then a Captain.

Cotton, Robbins, and Judson,* are sufficient to remind us that their clergy were of kindred spirit.

Thus far have we spoken of the subject-matter of this volume, and especially of the character which is chiefly discussed and developed in it, in terms of praise alone. It will not be inferred that we are blind, or that our historian has shown himself to be so, to the faults of the Pilgrims. These are too obvious, indeed, and too familiar, to justify the affectation of setting up a court of inquiry here, at this late day, to try them anew. Those who wish to refresh their recollection of such points as are the least acceptable, we have presumed, to most readers, will find that he has given them sufficient opportunity to do so. They can go over the Indian intercourse, and the persecution of the Quakers, and the illiberal laws, to their hearts' content. None of these facts, which certainly make against them, whether as faults of their own or of the age, are here suppressed;—though we must acknowledge our apprehension, by the way, that, while the author's enthusiasm in the prosecution of his work, as an historian, has impelled him to an impartial exhibition of details, his enthusiasm, as a son of the Pilgrims, in behalf of their memory, has, perhaps, as strongly swayed him occasionally to conclusions, which even his own statements do not entirely sustain.

Take, for example, the case of Standish's summary treatment of the Indian whose head he fixed on the Plymouth fort, and the whole transaction connected therewith, which drove so many of the frightened savages to perish in the swamps; the generous Iyanough, and other chieftains, against whom nothing was known, among the number. No wonder that good Mr. Robinson appealed to the Plymouth Church, "to consider the disposition of their Captain, who was of *warm temper!*" The chief evidence on which the latter acted, seems to us to have been the declarations of Hobamock and Squanto, the latter of whom, pretty soon after his joining the English, had been ascertained to be a person "not to be relied on."† It was but too probable, that Hobamok, after *his* death, if not before, might have been influenced by similar views. At the best, it was but a single testimony, and did not justify

* Father of the distinguished Baptist Missionary of the same name.

† Page 46.

going to work in the style we refer to, without so much as an inquiry into the matter of complaint, or an opportunity given for explanation or satisfaction by those complained of, provided there should be occasion for demanding either. As to the apparent "coolness" in the manners of Massasoit,* whose fidelity had been most thoroughly tested, there would seem to have been reason enough for that, in the facts (stated on the same page) regarding the Governor's refusal to punish Squanto at his master's demand, although the Governor himself "*admitted that he deserved death*;" — for the sole reason, it must be inferred, that the services of this vagabond were needed as interpreter, to keep up the "*necessary intercourse*" between the two people. After all, what was the crime suspected? It was "a hostile combination" of several tribes of Indians against the settlement at Wessagusset,† (or Weymouth.) This was the subject on which the Governor made his communication, such as it was, on the annual court-day. On the strength of this "it was resolved," that Standish should take men enough to meet all the Indians in the Bay, consult with the settlers at Weymouth, and bring home the head of the supposed ringleader, Wattawamat. In other words, war was not only declared, but commenced, and carried on till the end of it was thought to be attained. And who were the people in whose defence this movement was undertaken? They were fifty or sixty men sent out from England a few months before (by Mr. Weston), who had tarried awhile at Plymouth on the way; and there, after receiving every hospitality the place afforded, they had acknowledged it by committing numerous thefts, and wasting the provisions of the planters who furnished them with supplies.‡ The Doctor himself does but follow his authorities, when he calls them a set of "*profligate miscreants*"; and it appears, on the very next page, that they early began stealing from the Indians, and were "*continually exasperating them against both settlements.*" Again, complaints were made, and some were punished, and one white man hanged; but all "*without amendment.*" It was for combining against these miscreants, profligates, and thieves, who were daily insulting them, and devouring their substance by robbery, that the natives were thus summarily attacked. It was for the suspicion, rather, of their intention

* Page 47.

† p. 55.

‡ p. 48.

so to combine. All which, without dwelling longer on so disagreeable a subject, we can, by no means, with our present information, consider as a "*defensible*" proceeding. The various circumstances suggested as palliations, may be gladly so received, and made the most of; especially the fearful example of the then recent Virginian massacre, and the general excitement of the times; but of course they only palliate,—they do not excuse.

We shall leave this strain of comment with more pleasure than we commenced it, after adding our dissent to a proposition in the Appendix to this volume, where, speaking of Alexander, the son and successor of Massasoit, the historian, we think, has inadvertently fallen into a common opinion, that this unfortunate young man was "devoid of his father's good qualities." Yet it is admitted, that all which is known of him is derived from one transaction. That affair is detailed here in two forms,—Mr. Mather's and Mr. Cotton's. The latter is founded on a statement of Major Bradford, who was one of the actors in the scene; and it wholly exculpates Alexander from any misconduct, to say the least. Under these circumstances, it seems to us a hard case enough, that the life of this unfortunate personage should have been so disastrously cut short as it was, without adding the ignominy of such a character as historians, both here and elsewhere, have ventured to ascribe to him. We confess, our own inferences have been decidedly in favor of the Indian, even from the evidently hasty and prejudiced account furnished by Mather. Every one, however, can judge for himself; and we must do our author the justice to say, that, whether he is right or wrong in his reasoning, he has followed in this instance his invariable practice of furnishing the *data* which led him to adopt it. One or two such inaccuracies, if such they are, in a volume like this, are no great marvel. The typographical blunders, which, we suppose the author is not chargeable for, might afford us better scope for critical scrutiny; the unceremonious change, by two months, in the date of the Pilgrim's landing, among others; but these errata, on account of their palpable *gaucherie*, are mostly of a character to require little notice, and we have left ourselves no time to bestow it.

In fine, as we began with waving a discussion of the character of the Pilgrim enterprise, and its consequences, or even of the character of the men who devised and sustained it, we may as safely end with repeating the intimation, that the

best compliment, the most generous justice, the worthiest monument, which can now be given them, is the strictest, plainest, and fullest statement, as far as possible, of what they did, and who they were. The task of mere eulogy, compared with this, if it be true, or founded on truth, is but a vain effort to construe actions which speak better for themselves. If it be *more* than true; — if it labor to conceal the real errors of systems, or the real weaknesses of men; — it fails of its own purposes as much, at least, as if it were *less*, — by suppressing the very obstacles which most of all, perhaps, — more than the elements, more than their enemies themselves, — were the trials the Pilgrims were called on to encounter, and to surmount. It was not only what they were, but what they did despite of what they were and what the age was with them, which gives them a title to our admiration. This we magnify in proportion as we magnify their faults and their misfortunes.

At all events we wish to know them as they were, and to appreciate, as it merits, the claim, which has been advanced for them, to the remembrance and the reverence of men. An extraordinary race they were, at least; such as the world never had known before, and never will know again. Extraordinary circumstances, which never can be revived, surrounded, nourished, educated, and impelled them. Consequences, most extraordinary of all, have resulted already from the lives, which their character and their circumstances together induced them, and enabled them, to lead; consequences developed, enough, long since, to prove them the founders of a new dynasty in the destinies of the race. We know not all as yet, indeed. We cannot know. We may not speculate even, with a tolerable plausibility, into the vast mysteries which veil the coming fortunes of the descendants of the Puritans. The existing spectacle, as Mr. Everett remarked at Plymouth, does not suggest even an idea of what must be. And yet, we see enough to feel, more and more, that the past, at least, must be secured; that the beginning, if nothing else, should be disclosed; that it is history, which must give us not only the sole clue we *can* have to prophecy, but the best interpretation of what we are ourselves, and what we owe, and have to do. And knowing and doing this, the rest may be left to those who may follow us. Time alone can tell the sequel of the story. Posterity must live it out.

B. B. T.

ART. V. — *Sartor Resartus*. In Three Books. Boston: James Munroe, & Co. 1836. 12mo. pp. 299.

IN giving our readers some account of this singular production, we will begin by reversing the usual method of our vocation, and instead of a review utter a prophecy. Indeed the book is so very odd, that some departure from the common course seems the most appropriate to any notice of it. We predict, then, that it will not be read through by a great many persons, nor be liked by all its readers. Some will pronounce it unintelligible, or boldly deny that it has any good sound meaning. Some will be deterred by its Latin porch and German decorations from having any thing to do with what seems not intended for their accommodation; while perhaps their neighbour, attracted by the quaintness of the title, "*Sartor Resartus*," — *The Tailor Sewed Over*, — and thinking only of being amused in a passive way, will soon find his mistake, and declare himself imposed upon. The taste of some will be offended by what they will call its affectation and mannerism, and you shall not easily dispossess them of the notion, that the style is a jargon and the philosophy stark nought.

These are they that will rise up to defame and vilipend the elaborate and mystic book of *The Philosophy of Clothes*, by Dr. Diogenes Teufelsdröckh (*Asafœtida*), Professor of Things in General at the University of Weissnichtwo (*Know-not-where*), and living in the attic floor of the highest house in its *Wahngasse* (*Whimsey Street*). Even his choice phrases and profoundest speculations shall be as unsavoury to them as the drug, from which he has rather unaccountably, — to say the least of it, — taken his name.* But then we plainly foresee

* An ingenious friend has just surmised, that there might be a secret design in the composition of this most un-euphonious proper name; as the Grecian part of it means *heaven-born*, and the German one the vilest of earthly or even infernal productions. This conjecture may seem to be confirmed by the character of our Professor, who is a great radical, and seems to be made up of violently opposite elements. "And yet, thou brave Teufelsdröckh, who could tell what lurked in thee? In thy eyes, deep under their shaggy brows, and looking out so still and dreamy, have we not noticed gleams of an ethereal or else a diabolic fire, and half fancied that their stillness was but the rest of infinite motion, the *sleep* of a spinning-top?" — p. 14. And again, p. 65. "Through all the vapor and tarnish of what is often so perverse, so

that there will be others, who will make very different account of our Professor's lucubrations. They will admire his wildest extravagances, and discover in his most playful disportings a hidden wisdom; even as the worshippers of Goethe found, and find still, a perfect system of philosophy and a whole canon of Scripture in the wondrous *diablerie* of the *Faust*. They will admit nothing in him to be obscure, nothing tedious. They will talk rather mystically about him at times, and as if they would form round him a special school of the initiated. Every novelty of the least pretension being now-a-days "a new revelation of man to himself," they will adjudge this "philosophy of clothes" to be among the leading phenomena of modern thought. Its style will be copied by young aspirants for literary fame. It will be quoted from the pulpit. It will be read aloud to enthusiastic circles of most intelligent persons.

For our own part, we shall not be much surprised either at the neglect and aversion that it will experience in some quarters, or the unqualified admiration that it will excite in others. We think that they may both be explained equally well, without impeaching the critical acuteness of either of the parties; though we by no means profess ourselves to stand indifferent, or as a middle term, between them. We retain the lease of a small tenement in the *Wahngasse* ourselves, and frankly own that this book has great charms for us. It is written with an earnest and full spirit, though under a freakish form. It is the work of a contemplative, fervent, accomplished mind. It abounds with just and original thoughts, mixed up with the most diverting fancies, and expressed in a style which, though rather grotesque, is of extraordinary copiousness, beauty, and power. The peculiarity, indeed, of the style is just that which will be most objected to and most relished, according to the tastes of different readers. We see nothing to forgive in it, though it is one of the last to be proposed for imitation. It certainly could not be changed without destroying the whole harmony of the performance. It is not only the appropriate dress, but a part of the very substance, of the work. If any will persist in calling it affected, we can only say that it seems

mean in his exterior and environment, we seem at times to look into a whole inward sea of light and love; though, alas, the grim, coppery clouds soon roll together again, and hide it from view." "One knows not whether to hate or to love him." — p. 64.

to fall very naturally from the pen that employs it, and that such affectations are not often to be met with. If any should wonder how it came to be adopted by the author of "The Life of Schiller," we think that, if they will but turn to the same author's masterly translation of John Paul's (Richter's) "Life of Quintus Fixlein," the mystery will be found solved at once. It seems to have been caught from familiarity with that strange genius, and suits perfectly the assumed character which he here undertakes to sustain.

Mr. Carlyle, who is well understood to be the only Professor Teufelsdröckh we are to think of, has published nothing as yet under his own name. His translations from the German novelists did not tell the English public to whom it was indebted for them. "The Life of Schiller" was anonymous. His chief reputation, both here and at home, arose from several remarkable articles in the British Reviews, of which the parentage would never have been known, if they had not excited the general curiosity. "Sartor Resartus" first appeared in several successive numbers of Fraser's Magazine. He collected it into a volume for the gratification of his friends; and of that volume this is an exact reprint, with the exception of a preface by the American editors, which is short and neat and just what it should be. The last literary announcement of his is a work on the French Revolution. We are looking for it among the pleasant things that are to come, and should have been favored with it perhaps before now, but for one of those disasters which Sir Isaac Newton has been famed for enduring so patiently. One of the volumes was confided in manuscript to a friend, and was burnt up,—by what ravenous chance we never learned. The contents had to be reproduced. It remains to be seen what the result will be of that most heart-sinking of all toil. We are happy, however, to have his own assurance that "the burnt ashes have again grown leaves, after a sort"; though almost two volumes were still to be gone through with, at mid-summer of the past year. The last rumor we heard of his more personal projects was, that he was thinking of making a voyage before the next winter to the United States.

"Sartor Resartus," according to its *form*, is a dissertation on clothes, or rather, selections from such a dissertation, composed by the German sage whose name we do not desire again to repeat, and interspersed with extracts from his autobiogra-

phy. It is fragmentary of course. Its desultory starts and unlooked-for combinations remind us sometimes of Sterne, though it does not imitate, nor is it indebted to him.* It is more easy and serious than he. It is never on the strain after mere singularity. It carries a deeper significance in its vagaries. We need hardly say, that it is every way above him in elevation of sentiment and reach of thought, in heart and conscience, as well as in invention and imagery and wealth of expression. That unscrupulous humorist has the impudence to say, in a preface to his Sermon on Conscience, that the sermon had "already appeared in the body of a *moral* work, more read than understood." Our author's work is indeed a moral one. It is never loose and indecent in its sportiveness; and if you now and then meet with what is less refined than you can desire, it will have at least a sober intent, and probably the coarseness will be somewhat wrapped up, as it is in the Latin of Count Zähdarm's epitaph.

It loves to bring together the low and the lofty, the learned and vulgar, the strange and familiar, the tragic and comic, into rather violent contrasts. We cannot say that it is always clear and sprightly. The words are often unusual, the digressions bewildering, the objects in view not very manifest. But it will seldom fail to repay a careful attention. The device of making a book by pretending to edit the papers of another person may appear to be rather a stale one, and has certainly been of late pressed quite unconscionably into the service. But in the present instance it was absolutely essential to the management of the author's plan, and has been so ingeniously availed of as quite to reconcile us to it.

If it were worth while to spend a moment upon verbal niceties, we should say that we were struck with the frequent recurrence of certain favorite turns of phrase, which has sometimes an unpleasant effect. There can be no reasonable objection to the roughest Germanisms, abundant as they are, for they are fairly in place; but the blemish we allude to is

* This is more, we fear, than can be said with truth of a very clever book called "The Doctor." It overflows with learning and good things; but we hardly know how to pardon its rambling prodigality. Its drollery savours strongly of second hand; and its copious sweepings of a most industrious portfolio, in scraps from almost every language of ancient and modern Europe, are in danger of being found as dull as an excellent jest-book.

one to be avoided by a writer, whose English, though highly characteristic, is so sterling and deep with the true old stamp. We have, for example, more than sufficient of the word "enough." The use of what may be called a negative and a half, such as "not without," "not un—" is repeated to satiety. "To go" dead, — forgotten, — dumb, — silent, &c. are liable to the same reproof. But these are trifles, mentioned only because they happened to attract our notice.

From the form of "The Tailor Sewed Over," we pass to what is of chief importance, and interest also, — its *matter*. We have already intimated that the whole fiction about Clothes and the Jena Doctor with the disagreeable name, was designed to dress up and set forth a series of reflections on Society and Religion, on Man and the Universe. These are the substance of the work, and they are combined *not unnaturally* with the clothes-metaphor. The object of the author is to present the Inmost, the Essential, the Absolute, the Idea. Every thing that is outside of this may therefore be considered, in very simple propriety, as its garments. It is of those outsides that he seeks to divest it. The outermost that belongs to men is their literal clothing. Take that away, and they are still "clothed with skin and flesh, with bones and sinews." Their social *habits* also, — what are they but the integuments of a hidden nature? And so he goes on, though not in the homely prose fashion in which we are endeavouring to explain him, till he arrives at Space and Time, those two mighty envelopes of the soul and of being.

"And now," he cries, "does the spiritual, eternal essence of man, and of mankind, bared of such wrappages, begin in any measure to reveal itself? Can many readers discern, as through a glass darkly, in huge, wavering outlines, some primeval rudiments of man's being, what is changeable divided from what is unchangeable? Does that Earth-Spirit's speech in *Faust* :

"T is thus at the roaring loom of time I ply,
And weave for God the garment thou seest Him by ;

begin to have some meaning for us ? " — pp. 268, 269.

There is a paragraph, also, on the 73d page, which we may take hold of as a sort of key for the unfolding of the whole general plan :

"Why multiply instances? It is written, 'The heavens and the earth shall fade away like a vesture;' which indeed they are, —

the time-vesture of the Eternal. Whatsoever sensibly exists, whatever represents spirit to spirit, is properly a clothing, a suit of raiment, put on for a season, and to be laid off. Thus, in this one pregnant subject of CLOTHES, rightly understood, is included all that men have thought, dreamed, done, and been; the whole external universe and what it holds, is but clothing; and the essence of all science lies in the PHILOSOPHY OF CLOTHES."

Such is a brief and extremely imperfect account of "Sartor Resartus," with its strange subject, and its still stranger method. Whether congenial or not with our tastes and intellectual habits, it is certainly one of the most extraordinary works of our day. It is wrought with great learning and ingenuity, though without the appearance of effort. It throws out the noblest conceptions as if at play, and its sparkling expressions seem kindled by the irrepressible fervor of a brilliant mind. It has imagination enough to give a poet renown; more sound religion and ethics than slumber in the folios of many a body of divinity; more periods that one would copy down in his note-book, to read and read again, than are to be found in all the writings together of many a one who has made himself famous everywhere for having written well. It is not equally sustained in every part; how should it be?—but we can scarcely look where we shall not find something of tenderness or sublimity or wit or wisdom;—something that makes us feel, and makes us reflect too, as deeply as some more pretending "Aids to Reflection."*

What we chiefly prize in it is its philosophic, spiritual, humane cast of thought. It is in thorough opposition to the materialism and mechanisms of our grooved and iron-bound times. It resists the despotism of opinion seeking to rule by crowds and suffrages and machinists' devices. It soars away far beyond the theories of Utilitarian calculators. It spurns every thing shallow. It expands and lifts itself above every thing contracted. It places us at a free distance from the turmoil of vulgar and selfish life. It exposes many an abuse and illusion of the passing ages. It is spirit. Warm with kind

* A rather heavy book under this title is in many hands. It has at least the merit of appearing to be struggling *up* after something. It has excellent paragraphs, but is all in pieces, like the rest of its author's works, and unhappily like his own life also. "Hadst thou not Greek enough to understand thus much: '*The end of man is an action, and not a thought,*' though it were the noblest?"

affections, and almost wild with generous aspirations after the broadest truth and the highest good, it is elevating when it most amuses us. It even perplexes us to some wholesome intent. It rebukes the hard dogmatism of conceited disputers, till it makes it look as poor and as ridgy as it really is. Here are true "Materials for Thinking," while much that circulates with that label is but an insisting that men shall think perversely. *

But it is time that we should permit the author to speak for himself. Here is a night scene :

"*Ach mein Lieber*," said he once at midnight, when we had returned from the coffee-house in rather earnest talk, "it is a true sublimity to dwell here. These fringes of lamplight, struggling up through smoke, and thousand-fold exhalation, some fathoms into the ancient reign of Night, what thinks Boötes of them, as he leads his hunting dogs over the zenith in their leash of sidereal fire? That stifled hum of midnight, — when traffic has lain down to rest, and the chariot-wheels of vanity, still rolling here and there through distant streets, are bearing her to halls roofed in and lighted to the due pitch for her, and only vice and misery, to prowl or to moan like night-birds, are abroad, — that hum, I say, like the stertorous, unquiet slumber of sick life, is heard in heaven! Oh, under that hideous coverlid of vapors, and putrefactions, and unimaginable gases, what a fermenting-vat lies simmering and hid! The joyful and the sorrowful are there; men are dying there, men are being born; men are praying, — on the other side of a brick partition men are cursing; and around them all is the vast, void Night. Gay mansions, with supper-rooms and dancing-rooms, are full of light and music, and high-swellings hearts; but, in the condemned cells, the pulse of life beats tremulous and faint, and blood-shot eyes look out through the darkness, which is around and within, for the light of a stern last morning. Riot cries aloud, and staggers and swaggers in his rank dens of shame; and the mother, with streaming hair, kneels over her pallid, dying infant, whose cracked lips only her tears now moisten. — All these, heaped and huddled together, with nothing but a little carpentry and masonry between them; — *such* work goes on under that smoke-counterpane! — But I, *mein Werther*, sit above it all; I am alone with the stars." — pp. 20, 21.

A word for the arts :

"Man is a tool-using animal. Weak of himself, and of small

* See, who will, two volumes of impudent trumpery under this title, by one William Burdon. 5th edition! London. 1829.

stature, he stands on a basis, at most, for the flattest-soled, of some half square-foot, insecurely enough; has to straddle out his legs lest the very winds supplant him. Feeblest of bipeds! Three quintals are a crushing load for him; the steer of the meadow tosses him aloft, like a waste rag. Nevertheless, he can use tools, can devise tools. With these, the granite mountain melts into light dust before him; he kneads glowing iron, as if it were soft paste; seas are his smooth high-way, winds and fire his unwearying steeds. Without tools he is nothing, with tools he is all." — p. 40.

The following paragraph may serve to illustrate the leading idea of the book.

"To the eye of vulgar logic, what is man? An omnivorous biped that wears breeches. To the eye of pure reason, what is he? A soul, a spirit, and divine apparition. Round his mysterious ME, there lies, under all those wool-rags, a garment of flesh (or of senses), contextured in the loom of heaven; whereby he is revealed to his like, and dwells with them in UNION AND DIVISION; and sees and fashions for himself a universe, with azure, starry spaces, and long thousands of years. Deep hidden is he under that strange garment; amid sounds and colors and forms; as it were swathed in, and inextricably overshadowed; yet is it sky-woven, and worthy of a God. Stands he not thereby in the centre of immensities, in the conflux of eternities? He feels; power has been given him to know, to believe; nay, does not the spirit of love, free in its celestial, primeval brightness, even here though but for moments, look through? Well said Saint Chrysostom, with his lips of gold, 'The true *shekinah* is man.' — pp. 64, 65.

To illustrate the idea, that "thought without reverence is barren, perhaps poisonous," he says, on page 68th,

"The man who cannot wonder, who does not habitually wonder (and worship), were he President of innumerable Royal Societies, and carried the whole *Mécanique Céleste* and *Hegel's Philosophy*, and the epitome of all laboratories and observatories with their results, in his single head, — is but a pair of spectacles behind which there is no eye. Let those who have eyes look through him, then he may be useful. — Thou wilt have no mystery and mysticism; wilt walk through thy world by the sunshine of what thou callest truth, or even by the hand-lamp of what I call attorney-logic; and 'explain' all, 'account' for all, or believe nothing of it. Nay, thou wilt attempt laughter; — whoso recognises the unfathomable, all-pervading domain of mystery, which is everywhere under our feet and among our hands, — to whom the universe is an oracle and temple, as well as a kitchen and cattle-stall, — he shall be a (delirious) mystic; to him thou with sniffing charity

wilt protrusively proffer thy hand-lamp, and shriek as one injured when he kicks his foot through it? *Armer Teufel!* Retire into private places with thy foolish cackle; or, what were better, give it up, and weep not that the reign of wonder is done, and God's world all disembellished and prosaic, but that thou hitherto art a dilettante and sandblind pedant."

We perceive that at this rate we should be long in coming to an end, and will therefore turn resolutely at once towards the latter part of the book. We leave untouched the images of a world without clothes, amusing "*enough*," but rather too fantastic for the gravity of our Magazine. We will repeat nothing about school-masters and school-days, though there are some things shrewdly spoken of them. We will not describe the boy's first bereavements, when his "mother wept, and her sorrow got vent, but in his heart there lay a whole lake of tears, pent up in silent desolation." We will stop to copy no flower from the bloomy pictures of young love. We will turn away from the battle-field, at page 175th, though seldom has it been, with a few vigorous pencil-strokes, so fearfully delineated. There is the admirable chapter, too, "*The Everlasting Yea*." We will but point to it. It makes Christian renunciation look attractive as well as obligatory, and beautifully describes that "low crypt, arched out of falling fragments," where the altar of the "*Worship of Sorrow*" may still be found, "and its sacred lamp perennially burning." Zollikofer has a sermon on the difference between *Glück* and *Glückseligkeit*; but he does not set forth the doctrine so glowingly as we find it here, that "there is in man a HIGHER than love of happiness; he can do without happiness, and instead thereof find blessedness." — We will not look over a stitch in George Fox's suit of leather; nor repeat a word of the dissertation on Symbols, that censures so sharply the "*Genius of Mechanism*," and man's "self-love and arithmetical understanding."

We will open at the 265th page, and extract a paragraph or two on the taking subject of Ghosts.

"Could any thing be more miraculous than an actual, authentic ghost? The English Johnson longed all his life to see one; but could not, though he went to Cock Lane, and thence to the church vaults, and tapped on coffins. Foolish Doctor! Did he never, with the mind's eye as well as with the body's, look round him into that full tide of human life he so loved? did he never so much as look into himself? The good Doctor was a

ghost, as actual and authentic as heart could wish ; well nigh a million of ghosts were travelling the streets by his side. Once more I say, sweep away the illusion of time ; compress the three-score years into three minutes. What else was he, what else are we ? Are we not spirits shaped into a body, into an appearance ; and that fade away again into air and invisibility ? This is no metaphor, it is a simple, scientific *fact*. We start out of nothingness, take figure, and are apparitions. Round us, as round the veriest spectre, is eternity ; and to eternity minutes are as years and æons. Come there not tones of love and faith, as from celestial harp-strings, like the song of beatified souls ? And again, do we not squeak and gibber (in our discordant, screech-owlish debates and recriminations) ; and glide bodeful, and feeble, and fearful ; or uproar (*poltern*) and revel in our mad dance of the dead, — till the scent of the morning air summons us to our still home ; and dreamy night becomes awake and day ? Where now is Alexander of Macedon ? Does the steel host, that yelled in fierce battle-shouts at Issus and Arbela, remain behind him ; or have they all vanished utterly, even as perturbed goblins must ? Napoleon, too, and his Moscow retreat, and Austerlitz campaigns ! Was it all other than the veriest spectre-hunt ; which has now, with its howling tumult that made night hideous, flitted away ? — Ghosts ! There are nigh a thousand million walking the earth openly at noontide ; some half-hundred have vanished from it, some half-hundred have arisen in it, ere thy watch ticks once.

“O Heaven, it is mysterious, it is awful, to consider that we not only carry each a future ghost within him, but are in very deed ghosts ! These limbs, whence had we them ; this stormy force ; this life-blood with its burning passions ? They are dust and shadow ; a shadow-system gathered round our ME ; wherein, through some moments or years, the Divine Essence is to be revealed in the flesh. That warrior on his strong war-horse ; fire flashes through his eyes ; force dwells in his arm and heart ; but warrior and war-horse are a vision, a revealed force, nothing more. Stately they tread the earth, as if it were a firm substance. Fool ! The earth is but a film ; it cracks in twain, and warrior and war-horse sink beyond plummet’s sounding. Plummet’s ? Fantasy herself will not follow them. A little while ago they were not ; a little while and they are not, their very ashes are not.”

One word from the chapter on Dandies, who are defined to be “Clothes-wearing men, or men whose trade, office, and existence consists in the wearing of Clothes ;” in which allusion is made to “an individual named *Pelham*, who seems to be a mystagogue, and leading teacher and preacher of the sect.”

“Of their sacred books” — fashionable novels — “I, not without

expense, procured myself some samples; and in hope of true insight, and with a zeal which beseems an inquirer into Clothes, set to interpret and study them. But wholly to no purpose. That tough faculty of reading, for which the world will not refuse me credit, was here for the first time foiled and set at nought. In vain that I summoned my whole energies (*mich weidlich anstrengte*), and did my very utmost. At the end of some short space, I was uniformly seized with not so much what I can call a drumming in my ears, as a kind of infinite, insufferable Jewsharping and scrannel-piping there; to which the frightfullest species of magnetic sleep soon supervened. . . . Loving my own life and senses as I do, no power shall induce me, as a private individual, to open another *Fashionable Novel*." — p. 278.

We here part with our author, hoping to meet him again in the book of the French Revolution. We shall probably leave many of our readers in the condition that he has himself described:

"Can it be hidden from the Editor that many a British reader sits reading quite bewildered in head, and afflicted rather than instructed by the present work? Yes, long ago has many a British reader been, as now, demanding with something like a snarl: Whereto does all this lead; or what use is in it?

"In the way of replenishing thy purse, or otherwise aiding thy digestive faculty, O British reader, it leads to nothing, and there is no use in it; but rather the reverse, for it costs thee somewhat. Nevertheless, if through this unpromising Horn-gate, Teufelsdröckh, and we by means of him, have led thee into the true land of dreams, and through the Clothes-screen, as through a magical *Pierre-Pertuis*, thou lookest even for moments into the region of the wonderful, and seest and feelest that thy daily life is girt with wonder, and based on wonder, and thy very blankets and breeches are miracles, — then art thou profited beyond money's worth, and hast a thankfulness towards our Professor." — pp. 270, 271.

We started with the acknowledgment that this book would be distasteful to many. But we fearlessly commend it to another many, who will find their hearts greatly in unison with it. It is not a work to be glanced at here and there. It should not be read through in a breath. It must be conned carefully, and not too much at a time. We do not say that it never put our very selves out of patience; but we declare in all sincerity, that we believe few books of its compass will reward the exercise of patience better.

N. L. F.

[For the Christian Examiner.]

ART. VI—*Thoughts on the Personality of the Word of God.*

To do good and to get good should be the desire and the study of the living man, so long as God continues his mental faculties. At this period of life and with my infirmities it is but little that I can hope to do; but to do according to the ability which God giveth is all that he requires. He yet continues to me some portion of mental vigor, and a heart to delight in the study of his revealed will. Recently my thoughts have been employed on the supposed personality of "the Word" — "the Word of God." To write any thing like a thorough review of the subject would be more than I could reasonably hope to accomplish. I may, however, be enabled to record a selection of thoughts, which may be in some degree useful to myself, and to some portion of my fellow men. I will therefore hope in the mercy of God, — and, with reliance on him, proceed to state some facts and thoughts relating to the subject, which shall appear to me both true and important.

1. I freely admit that Jesus, the Messiah, was properly a person, anointed of God, — one in whom the Father dwelt in a peculiar and intimate manner, — and that he is the person of whom it is said, "his name is called the *Word of God*." Rev. xix. 13. Among the Jews it was a custom to give or assume significant names. The angel who appeared to Joseph, the reputed father of the Messiah, said to him, "Thou shalt call his name Jesus, — for he shall save his people from their sins." As Jesus signifies Saviour, it was properly given to him whom the "Father sent to be the Saviour of the world." As bread is food for the body, so the truths of the Gospel are food for the soul. As Jesus was the medium through which God was pleased to communicate this food to men, the Messiah in one of his figurative discourses said to his hearers, "I am the BREAD OF LIFE" — "the BREAD OF GOD which came down from heaven" — "the LIVING BREAD." This was figurative language, and on the same principle he might be called the WORD OF GOD. When Jesus instituted the memorial of his death, he said — "This *cup* is the new Covenant in my blood." No Christian perhaps doubts, that by the *cup* Jesus meant the *wine* which the cup contained; this was an emblem of his blood. The body or flesh of Christ was the Bread of life, in

the same sense that the *wine* was called the cup. To give to a vessel the name of the thing which it contains is a common figure of speech.

2. What was written by John concerning the Word in the first chapter of his Gospel is supposed to have been the principal ground on which the hypothesis was formed, that by the Word is meant a second person in the Godhead. Had it not been for what John wrote, no such opinion perhaps would ever have been entertained. Cruden, the author of a celebrated "Concordance," was much disposed to favor this hypothesis; yet he has marked but six cases in which he thought the WORD meant a divine person. Four of these are in the first chapter of John's Gospel. One is found in 1 John v. 7,—the text, which at this day is supposed to be spurious. The other is Rev. xix. 13, where the Messiah has his name "called the Word of God," as significant of his office, or the errand on which he was sent into the world. When on trial, Jesus said to Pilate; "To this end was I born, for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth." This he did during his ministry; and this testimony he sealed with his blood.

3. Some learned men have supposed, that John employed the term *logos* or Word, in a sense which he borrowed from Plato's philosophy; but who can admit this, that duly considers how often the term "Word," had been used in the Old Testament? Unless John meant to mislead his readers, it is reasonable to believe that he used the term in its Scriptural sense. In the Old Testament as well as in the New, the Word is sometimes personified, or spoken of as though a person was intended. It is said "the Word of the Lord came" to one and another of the prophets, "saying." Then we are told what the Word said to them. Yet in the New Testament the matter is thus explained—"Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." 2 Pet. i. 21. Who can doubt that what Peter ascribes to the Holy Ghost is the same that was ascribed to the Word in the Old Testament. It is true, that in both forms of speech the agency of a real person is implied; and that person was Jehovah, the living Father. He came by his Word or spirit, and taught the prophets, what they should say or write. Had it been written "Jehovah came to Jeremiah saying,"—and then by Peter, that "holy men of God wrote as they were moved by the Father," the meaning would, I believe, have been the same that was meant by the forms of speech adopted

in the Bible. It is supposed, that David sometimes wrote by inspiration. Among his last words are the following. "The spirit of God spake by me, and his word was in my tongue. The God of Israel said, the Rock of Israel spake to me, He that ruleth over men must be just." 2 Sam. xxiii. 2, 3. Here, if I mistake not, we have four different forms of expressing nearly the same thing. What is said, spoken, or done, by "the spirit of the Lord," or "the Word," is spoken or done by "the God of Israel," and by "the Rock of Israel." What more does the whole amount to than this, that David spoke as he was taught by God, or by the spirit of God? Those who are fond of having a plurality of persons in the one God, may perhaps find four as clearly spoken of by David, as three are spoken of in any part of the Bible; "The spirit of the Lord,—the Word,—the God of Israel,—and the Rock of Israel." These four, it seems, united in teaching the same lesson—"He that ruleth over men, must be just." May I then go forth and proclaim that the one God is four distinct persons?

4. Is not the term Word, as well as the Spirit, of the neuter gender? are not its pronouns, *it*, *its*, *it*, not *he*, *his*, *him*, when they are grammatically given, except in a very few instances of personification? Had the rule of grammar now in view been duly observed in the common translation of the first chapter of John's Gospel, how very little there would have been of even the appearance, that, by the Word, was meant a person distinct from the God mentioned in the first verse. In translating the first four verses Dr. Campbell has observed the rule of grammar, which requires the pronoun to "agree with the noun in gender and number." The following is his translation:—"In the beginning was the Word; and the Word was with God; and the Word was God. *This* was in the beginning with God. All things were made by *it*, and without *it* not a single creature was made. In *it* was life, and the life was the light of men."—So far is this translation from representing the Word as a person equal with the Father, that there is scarcely the shadow of personification.

In further speaking of the last clause of the first verse Dr. Campbell says:—"The old English translation, authorized by Henry VIII., following the arrangement used in the original, says 'God was the Word.'" Perhaps this more correctly expresses the meaning of John, than saying, "the Word was God." John probably meant, that God was manifested in or by his

word, — that word by which he spoke the world of creation into existence.

5. In my opinion Dr. Campbell was correct in saying that in the first verse "there was a manifest allusion to the account given in the first chapter of Genesis, where we learn that 'In the beginning God made all things by his Word,' God said 'and it was so.'" — But may I suppose that a "God *said*," or a word spoken by the Almighty, was a distinct person equal to himself? — It is my opinion, that by what John said of the Word in this chapter, he meant to teach Christians, that the same Almighty power, by which God in the beginning spoke the natural light into existence, had been caused to dwell in Jesus as the Messiah, to establish his mission as divine, that he might be the spiritual light of the world, — the light of men.

In other words, I think John meant to teach, that the same divine Power, Word, or Spirit, which gave existence to the first creation, had been displayed in the new creation, and that both were equally the works of God. The divine Word, or all-sufficiency of God, having been caused to dwell in Jesus as the Messiah, John proceeds to say; "We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father." Here we have the Word dwelling in the Messiah, in whom it pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell. The all-creating Word, the spirit not by measure, the fulness of the Godhead, and the Father dwelling in Christ, seem to me but different forms of expressing the same thing, each denoting the all-sufficiency which it pleased the Father should dwell in his Son. Nor have I the least doubt, that the Messiah was as all-sufficient as he could have been by union with a second person of Deity equal to the Father. Christ said expressly "The Father who dwelleth in me, he doeth the works." If all fulness dwelt in the Father, and he dwelt in Christ, what more could be necessary either to the dignity or the sufficiency of the Messiah? What addition is made to either by the hypothesis, that Jesus was united to a second person equal with the Father? The hypothesis seems to me adapted to confuse the minds of men, and greatly to obscure the real glory of the Messiah.

6. In the 4th verse of John's Gospel we thus read concerning the Word — "In *it* was life, and the life was the light of men." While this Word dwelt in Christ he said, "I am the light of the world,"—"The words which I speak, they are spirit and they are life." It was by his words, by reveal-

ing the truths of the gospel, that Jesus was the light of the world. By the all-creating word of his power God gave life to the various tribes of animals. So when he had caused this Word to tabernacle in the flesh, Jesus was enabled to give natural life to some who had been dead; and to give spiritual life to many who had been dead in trespasses and sins. By the indwelling of the Father, — by his Spirit or Word, Jesus could say, "I am the resurrection and the life." The power of the divine Word was as really displayed when Jesus said, "Lazarus, come forth," as when "God said, Let there be light." In both cases the effects corresponded with the mandate, — with the Almighty Word.

7. It may be proper to inquire whether the Scriptures do not afford further evidence, than has yet been brought to view, that John, in the first verse of his Gospel, alluded to the first chapter of Genesis in what he said of the Word, and not to any hypothesis of a plurality of persons in the Deity. In speaking of the scoffers who are to appear in the last days, Peter says; "For this they are willingly ignorant of, that by the Word of God the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water, and in the water, whereby the world that then was, being overflowed, perished. But the heavens and the earth which are now, by the same Word are reserved unto fire against the day of judgment, and the perdition of ungodly men." 2 Pet. iii. 5, 6, 7. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were made by the Word of God." Heb. xi. 3. "By the Word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the *breath* of his mouth." Ps. xxxiii. 6. In each of these passages there is probably an allusion to what is recorded in the first chapter of Genesis. To what other passage of the Scriptures could either of these writers have referred? They all, doubtless, had in view some well-known passage of scripture which related to the creation of the heavens and the earth; and I know not of any other which seems so probable as the account in Genesis. In the latter part of the verse quoted from the thirty-third Psalm, the "breath" of the Lord is the same as the spirit of the Lord; and is nearly the same as the "Word of the Lord" in the first part of the verse, as our words are the same as the breath by which they are formed.

By the call of Christ, — "Lazarus, come forth," life was given to a corpse which had been dead four days. Suppose that in another account of this event we should read that the

Word of Christ raised Lazarus from the dead; might we hence infer, that the word of Christ is a second person of the Messiah, equal with Jesus? If not, why should we from similar language infer, that God and his Word are two distinct persons? Whatever is done by the Word of a man is done by the man; in the same way we should infer, that what is done by the Word of God, or by the spirit of God, is done by God himself. All this is according to the common acceptance of language. When a writer departs from this use of language, he either writes incorrectly, or he uses the words in a figurative sense.

8. God communicates his revelations to us in the language of men, and we must suppose that he uses words in a sense known to men, or they would not contain revelations. For they would be to us words without meaning, and could communicate to us no idea. God is to us invisible, and we can have no idea of the manner in which effects are produced by him, otherwise than by supposing something pertaining to him analogous to those members or properties by which effects are produced by us. Hence God is represented in the Scriptures as having eyes and ears, arms, hands, fingers and feet, — a mouth, a tongue, lips, breath, and speech or Word. By the use of such members, or properties, we produce effects; and God is represented as producing effects in a similar manner. Yet it is possible, and perhaps probable, that what is called his spirit, includes all that is meant by most of the members he is represented as possessing, — such as his arms, hands, fingers, his mouth, breath, and word. For it is very certain that these are often used as synonymous with his spirit. His arm, hand, finger, breath, and word, are expressive of his power; and so is his spirit and his word. In Matt. xii. 28, Christ is represented as saying, "If I by the *spirit* of God cast out devils." In Luke xi. 20, the same idea is thus expressed, "If I by the *finger* of God cast out devils." What then can be more certain, than that in such cases the *spirit* of God means the same as the *finger* of God. So a man's spirit or power may often be represented as his hand or finger; or that may be ascribed to a man's hand or finger which is effected by his breath, spirit, energy, or word.

9. Every member or property of a man may be personified and spoken of as though it was a distinct person. How often do we personify his arm, his hand, his mouth, his tongue, his

breath, and his word. To each of these human agency is often ascribed, as though they were personal agents. In like manner, the arm, the hand, and the finger of God are personified, as well as his Word and spirit, or breath. But when we personify the arm or hand of man, or his breath or his word, it is seldom, I believe, that learned men make such mistakes as to suppose that by these members, or personified properties, are really meant several distinct persons in one man. Why then, should they not evince equal wisdom, or equal candor, when the attributes or properties of God happen to be personified in the Scriptures? This would be no more than judging from analogy as to the meaning of Scripture personifications. But when they convert such personifications into real persons, do they not in fact depart from all known analogies in the use of language? And have they not as good ground for affirming that a man is three distinct persons as for affirming this of God?

We read of "the Word of Christ," and of "the Spirit of Christ," as well as of the Word and Spirit of God. We also are informed that the Messiah is "the image of the invisible God." If then, God is three distinct persons, why may we not infer that the Messiah is also three distinct persons.

10. Is it not a solemn truth that the Hand of God is more frequently personified in the Bible, than either his Word or his Spirit? Besides, one of the principal arguments to prove that the Word and the Spirit of God are persons equal with the Father is this, that the same divine works are ascribed to the Word and the Holy Spirit as to the Father,—and particularly the work of creation. Let us then see whether, on the same ground, the Hand of God should not be regarded as a fourth distinct person of the Godhead. Let Jehovah himself be the witness in this case. "Thus saith the Lord, the heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool, for all these things hath my HAND made." — Isa. lxvi. 1, 2. "Mine HAND also hath laid the foundations of the earth." — xlviii.

13. Hear too what God has said of his ARM, which perhaps implies the HAND. "Mine ARM shall judge the people,—and on mine ARM shall they trust." Can any thing short of a person equal with God be competent to judge the people, or be to them a proper object of trust? Yet who has supposed the HAND or the ARM of God, to mean a distinct person equal with the Father? Full evidence can be produced from

the Bible that the work of creation is ascribed to the Father, — to the Word of God, — to the Spirit of God, and to the Hand of God ; why then have we not as good evidence that God is at least four persons, as that he is three. It is, however, my belief that as, when any work is ascribed to the Hand of Moses, or the Word of Moses, the meaning is the same as when it is ascribed directly to Moses ; so, when any work is ascribed to the Word, the Spirit, or the Hand of the Lord, the meaning is the same as when it is directly ascribed to Jehovah himself. The explanation which has now been given respecting what is ascribed to the Hand of God, would doubtless be admitted as correct by those who believe that God is three persons. Let them then only extend the principle to what is ascribed to the Word and the Spirit of God, and they may find that the hypothesis that God is three persons, is as needless as the hypothesis that he is four persons.

11. Suppose that, on an impartial examination of the Scriptures, the following facts should be discovered as unquestionably true ; — That in as many as thirty instances God is styled “the Holy THREE of Israel ;” that in many other cases he is styled “the Holy THREE,” or “the high and lofty THREE,” but never “the Holy One” ; that, in speaking of themselves, the Holy THREE are accustomed to the use of this language, “*We* are the God ; and besides *us* there is no God,” “Thou shalt have no other gods before *us* ;” that there are several thousands of pronouns for God, Jehovah, the Most High, all of which are in the plural form, excepting three or four, as *we*, *our*, *us*, — not *I*, *my*, *me* ; that all the prayers and every ascription of praise, which are found in the Bible as addressed to God, are addressed to the Holy THREE, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. Now what would be thought of learned Christians who should treat all this evidence as nothing, and boldly subscribe a creed which declares that God is one person only ? Should we not think we had good reason to say, that they are remarkably blinded by their prejudices ? Suppose once more, that these Unitarians should not only treat as of no weight such a flood of evidence that God is Three, but also treat the believers in that doctrine as unworthy of the Christian name ; would not such conduct not only grieve but astonish all candid and well-informed men ?

In making the preceding suppositions, I have only supposed the reverse of what is in fact true, as to the evidence which the Bible affords that God is but one person. He is thirty

times styled "the Holy ONE of Israel," — many other times he is called "the Holy One," or "the high and lofty One." He says, "*I* am God; and besides *me* there is no God;" — "Thou shalt have no other gods before *me*;" — and it is a solemn fact that every prayer, and every ascription of praise addressed to God in the Bible, is addressed to him as one person only, and he is never styled or addressed as the Holy Three. I shall therefore leave it to others to estimate the wisdom and candor of those who reject all this evidence, — subscribe a creed which declares God to be three distinct persons, and deny even the Christian name to those who believe that God is but one person.

12. For a long time it seems to have been taken for granted by a large portion of Christians, that the Word, as a distinct person of the Godhead, was united to Jesus of Nazareth, in a peculiar manner, and tabernacled in the flesh in such a sense as cannot be admitted or supposed to be true of the Father or the Holy Spirit. It may, therefore, be of great importance to inquire seriously, whether the Scriptures afford any clear foundation for this commonly received opinion. That the inquiry proposed may be answered correctly, I shall aim to exhibit the principal things which I have found in the Bible relating to the union of each of the supposed persons of the Godhead, with "the man Christ Jesus," or their dwelling in him.

First. In regard to the Word, we have the following declaration; "The *Word* was made flesh and dwelt among us." John i. 14. This, if I mistake not, is all or nearly all that can be found in the Scriptures, on which the opinion could have been founded, that the Word was in a peculiar manner united to the Messiah, so as to be with him one and the same person, and distinct from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and of equal dignity with the Father.

What, then, is meant by the phrase "was made flesh"? It surely cannot be meant, that a person equal with the Father was transubstantiated, or changed into flesh. What intelligent person would not be shocked at such an hypothesis? Instead of "the Word was made flesh," Dr. Campbell gives the following translation: "The Word became incarnate." Admitting this to be a correct translation, we have still to ask, What is meant by becoming incarnate? "Clothed with flesh, — embodied with flesh," is the definition of Johnson and Walker. Any thing, therefore, may be said to be incarnate which

dwells in flesh, or a human body, so as to be "clothed" or "embodied." Jesus spoke of his body as a "temple"; and it may perhaps be found, that the whole supposed family of divine persons equally dwelt in this temple, and were equally united to it.

Secondly. That the Spirit of God, or Holy Spirit, was united to Jesus and dwelt in him we have abundant evidence. His title, the Messiah, or the Christ, is expressive of this union; for it means "the anointed," and we are assured that "God anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost." This anointing was foretold by Isaiah. John the Baptist had a sign or token revealed to him by which he was to know the Messiah. This token was a visible emblem of the descent of the spirit in the form of a dove. Jesus was baptized by John, and, as he "went up straightway out of the water, the heavens were opened unto him, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and lighting upon him." Of this event John says, — "I saw and bare record that this is the Son of God." He further testified, "He whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God; for God giveth the Spirit not by measure unto him." To possessing the spirit of God, Jesus ascribed his power to cast out devils; "If I by the spirit of God cast out devils, the kingdom of God is come unto you." So perfectly was Jesus anointed with this Spirit, that he was enabled to baptize his Apostles, or endow them with miraculous powers. As an emblem of the manner in which they were to be baptized or immersed, Jesus "*breathed* on them, saying, Receive ye the Holy Spirit." As the spirit of God and the breath of God mean the same thing, this may account for his breathing on them as an emblem of the manner in which they were to be baptized with the Spirit. This Holy Spirit was what he personified under the name of the Comforter, which he promised to send them to be their guide after his ascension. Of this Comforter he said to the Apostles, "He *dwelleth* in you and shall be in you." Suppose then, that we are to regard the Word and the Spirit as two divine persons, is it not a clear case, that we have much more said of the incarnation of the spirit, than we have of the incarnation of the Word? By dwelling in Jesus, they equally became incarnate, — became embodied, or dwelt in human flesh, as in a temple consecrated by God to the purpose of manifesting his power, wisdom, and love.

Thirdly. What evidence have we that the Father was united to the Messiah and dwelt in him? In reply to this question, I shall regard the testimony of the Messiah himself as sufficient. During the memorable interview between Jesus and his Apostles, in the evening prior to his crucifixion, he made a remark which led Philip to say, "Show us the Father and it sufficeth us." Jesus replied, "Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? He that hath seen me hath seen the Father, and how sayest thou then, Show us the Father? Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? The words that I speak, I speak not of myself; but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me; or else believe me for the very works' sake." — John xiv. 9, 10, 11.

No further testimony seems necessary to convince the impartial Christian that the Father dwelt in the Messiah in a most intimate and efficacious manner, so that the words uttered by Jesus were the words of the Father, and the miraculous works of Jesus were works which the Father "did by him."

For what important purpose, then, could it have been needful that one or two other divine persons should dwell in the Messiah? So far as either sufficiency or dignity was concerned, no addition would have been made by the indwelling of more than one infinite person. If the Father dwelt in Jesus by his own all-sufficient Spirit or Word, will not this account for all that is said of the union of the Word and Spirit with the Messiah? And does not this accord with Paul's testimony that "it pleased the Father that in him all fulness should dwell?"

13. Having some further inquiries to make, I shall mention two rules, which to me seem of importance to be observed in our attempts to ascertain the meaning of difficult passages of Scripture.

First. When a text seems to present two or more meanings, we should inquire which of the different meanings appears less to accord with the unquestionable and general meaning of other passages of Scripture relating to the same question or subject.

Secondly. To ascertain the meaning of a particular text, or of particular words and passages, as used in relation to God or the Messiah, we should consider what would have been

their meaning had they been used in regard to Moses or any other eminent person.

With these rules in view, the following inquiry may be proposed :

Was not the Messiah a person properly distinct from any other person who is represented as dwelling in him? Moses said to the Israelites, "A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you like unto me." The Spirit and the Word doubtless dwelt in Moses, for "the Law came by Moses," and God spoke by Moses. But was not Moses a person distinct from the Spirit or the Word? This will be answered in the affirmative. If then, the Messiah was like unto Moses, we may believe that he was truly a person distinct from the Word or the Spirit of God. But while I believe that Jesus was a person distinct from any person who dwelt in *him*, I think he was not the Messiah independent of God's anointing him with the Holy Spirit. By this anointing he became the Messiah, and was consecrated to that office. But as Moses was a person prior to his being endowed with miraculous powers, so I suppose it was with the Messiah.

When we read that the Father, the Word, or the Spirit dwelt in Jesus, the forms of speech clearly convey the idea that Jesus was a person distinct from any divine person, or divine attribute, which became united to him. When Jesus said, "The Father that dwelleth in *me*, *he* doeth the works," — the *me* and *he* are evidently different persons. When a parent speaks of himself and his son, or a son speaks of himself and his father, two persons are always presented to our mind. So when any one person speaks of himself and another person as united with him, two different persons are ever brought to view.

We have, to say the least, as much evidence that the Father and the Spirit dwelt in Jesus, and were united to him, as we have that it was so in regard to the Word. If then, like the Father, the Word and the Spirit are divine persons, will it not follow that in the Messiah there were four different persons, Jesus as one, and a Trinity of divine persons?

14. In view of the two rules of interpretation which have been mentioned, the following queries may be proposed with some confidence :

What appears to be the general meaning of the Bible in regard to the personality of the Word and the Spirit of God,

and the number of persons in the Deity? As the Word and Spirit are nouns of the neuter gender, and have neuter pronouns, except in a few cases of personification,—and as the thousands of pronouns for God are of the singular number, except a very few doubtful cases, in which *us* is introduced; it seems to me that all candid and well-informed persons must admit that the Word and Spirit are generally spoken of in the Bible as *not* persons,—and God is generally represented as one person only. Such being the Scriptural facts, a creed which denies or contradicts the general meaning of Scripture language, needs such clear and direct proof in its support to render it credible, as I am unable to find in the instructions of the Scriptures, or in any of the dictates of reason.

15. Another query is this, Is it not an undeniable truth, that what John said in a very few verses respecting the Word which was in the beginning with God, is nearly the whole ground on which the hypothesis was formed, that by the Word is meant a distinct person equal with the Father? And is it not also true, that what John recorded of our Saviour's figurative discourse relating to the Comforter, is the principal ground on which it has been imagined that by the Spirit of God is meant a distinct person of the Godhead?

It is believed that these queries will be answered in the affirmative by all candid Christians who have carefully examined the subject. Let it then be remarked, that John is supposed to be the last of the inspired men whose writings have found a place in the Bible. Is it then probable or credible, that John advanced doctrines relating to the personality of God which contradict what had been written on the same subject by Moses and the prophets? Is it not much more probable, that a few figurative expressions, or a few personifications, in his writings, have been misunderstood and misinterpreted by fallible and uninspired Christians? If John taught that the Word and the Spirit of God are two persons equal with the Father, and that God is in fact the Holy Three instead of the Holy One, he has not only taught what was not taught by any of his predecessors, but has contradicted what they taught for truth. If he has done so, have we not good reason to doubt his inspiration, or the inspiration of Moses, and all the prophets who represent Jehovah as the Holy One? Both parts of such a condition cannot be true. If the learned Jews are made to believe, that John so contradicted

their lawgiver as to teach that there are three divine persons in the one God, equally worthy of supreme worship, can we wonder that they deny the inspiration of John? and if they believe, that John obtained his doctrine from the testimony of Jesus, have they not a better excuse for rejecting his Messiahship than any which they have been supposed to possess?

16. An error in regard to the number of persons to be worshipped as the true God, is surely an error of a very serious nature. It is, indeed, pleaded by those who profess to worship three distinct persons, that they have but one object of supreme worship, because all the three persons are supposed to be but the one God. Is it not, however, equally true, that they profess to regard each of the three persons as the true God, and possessed of all divine perfections? Is it not also true, that one such *person* is one *object* of supreme worship? If so, does it not clearly follow that two such persons are two objects, and three distinct persons three distinct objects? I freely confess, that I have not discernment enough to perceive any incorrectness in these conclusions, except it may be on this ground, that the worshipper has no definite idea of what is meant in this case by persons, and of course worships the Father as but one intelligent being. But of what advantage can it be to profess to worship three *persons*, if we know not what is meant by the term? If any of us thus worship, may it not be truly said of us, "They worship they know not what."

I hope I shall never cease to praise God for his goodness in freeing my mind from what I now believe to be great errors respecting his personality. But, having known by experience the confusion and embarrassment of mind, which the triune views are adapted to produce, I wish ever to cultivate in my heart candid feelings towards those who still retain such views. While I regarded myself as a worshipper of one God in three persons, I am conscious that in general my worship was addressed to the Father only, as it now is, and to him as the only living and true God. So far as I am able to judge by the language I hear used in prayer by Trinitarians of the present day, I cannot doubt that in general their worship is paid to the Father as mine formerly was, and as it is now. I therefore do not and cannot impute to them idolatry, or the worship of more Gods than one. God looketh on the heart, and I believe that honest Christians, of every sect, mean to

worship one God only. Happy would it be for men, if they were more like God in judging one another.

N. W.

ART. VII. — *A Discourse on Miracles, preliminary to the Argument for a Revelation: Being the Dudleian Lecture, delivered before Harvard University, May 14th, 1836. By the Rev. ORVILLE DEWEY.**

MARK iv. 40, 41. And he said unto them, Why are ye so fearful? how is it that ye have no faith? And they feared exceedingly, and said one to another, What manner of man is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?

THE power of Jesus on the occasion here referred to, was undoubtedly miraculous. Without dwelling on the circumstances, — which are familiar to you, — I wish to call your attention to two points in the narrative, as fairly presenting the subject of my present discourse. One is the natural astonishment of the disciples, amounting almost to a reluctance to believe what their eyes beheld. “What manner of man is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?” The other point, to which I wish to draw your attention, is the language of rebuke with which our Saviour addresses this feeling of incredulity. “How is it that ye have no faith?” And I may add that he frequently reproaches, in similar terms, the want of faith in his miraculous powers.

Now it is this presumption against miracles, — in other words it is the preliminary ground of the argument for Christianity, that I propose in this discourse to examine. And of such importance do I hold this preliminary view of the subject, that I think it will make all the difference, with many minds, between believing in Christianity, and not believing. That is to say, the evidences of revelation are strong enough to produce belief, if it were not for this presumption against them. Let there be no prejudice against miracles; let it appear, in any man’s account, perfectly reasonable and philosophical to admit them; let him regard it as extremely probable that the Supreme Being would interpose for our spiritual relief; and then

* We gladly avail ourselves of the author’s permission to lay the entire discourse before our readers. — Ed.

I say, that he must feel the evidence, actually offered, to be ample and overwhelming. It is not from the weakness of the proof, but from the strength of the presumption against it, that it fails of producing conviction.

That there is this presumption against miracles, I hardly need say. It appears in many forms. There has always been a prejudice of this nature lurking in the bosom of science. The doctrine of philosophical necessity seems to me to proceed from the same source, though I am aware that its advocates do not deny the Christian attestation to those facts which we denominate miraculous. The modern system of German Rationalism is a standing and recorded proof of the same presumption against miracles. Nay, with some writers it has amounted to an assertion of the essential incredibility of such facts.* And where it falls short of this, it is still a

* The essential incredibility of miracles, the impossibility indeed of such occurrences, has lately been argued by an English writer, the author of "*Essays on the Pursuit of Truth*," in the Third Essay. It is the old argument of Mr. Hume; but it is presented with great clearness, in a manner at once very calm and imposing, and without any of those terms that would indicate its purpose, or any consideration of the answers that have been, and may be, given to it.

The course of the author's argument is as follows. In the first place, he maintains that all reasoning, belief, and knowledge depend on the uniformity of causation; in other words, upon the regular succession of antecedents and consequents. That most of them do, is doubtless true. We could not anticipate the future nor interpret the past, but upon the supposition that the same principles have been, and will be in operation, that are now. But whether there is no other basis or source of belief, is the question. Most philosophers have persuaded themselves that the world had a beginning, — an event which quite breaks in upon their order of sequences.

In the next place, the author maintains that our belief in the uniformity of causation is instinctive, original, ultimate, and irresistible in the mind. That a general sense of preference of order is so, I believe; and that experience working upon this, or without it, must create a very strong conviction of the regularity of nature, is obvious; but whether any thing more than this is true, I must doubt.

But I am willing to give the argument the benefit, on both points, of any doubts that do not involve a begging of the question, and come at once to the conclusion. The question, then, of miracles is brought to the point of conflicting testimonies. Nature, on the one hand, testifies, it is said, to undeviating regularity. Change, then, is impossible. Man's testimony, too, is valuable, and has its regularity as truly as nature; but it is more liable to be mistaken, or we are more liable to mistake its marks, and therefore it can never counterbalance the testimony of nature. Therefore a miracle is impossible; and the belief in it, absurd.

This argument proves too much. For suppose now that I acquiesce

secret reluctance to receive them. And I think this reluctance has some unusual developement among many reflecting persons in this country, at the present moment. It is seen in the disposition of many to turn from the miracles to what they call the internal evidence. It is not uncommon in society to hear the miracles spoken of slightly. There is in every age, a

in the conclusion, and quietly take my seat in this pinfold of philosophy, what does this argument suppose me to say? Or what does the skeptic say, who strives to lift his head high enough (but cannot) above the machinery of causes, to declare their laws, and processes, and bounds?

In the first place, he says that God Almighty either *cannot* change the course of things, though he should please to do it, or else that He *will not* please to do it. For the reader will observe, that such a change is pronounced, without qualification, impossible! To know so much of the Omniscient purpose,—to know so little of the Omnipotent power,—presents a solecism in which it is difficult to tell whether the ignorance or the presumption is the most extraordinary.

In the second place, this argument would prove that the world and the universe are eternal. They could never have begun, they can never cease to exist; for either fact would be a deviation from the uniformity of causation. In the one case, there would be a consequent without any regular antecedent. In the other, an antecedent without any regular consequent. Nay, since the author holds that there is the same unchangeable order of sequences in the intellectual as in the physical world, the race of men can have, in his theory, neither beginning nor end. In short, this assumption seems to me to be compatible with nothing but Atheism. If there be no Power superior to nature, none that can interfere with its processes, then perhaps it is fair to infer that its processes must go on unchanged and unchangeable. But if there is a God, the *possibility* of change is equal to his *power*; it is unbounded and unquestionable.

In the third place, the argument proves too much, because it goes beyond all reasonable and known bounds of skepticism. The author who says to his fellow-men, "You cannot justly believe in a miracle; the thing is impossible, and faith is impossible," transcends the bounds of all human experience, if not of all human patience. Because almost all men, who have ever lived, *have* believed in miracles. And is not the very question before us, in fact, a question about experience? Could all men have believed in miracles, if, as our author contends, an original and fundamental law of the mind forbade their believing in them? Is it not as unphilosophical, as it is intolerable, to say that all mankind have been found believing in a thing which is plainly impossible? What is meant by its being impossible? That God cannot perform it? I will not impute to any one the intentional blasphemy of such an averment. Is it meant, then, that it is impossible that we should believe it? But we do believe it. We can believe it. All men do and can; all but the few, the very few who agree with our author. Is there any *remaining* idea, then, that can be attached to the word *impossible*? I know of none.

fashion of thinking ; and the fashion of thinking at the present day, I conceive, is growing more and more adverse to these primitive, peculiar, and hitherto received evidences of revelation. It seems to be thought by some, that the day has gone by for talking about miracles ; that they answered a purpose indeed in the primitive age, but have no longer any use. Not a few are saying, " Our feelings convince us, that Christianity is true ; the Book convinces us that it is true ; and we want no other evidence." It was in this feeling, obviously, that Coleridge exclaimed, " Evidences of Christianity ! I am weary of the word. Make a man feel the want of it ; rouse him, if you can, to the self-knowledge of his need of it ; and you may safely trust it to its own evidence." *

That this way of thinking is unphilosophical, that it does not properly perceive the very ground on which it professes to stand, that the reluctance to receive miracles, though natural and reasonable, to a certain extent, is unphilosophical when it amounts to a strong prejudice or presumption against them ; nay more, that on a whole view of the case, the presumption ought, in fact, to be *the other way*, is what I shall now attempt to show.

But as this way of thinking arises in part, I believe, from a misconception of the place which miracles properly hold in the Christian system, let me employ a word or two of explanation on this point. A man says, that he cannot regard miracles as the great things in Christianity, since he assigns that place to its doctrines, and precepts, and spirit. Neither do we ask him to regard miracles as the great things. It has been well said of the miracles, that " they are like the massive subterranean arches and columns of a huge building. It is not on their account that we prize the building, but the building for its own sake. We do not think of the foundation nor care about it, other than to know that it has one. We dwell above in the upper and fairer halls. The crowds go in and out, and rejoice in their comforts and splendors, without ever casting a thought on that upon which the whole so peacefully and securely reposes. Such are the miracles to the gospel. They support the edifice, and upon a divine foundation. They show us, that if the superstructure is fair and beautiful to dwell in, and if its towers and endless flights of steps *appear* to reach

* Aids to Reflection, p. 245. Amer. ed.

even up to heaven, it is all just what it seems to be; for it rests upon the broad foundation of the Rock of Ages." *

This observation will apply, perhaps, to the case of those who say, that they do not feel the miracles to be necessary to their faith in Christianity. When they say this, they must mean by faith, that moral apprehension of the spirit and power of Christianity, that sense of the spiritual relief and comfort that it brings, which does not, it is true, depend on miracles; in other words, that view of the superstructure which does not, it is true, immediately depend on any view of a foundation. But this view presupposes a speculative or traditional belief in the Christian Religion; or, if it does not, then it is just like a faith in any other good writings; that is, simply a belief that they are good, and wise, and therefore true; and if true, accordant with the will of God. In this sense, we have faith in all the dictates of reason. But Christianity we receive as a special revelation, an authoritative record of God's will; and in this character it must have some attestation beyond its general consonance with our rational or moral nature; else every demonstration in the mathematics, and every undisputed principle in moral philosophy, would be a revelation. That attestation, I say, is miracle.

The state of opinion on this subject makes it necessary, perhaps, before proceeding farther, that I should define the word *miracle*. All Christians of whom I know any thing, in this country, hold to miracles in some sense. I wish distinctly to say this; because if the sense which I affix to this word, as the only one satisfactory to myself, is not received by others, I would by no means leave it to be inferred, that there is any professed difference of opinion between us as to the miraculous origin of Christianity. There is only a friendly question between us about the meaning which ought to be assigned to this word.

What then is a miracle? I answer, It is an interruption or ceasing of the regular and established succession of events, taking place in connexion with the mission of a person professing to be sent from God, and designed to give that proof of his mission. I say, an interruption or ceasing of the regular and established succession of events, and that for a specific purpose. A miracle is a fact, like to which nothing ever has occurred, or ever will occur but for the same purpose. I lay

* The Rev. William Ware.

stress upon its being a simple fact. In regard to the succession of events, I say nothing of causation or necessity, of which we know nothing. I do not conceive that one event compels another, as the cogs of one wheel push on another wheel. I take the bare facts. Since the world began it was not known that a blind man received sight at a word, or that a man with a broken limb, or that a dead body, already in the first stages of putrefaction, instantly and at a word, recovered vigor and activity. Such events, we say, on certain occasions, and for certain purposes, without precedent, without parallel, have taken place. They are the miracles.

Now the question is, What is the fair and philosophical description of these events? On this point there is a strong reluctance in many minds to admit that there was any thing, in these cases, out of the course of nature or contrary to it; any interruption of the order of nature or suspension of its processes, or departure from its regularity. They say, that there may have been causes in nature or in the mind, which, though unknown to us, are sufficient to account for the results in question. I object to the word "causes," as implying an efficient power in one event to produce another, of which we know nothing. And therefore I consider the word "interposition," though proper enough to be used in popular discourse, to be strictly speaking unphilosophical, since it implies that one event *has* an inherent power to produce another, and conveys the impresson of a hand thrust in to stay the event that would otherwise take place. This may be true, but we do not know it. We come then to the bare facts. And, if we deal with facts alone, I see not how it can be denied that a miracle is something out of the course of nature, and contrary to it; an interruption of its order, a suspension of its processes. On this point, a distinction is sometimes made between a real interruption and an apparent interruption; and it is contended that the interruption is only apparent. But in speaking of facts, submitted to the observation of our senses, it appears to me, that we must conceive of real and apparent as the same thing. That is to say, if such a fact or such an event, as one of the Christian miracles, never appeared before, and never shall appear again but at the intervention of some divinely commissioned agent, then it is a real departure from the order of nature,—that is, from the universally received and known order of events, which is all that we know of the

order of nature. In other words, the whole thing is a peculiarity, — a special conjunction of events for a particular purpose. And, for myself, I certainly feel none of this strong repugnance to the idea of an interrupted succession of events. I have no respect for the mechanical order of nature, that makes me feel as if it could not be changed. I do not see that the moral purpose of that order is at all impaired by occasional departures from it. Surely, the Almighty Will is not bound in the chains of fate, or of nature, or by the powers of nature. I am unable to see, why the Infinite Parent may not change the course of his providence for the benefit of his children, as well as a human parent may change the course of his administration for a similar purpose. Not, indeed, that it would be an unforeseen expedient with the Omniscient Ruler ; but I cannot see that its being foreseen alters at all the state of the facts.

But now let us grant for the sake of the argument, that the miracles are, as the modern interpreter proposes to consider them, only seeming miracles, — only apparent, not real interruptions of the order of nature. Would they then be valid evidence of revelation? When Jesus says, "Peace, be still," the winds and waves sink to an instant calm. It was wonderful ; it appeared miraculous ; but it was miraculous, say some, only to the ignorance or misapprehension of the observers. There was a sudden lulling of the winds and waves, which, to the disciples, seemed miraculous. Or there were causes in the bosom of those turbulent elements, however hidden from us, which produced that sudden calm ; and such occurrences may yet come to be as well known, if not as familiar, as any of the phenomena of nature. But then, I ask, would there be any evidence of a special divine commission? To illustrate the case, let us make a supposition ; or let us take a piece of real history. Soon after the arrival of Columbus on the shore of the New World, there was an eclipse of the sun. The rude inhabitants had never, perhaps, remarked such an event before. Columbus, for a certain purpose, informs them that the sun will be darkened, and he predicts the precise day, and hour, and moment, when it will happen. The people hold their minds in suspense till the hour arrives, and then, witnessing the results, they come to the conclusion that Columbus is a supernatural being, and they reverence him as such. It was to them a miracle. But, in after times, suppose that this peo-

ple, or their descendants, should study astronomy. What *then* would be their conclusion? Would they not say, "We were deceived"? And what other than this could be the conclusion, if it should at length be discovered, that the miracles of Jesus belonged to the natural, though at that time unknown, order of events.

But let us see now, if miracles, in the sense which I contend for, do not inevitably belong to the Christian system. Is it possible that those who originally witnessed them, could have received them in any other light. "We never saw it on this wise; since the world began, such things were never seen," — is their language. If all this belonged to the order of nature, must they not have been grossly deceived; and deceived too, with the knowledge, if not intention, of the first teachers of Christianity.

But further; is there any one branch of the Christian evidences that does not involve miracles of the character contended for? Does not the argument from prophecy, and does not the argument from the early spread of Christianity, clearly proceed on this ground? In the one case, more than the natural prescience of any human mind is supposed; in the other, more than any known powers of persuasion. Nay, do not the very attempts to explain away miracles still leave unexplained miracles, — unexplained departures from the order of nature? It is said for instance, in regard to the cases of the sick healed, and the dead raised to life, that we cannot aver that the powers of nature were suspended or modified, because we are not acquainted with all the powers of nature; because there may have been a secret power in the sick or the dead body suddenly to restore it to health or life. But, granting this, still the knowledge of the exact *time* when that event was to happen must have been miraculous. Let us take, for example, the miracle recorded in our text. Our Saviour arose and rebuked the wind and the sea, and there was a great calm. Will it be pretended by any *honest* believer in Christianity, that Jesus acted upon a very sagacious judgment with regard to the signs of the weather? Surely not. The only tolerable supposition of him who receives Christianity, but rejects the miracles, is that there were powers in nature, though beyond human penetration, which produced that sudden calm. But then, it is necessary, I repeat, to suppose a *miraculous knowledge* in him, who discerned either

that power, or the moment of its operation. — Or, if any one should say that there are powers in the *mind* with which we are unacquainted, and if he should maintain a natural, moral connexion between the mind of him who spake and that sinking of the winds and waves, then, I should say, — granting a connexion so entirely gratuitous and so utterly inconceivable, — that such instances occurring once, and never afterwards, were themselves miracles. If that were not a miraculous effect of mind on matter, we ought to see something of it still.

Miracle, then, holds its place in every honest explanation of the external evidences of Christianity: and I think the same is true of the internal evidence.

With regard to this branch of the argument, various and vague impressions are prevailing which seem to me to possess no weight whatever, as furnishing substantive proof. They may be useful preliminaries or auxiliaries to conviction, but they are not its foundations. Such are the ideas that are entertained of the moral charm and beauty of the Scriptures, or of their adaptation to human wants, — not to mention those enthusiasts, who profess to have a secret and intuitive perception of the divinity of those writings. But, granting the singular moral beauty and charm of the Scriptures, I see not how it constitutes proof. Suppose that a person had never heard of a revelation, and, seeking light and rest for his mind, were to take up some of the writings of Fenelon. Would he not feel the same kind of impression? Would he not be charmed with their beauty, and their adaptation to his necessities, and say, “This is just what I wanted; this must be the truth of God.” And would he not very justly say this? What, then, would be the distinction between the writings of Fenelon and the records of inspiration? There is a difference between truth and revealed truth. A thing may be true, whether it is revealed or not: nay, it must be true independently of that consideration. But, Is it revealed to be true? is the question; and that question is overlooked in this view of the internal evidences. So in the writings of the “divine Plato” the reader will be amazed and charmed with the elevation, the exquisite moral discrimination and beauty of some of his thoughts; but will this prove that they are inspired? Indeed, it must be confessed, I think, that there is not one moral precept of the New Testament, but it may be found in the old heathen philosophers.

The only valid internal evidence which the New Testament contains of being a revelation, is found in the proposition, that these writings possess altogether a character, for which nothing but special divine illumination can account. If some rustic youth should come to you with Newton's Principia in his hand, and satisfy you that he was its author, the fact would not be more astonishing, than it is that the fishermen of Galilee should have produced such a book as the New Testament. The character of Jesus is itself a moral miracle. This is evidence: and it will be more and more convincing, as we more and more clearly understand the nature of moral phenomena, the power of moral prejudice, and the difficulty of moral progress.

Still, then, I find miracle in every species of satisfactory and substantive proof. And now I would ask, if there is any conceivable and sufficient evidence of revelation, but miracles? Suppose a man to stand before you and to say, "I am the bearer of a special communication from God." What would you—what must you ask of him, as the credentials of his mission? His air might be noble, his doctrine excellent, his speech divine. His communication might thrill you with awe, or with rapture. Would that satisfy you? If you were an enthusiast, it might; but if you were a philosopher, I am sure it would not. He might tell you things which above all things you wished to know. He might tell you, as Swedenborg has professed to do, of the very state of the blest who have departed from you, and of your own future state,—how you were to live in that unknown world,—and you might wish to believe it. What could make you believe it? I can conceive of but one thing,—*a miracle*. If he came from an earthly monarch, you would demand his credentials,—the signet ring, or the sign manual. The chosen seal of the Almighty Monarch is *miracle*!

But I hear it said, "Could you receive a communication as from heaven, if it were evidently of bad tendency? And if not, then is not the excellence of the communication a part of the evidence?" I answer, No; it is only something presupposed in the case; not the proof that makes out the case. If a man undertakes to prove any thing to me, he must undertake to prove something that is credible. I cannot listen to him but upon that condition. It would be incredible,—a case not to be supposed nor argued upon, that the Almighty had

sent to me a communication of evil tendency. I demand this condition then, that the message be good, but the condition is not the proof. That a thing is credible is necessary to its being credited; but the credibility of a thing is not to be confounded with the belief of it. The former is one of the postulates; the latter is the conclusion. They are completely distinct. Thus the lawyer, who argues in behalf of his client to a jury, must make a case that is credible; but the credibility is no part of the argument. And the juror who should say, "I was convinced by the internal likelihood of the case, and not by the witnesses nor by the arguments," would be thought a very bad reasoner, however well-disposed a man.

I have dwelt longer on this point than I wished; but it seemed to me important to show, if it be true, that Christianity is really founded on miracles, and that all attempts to escape from them in the matter of revelation are vain, and are especially proved to be vain by the very efforts to explain them away, to which their rejectors are driven.

But now let us examine, in as few words as may suffice, that presumption against miracles from which these efforts have apparently arisen, and see whether the presumption ought not in fact to be the other way.

And, first of all, I must beseech the inquirer to approach this subject in the purest spirit of philosophy. It is the constant suggestion of unbelief, that, to support the argument for a revelation, prejudice is necessary. Now I say, that is precisely the aid that we do not want. Nay more, I say that prejudice is the very obstacle, and the main obstacle, to true faith. I ask the skeptic to lay aside *his* prejudices. I ask him to be a philosopher; and yet more distinctively I say,—a philosopher of the inductive school. Let him reason upon facts. Let him take nothing for granted. Let him assert nothing which he does not know; and deny nothing which, for all that he knows, may be true.

Now let us see how much is cut off from the ground of this inquiry by these discriminations. You are not to deny the possibility of miracles. Evidently, he who made and who controls all things, can modify and change them if it be his pleasure. The act of creation is but the grandest of miracles.*

* "The act of creation is but the grandest of miracles." This idea occurs in some of the French writers. I have met with it, I think, in Necker's "*Morale Religieuse*," and in the French preachers. But it

Again, you are not to say or suppose, that there is any difficulty in the performance of miracles, or that it requires any extraordinary, or any new exertion of divine power to produce the changes in question. You do not know but that every event in the universe springs from an immediate exertion of divine power, and, therefore, that one result is as naturally and easily produced, as another. In other words, you are not at liberty

seems to be used by them, rather as a figure of speech than otherwise. I do not introduce it as such. I hold it to be a philosophical truth. The act of the creation is the producing of new forms of being, out of the usual course of production. It is an event without any antecedent in the processes of nature. It is "a deviation from the uniformity of causation." And that is the definition of a miracle. That it is the commencement of a series of events does not affect this conclusion. The point of departure from the ordinary modes of production is none the less deviation, — none the less miracle, — for the regularity that follows. If the earth were suddenly arrested in its course, and made to take a retrograde movement through its orbit, for thousands of years, the point of change would be miracle, and none the less miracle for the regularity that followed. And surely it would be no less a miracle, if a world were suddenly created, — if solid matter instantly, at a word, filled the void space, and were launched forth upon its mighty career. All the difference in the cases, with reference to the point in hand, is made by an unphilosophical idea of causes; as if there were a tendency in antecedents to produce their consequents, — a pushing on of one event by another, — of which we know nothing. And yet even then we might say, that there were causes in that void space to keep it void, and that those causes were arrested by the creative act which filled that space with matter.

When life is communicated to a dead body, what is that but the creation of life? Suppose that a human being were instantly created before our eyes, in full size and strength, would not that be just as great a deviation from the usual and natural course of production, as it is to raise a dead body to life?

I have supposed, in another part of the Discourse, a world to be created in our sight. But, to present a more palpable case, and one directly beneath our eyes, suppose that, as we were looking upon a barren and blasted heath, it were suddenly covered with a crop of grain, ripe for the harvest. That would be creation, and that would be a miracle. And if we and many more saw that miracle, and knew moreover that it was wrought in attestation of a divine commission; — nay more, if we harvested the grain, and ground and ate it, it would not only be philosophical to believe, but impossible to doubt. Thus, if I may speak so, did the Christian witnesses handle the evidence of the miracles they record.

But I am not now to pursue this argument beyond the point which is immediately before me, — to wit, the credibility of miracles. And for this credibility, on the strictest grounds of philosophy, I say that the fact of creation is a sufficient warrant.

in the spirit of true philosophy, to regard nature as a piece of mechanism, — as a clock for instance, which is wound up and has a natural or necessary tendency to run down. And you are not to say, that the need of a miracle to answer the purposes of the Author of nature implies some imperfection in the machinery of nature. The idea of machinery is a pure assumption. Des Cartes might as well have argued from those vortices, or whirlpools of ether, by which he supposed the heavenly bodies were moved, as we may argue from the notion of any other mechanism. Once more; all ideas of miraculous interference, as if it were derogatory to the Infinite Being, all presumptions on this point, drawn from the infinity of the universe, and the comparative insignificance of the earth and of man, are to be laid out of the question as entirely unphilosophical.

With these reasonable disclamations then, we come to the simple and unprejudiced experience of facts. We see an order in nature, not mechanical, not necessary, but appointed. *Can* that order be changed? Doubtless it can. To assert the impossibility of change, is to go far beyond our province. The power that ordained the succession of events, can modify them. *Has* the order of nature been in any instance interrupted? That is the great question. I am not now to discuss it. I have only to ask, if that question may not be fairly entertained; if it is not open to argument; if witnesses may not be called to testify; and if we are not bound to listen to them without setting up any bar of presumption against their testimony. Certainly, if there is no intrinsic and ascertained impossibility in the events alleged to have taken place, we *are* bound to listen.

But in what spirit shall we listen? With an extreme and almost insurmountable prejudice against miracles? This is the assumption of unbelief. And on what is this assumption founded? "On experience," is the answer. And what now is this boasted experience? Is human experience the measure of divine power? Can a limited experience set bounds to possibility? What is this life's experience, but a childhood amidst the ages of eternity? Suppose that we were hereafter to be placed, for the correction of some mental errors, in a scene of being where *all* should be miracle, *all* change; where every thing should reveal the immediate action of Almighty Power. Where would be experience then? Or, to illustrate

the same point, let us revert to the truly philosophical, the primitive, experience. Suppose that the first man had been created before the heavens were spread forth, or the earth hung in the empty space, and that he had beheld those awful effects of Omnipotence. Would he, at the close of the first day of his existence, find it difficult to believe in miracles? Why then, should the experience of forty years, amidst regular successions of events, make him forget that miracles might again be a part of the course of nature? The experience that makes a man feel as if there could be no more miracles, seems to me narrow, and if I may say so, provincial; like that which makes an ignorant and home-bred rustic feel as if every thing in the great world must be just like what he had seen in his father's house, and fills him with astonishment, amounting to incredulity, at every thing new and extraordinary.

What is the spirit of a real and studious philosophy, in cases which, so far as the facts are considered, are precisely analogous to miracles. An extraordinary, unheard-of, and before unknown fact is presented in nature. Water, for instance, is produced by the intense combustion of two invisible gases. There are many men in the world who would say on the first proposition of such a marvel, that they would not believe it. But does the philosopher say so? Or does he wait, before he will believe, till he can resolve that fact into some order of nature? By no means. The fact has been submitted to the test of experiment, and he is satisfied. And he believes it, let me add, not because it belongs to any *order* of things, but because it has been proved by satisfactory experiments. The King of Siam would not believe, that the liquid and flowing water could become a solid body under his feet. He took the very ground of the skeptic about miracles. He had never seen water frozen; nobody in his country had ever seen it; and he would not believe it. Was that the ground of philosophy, or of prejudice? A man says, that he cannot and will not believe in miracles. And yet every object in the universe around him, had its origin in a miracle. And suppose that it were given us again to witness such displays of power. Suppose that another sun were created and placed in the heavens before our very eyes. Should we not believe the fact till we perceived that it was produced by some preëxisting, world-making machinery of causes? And yet I verily believe that that wonderful creation would not be more extraordinary, than

to the discriminating moral eye is that great Light which burst upon the darkness of the world, eighteen centuries ago!

If, then, the strong and almost insuperable presumption against the doctrine of miracles, which many feel, is not justified by a strict philosophy, let us now proceed a step farther.

I am willing to concede something to this presumption; I wish to give it all the weight that it deserves; but I do not conceive that it possesses the broadest characters of philosophy. It appears to me instinctive rather than rational, hasty rather than deliberate, and narrow rather than comprehensive. And I believe that the rational, deliberate, and comprehensive view of things is more than sufficient fairly to rebut the narrow, the hasty, and the instinctive view.

It is said, that nature and experience are against miracles. That a part of nature and experience is so, I admit; but I desire special attention to the remark that it is only a part. That the whole is so, I deny. Nay, I would invite your still more particular attention to the observation, that the parts of nature and experience which are against miracles are the lowest and humblest. It is the mechanical order of nature which is opposed to miracles, and not its grand, comprehensive meaning and principle. And it is a less cultivated experience, which, — feeling less the need of those truths that revelation discloses, — is less disposed to admit of such a revelation, than the mind in its highest developement.

Let us then, go into the broad field of nature and experience, — into that very field, where skepticism has found its strong-hold, — and see what it teaches us.

The particular course of things in nature is order; the great principle is beneficence, — the adaptation of all things to the happiness of sensitive beings, the supply of all wants, the relief of all sufferings. Nay, order itself has its chief value in its uses; it is designed for the improvement of rational beings; and it has been well argued, on a former occasion in this place, that, “if the great purposes of the universe can best be accomplished by departing from its established laws, those laws will undoubtedly be suspended, and, though broken in the letter, they will be observed in the spirit;” and hence that “miracles, instead of warring against nature, would concur with it.” *

* Channing's *Dudleian Lecture*.

But let us cast a glance, first, not at human experience, but at the condition of irrational natures. The most striking feature in that condition is the adaptation of means to beneficent ends, — of supplies to wants, of reliefs to unavoidable sufferings. Among all the tribes of animate life, there is not a creature so small, but contains within it a world of wonders; and wonders not of skill only, but of beneficence. The anatomy of a fly, the instinct of a spider, the economy of a hive of bees, the structure of an ant-hill, are each of them subjects which fill many ample pages in the books of philosophy; and fill them constructively with this one theme, — the goodness of the Creator, his gracious regard to the humblest thing that lives. If you rise higher in the scale of the creation, you find everywhere, multiplying and crowding upon you, the proofs of unspeakable goodness. In heaven, on earth, and abroad upon all the pathless seas, are innumerable creatures, possessing frames filled with the most exquisite adaptations of part to part, guided by kindly instincts, supplied with bountiful provisions, arrayed, as Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed, and provided with habitations, more perfect for their purposes, than palaces of cedar or marble.

To illustrate the argument which I design to draw from this appeal to nature, let me make a supposition entirely *at variance* with the facts to which we have now adverted. Suppose, then, that you had found any one tribe of the animal creation unprovided for. Suppose, that it had no appropriate food, or that it had no instinct to guide it to that food, that it knew not where to seek its sustenance, whether in the water, or the air, or the earth. If we had seen any species of beings in this situation, if, for example, every summer should bring into existence a certain kind of bird, for which there was no suitable provision, or no guiding instinct, if we should see them flying about us, as if uncertain, destitute, and suffering, with wild screams testifying their anxiety and distress, apparently ignorant whether the night or the day was appointed for them, now rising into the air, now plunging into the water, and then madly dashing against the earth, — if, I say, we had thus seen them holding a precarious and painful existence for a few weeks, and then miserably perishing; we should feel as if such a phenomenon was most extraordinary and astonishing, — at war with the whole system of nature, and with all the proofs of divine benevolence. We do unhesitatingly pronounce the

facts embraced in such a supposition impossible. If we were to study nature for ever, we should never expect to meet with any thing like this.

Now I apply this to the case of human nature. And I desire you to suspend your judgment of the comparison for one moment till I can fully lay it before you. Consider, in the first place, the dignity of the being, to illustrate whose condition this comparison is brought. Consider all the difference between animal sense, and a being so "infinite in faculties" as man. Suppose, in the next place, that this being, acting according to an unquestionable law of his nature, should improve his faculties to the highest degree conceivable, without the knowledge of a future life. And finally, suppose him, with all the craving wants, the soaring aspirations, and the exquisite, varied, and multiplied sorrows of refined thought and feeling, to stand upon the earth, as it rolled in silence through the mighty void of heaven, — with death all around him, and without one voice from beyond the realms of visible life to assure him, that he should live hereafter, — and then say, whether this would not be a condition more mournful, more disastrous, more at war with the order of divine beneficence, than any catastrophe that ever could befall animal natures.

If any one distrusts this comparison, I must beg leave to doubt whether he fairly comprehends it. The truth is, that all the world has held to revelations in one form or another. By communications direct or traditional, by the voice of augurs or of prophets, by open miracle or inward light, all mankind have deemed themselves to have special guidance from above.

It is an important inference from this fact, that no one can very well estimate the case of supposed utter destitution; and, therefore, that it is extremely difficult for any individual to feel the whole and legitimate force of this argument. Every man has been trained up from childhood by a system of communications; and now, upon the very strength of these communications, or of the convictions they have inevitably inspired, he deems himself able to stand without them. But difficult as the task is made by the unfair position of the objector, I shall offer two or three observations, in close, tending to show the need, and therefore the likelihood, instead of the often alleged improbability, of an extraordinary revelation.

Leaving other communications out of the account, then, we, as Christians, say that about eighteen centuries ago, at a period

at once of unprecedented intellectual developement and equally prevailing skepticism, there appeared an extraordinary teacher from heaven. I am not now to offer any of the arguments for his divine mission, that seem to me so abundant and overwhelming; but I think I am fully entitled by the circumstances to say, that there ought to be no presumption against it. For it is undeniable, that, amidst all the lights of Grecian and Roman civilization, the most important truths, — the unity and paternity of God, and the immortality of man, — were obscured; and it is but a reasonable inference, that without a revelation, they would have been overshadowed with doubt till now. And even the belief that prevailed in the minds of a few philosophers, seems to me singularly to have wanted vitality. There is more reasoning than conviction apparent in their discourses; and certainly their faith had but little influence on their lives. Cicero, we know, and others, amidst all their hopes, had strong doubts. And I maintain, not only from these examples, but from the experience of every powerful mind since, that no reasonings can relieve that great question from painful, from distressing uncertainty.

My argument, then, is from human experience, and from cultivated human experience. It is easy to see, that a rude age might less need the relief which a revelation on this point would give; and for this reason, as I hold, to rude ages it was not given. My argument, then, is from cultivated human experience. And this is the form into which it resolves itself. God is the author of life, and the former of the mind. It is fair to presume, that he, who has provided for the wants of the humblest animal life, would not doom the noblest creature he has made on earth, to overwhelming despondency and misery. Now I say, that, without a revelation, this result is inevitable. I maintain, that no scheme of a virtuous, improving, and happy life can be made out, which leaves the doctrines of God's paternal and forgiving mercy, and of human immortality, in great and serious doubt.

My friends, I bring home the case to myself, and to you. I know what it is to doubt, and I say that no man should judge of the effect of that doubt, till he knows by experience what it is; till, crushed by its weight, he has laid himself down to his nightly rest, too miserable and desperate to care whether he ever raised his head from that pillow of repose and oblivion; till every morning has waked him to sadness and despond-

ency darker than the gloomiest night that ever clouded the path of earthly sorrow. It is not calamity, it is no worldly disappointment, it is not affliction, it is not grief, that I speak of; nor is it any of these that gives the greatest intensity to this doubt; it is a developement of our own nature; it is the soul's own struggling with the mighty powers with which it is made to grapple; it is the longed-for and almost felt immortality, struck from our eager grasp, — the light gone out, — the heaven of our hope all overshadowed and dark. Yes, it is the consciousness of infinite desires and capacities, all blighted and broken down; it is the aspiring which suns and stars cannot bound, all shrunk and buried in a coffin and a grave! In short, it is the proper and legitimate state of a mind following the premises of the case to their just result; and not that worldly condition of the mind, which is no more fit to judge of this subject than childhood is to judge of the interests of an empire. And now I say, Is it hard to believe that God would interpose for humanity, so circumstanced? Is it incredible that he should send a voice into that deep and dark struggle for spiritual life and hope?

I appeal to *you*, my brethren. I appeal to the youth who are before me. It is thought that this age is witnessing an unusual developement of infidel principles. One whole nation, indeed, has fallen a victim to them. And what is new and striking, it is said has a kind of fascination for youth. But I hold that this is an age, too, which is witnessing an extraordinary developement of sensibility in the young. This arises from an earlier, I had almost said, a premature education; from an exciting literature; and from the character of enterprise and expectation which now invests all the interests and prospects of society. But I ask, Is this an age, when you can safely break the great bond of faith and hope? If you were a dull and sluggish youth, or a youth amidst rude and barbarous times, it might not yield me the argument which I now seek. But I know that in this age, ay, and in this assembly, there is many a youthful heart, whose daily experience is the strongest possible proof of the need, and therefore of the likelihood, of a divinely sanctioned religion. Ay, I know, and many a sorrowing parent in this land knows, that the period of youth cannot be safely passed without it. Those thronging passions, those swaying sympathies of social life, the deeper musings of solitary hours, the imaginations, the affections, the thoughts,

unuttered and unutterable, — all the sweeping currents that bear the youthful heart it scarcely knows whither, — all show that it cannot be thrown without infinite peril, to drift upon a sea of doubt.

Humanity, in fine, and especially in its growing cultivation, has too hard a lot, it appears to me, if God has not opened for it the fountains of revelation. Without that great disclosure from above, human nature stands, in my contemplation of it, as an anomaly amidst the whole creation. The noblest existence on earth is not provided with a resource even so poor as instinct. On the heart that is made to bear the weight of infinite interests, sinks the crushing burthen of doubt and despondency, of fear and sorrow, of pain and death, without resource or relief, or comfort, or hope. The cry of the young ravens, the buzzing of insect life in every hedge, is heard; but the call, that comes up from the deep and dark conflict of the overshadowed soul, dies upon the vacant air; and there is no ear to hear, nor eye to pity. Oh! were it so, what could sustain the human heart sinking under the burthen of its noblest aspirations? "The still, sad music of humanity," sounding on through all time, would lose every soothing tone, and would become a wail, in which the heart of the world would die!

And why must any man think that the world is left to that darkness and misery? Because he cannot believe, that a communication has been made from heaven in the only conceivable way in which it *can* be made and *proved*; by miracles. For I affirm, that, if that great preliminary difficulty were over, all difficulties would vanish before the stupendous proofs of a revelation. He that thinks, then, that the world is left to nature's darkness, thinks thus, I repeat, because he cannot believe in miracles; because he cannot admit that the order of nature which is itself not an end, but a means to an end, may be interrupted for the greatest of all ends; — because he will not admit, that the infinite Power is superior to the laws itself has made; because he will not allow, in his philosophy, that liberty to the Infinite Parent, in changing and adapting his provisions to the wants of his children, that he allows to every earthly parent. Is this the childlike and trustful, the deep-searching and discerning, the expansive and unprejudiced spirit of true philosophy, or is it the shallow and skeptical spirit of bondage to the mere outward forms and

processes of things, regardless of their higher meanings and ends?

Here for the present I leave the subject. I have not undertaken in this discourse to prove the truth of Christianity; but, if I have succeeded in removing the great obstacle, — in opening the door to the argument, the conclusion, I think, will easily follow. I have not undertaken to prove that there have been miracles; but I do hold myself entitled to say, as the close and inference of this discourse, that I should wonder if there had not been miracles. The philosophical presumption is for, rather than against them. Nature is for, more than it is against them, — its mechanical order only being against them, while its whole spirit is in their favor. Man's necessity, God's mercy, is for them; and against them is — what? What is against all legitimate wisdom and conviction? Why, only a doubt, — which is mostly vague and irresponsible, — which, because it is a doubt, holds itself scarcely bound to give a reason, — and which, though it is a doubt, sits immovable, as if it held the very seat of knowledge, and throne of reason. To allow it to sit there undisturbed, is to yield more deference to a shadow, than to the very substance of reason and truth.

ART. VIII. — *The Library of American Biography*. Conducted by JARED SPARKS. Vol. V. *Life of John Eliot, the Apostle to the Indians*. By CONVERS FRANCIS. Boston: Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 357.

A WORTHIER literary enterprise has not been projected amongst us than this "American Biography." Mr. Sparks was fortunate in the first conception of the plan, nor has he been less so in the execution, the subjects chosen, and the contributors obtained. The time, too, is propitious. The country is not so new as to make the catalogue scanty of those deserving such memorial, or to give to their biographies a contemporaneous character; nor yet is it so old as to preclude system and considerable completeness in the undertaking. An editor, so well versed in our annals as Mr. Sparks, and, we may add, so judicious in selection, and indefatigable in accomplishment, with

such assistance as it appears he can command, need not despair of providing some satisfactory notice of all the really important and conspicuous names that occur in the first three quarters of the two centuries of our history. The time has arrived, we may suppose, when such names may be put into the balance, with the hope of impartiality, as far down at least as the origin of the present constitution. Political or other prejudice does not now reach back beyond that period. Contemporaneous biography, though a good service in its time, yet, for obvious reasons, needs to be re-written long after, in most cases in which it proves worthy to have been written at all. The whole extent, therefore, of our brief American antiquity seems open to this excellent enterprise, inviting a thorough survey. We trust the editor finds encouragement to persevere in a project so well begun.

A complaint has proceeded from a high critical quarter, that, the Novel species being on the decline, literature is running too much to Biography; meaning that we are likely to be overrun with lying and gossiping memoirs of men, women, and children, who may be very good or very wicked in their spheres, but have no special claims to be commemorated beyond the narrow circle in which they move. If all the types of the Harpers and their kind should be withdrawn from fiction, and go to practising their wondrously rapid permutations upon "Real Lives" and "True Narratives," then, doubtless, would be a time for all insignificance to be magnified, all low things to be exalted, a little one to become a thousand, and the reign of foolish tattle and pompous imposition be more extended and potent than ever before. Evils of this sort do impend; neither is the peril new. But, while we would not have all writers write lives, or the lives of all who have lived be written, still we would mark some goodly number of names in every age of every people to be fully chronicled, and we would reserve some of the most philosophical and choice minds to do it. Such lives furnish some of our best books. They are the best chapters of history. Biography recognises human individuality, what the individual is and does; and we esteem the characters and doings of individuals as such, quite as instructive and healthful subjects of contemplation as those of masses and organized bodies of men; less needful indeed in the study of policy and expedients, but more so in that of humanity, and the higher expressions of the moral

sentiments. And while we would pay due honor to the great moral energy and achievement of the present times, as manifested in the resolves of Societies and the reports of Executive Committees, we are also well pleased to go back with Mr. Sparks and his coadjutors to the times when men moved more of their own motion, and were more individual in character and action, — times when the established relations and ordinary sympathies of life sufficed for union, — and the separate energies, conscience, and vocation of a man served for guidance and machinery, — more simple and natural, however less wonder-working and omnipotent.

None who know any thing of the character and apostleship of John Eliot will deny, that he holds a rightful place in this "American Biography"; and those, who may never have heard of him before, will be satisfied by the work of Mr. Francis, that the place in the series could not have been better filled. Mr. Eliot was a young Puritan preacher in England; but being made uncomfortable there on account of his Non-conformity, he came to New England, and was established as teacher of the church in Roxbury, Nov. 5th, 1632, as colleague with Mr. Welde,* who appears to have been settled there a few months before. He exercised a long and faithful parochial ministry. He became early and deeply interested in the moral condition of the Indian tribes of his neighbourhood, — an interest "inspired by his sanctified love of doing good, and increased probably by his belief, that the Indians were the descendants of the lost tribes of Israel." He visited them and received their visits; preached to them, and taught them the facts and principles of the Christian faith; studied their language, and used it in his intercourse with them, and finally translated the whole Bible and several other books into it, and made an Indian Grammar. He acquired a great influence over many of the chiefs and people, and made many converts. He labored to introduce the arts of civilized life among them. In due time he collected a great portion of his converts from various tribes into a settlement of their own, called Natick, where a church was formed and municipal authorities were instituted, still under the paternal and apostolic guidance of Eliot. We can easily im-

* Mr. Francis makes Eliot the first minister of Roxbury. It is of no moment to correct the slight error, but we believe the highest chronological authorities assign the priority to Welde.

agine what zeal, combined with prudence and patient industry, was required in doing all this. And there is abundant evidence that on none of these points was he wanting.

“ The design seems to have sprung up amidst the silent workings of his own mind. No voice of invitation or encouragement, at the first, came to him from without. No eloquent appeal to his piety or his compassion was made by others. No one had gone before him in the enterprise, and returned to tell the story of the red man's wants, and to arouse the white man to supply them. He hearkened in silence to the admonition within his breast, which he revered ‘ as God's most intimate presence in the soul,’ and which told him, that a work of benevolence must be performed for the neglected and forlorn barbarians. He went forth to perform it amidst discouragements and obstacles, which were ever driving back his spirit on the resources of faith ; amidst suffering, danger, and personal exposure, which were ever making large demands on his power of endurance.

“ No trace of spiritual ambition, no mark of self-complacency, no word of vanity appears in the whole course of the labors of more than forty years. He cared not who had the praise, so the work of God were done. There have been achievements more brilliant than his ; there have been enterprises more susceptible of attractive embellishment in the description than his ; but none more unequivocally marked with the spirit of Christian disinterestedness. We cannot hesitate to yield a full assent to the testimony of Gookin, when he affirms, that ‘ Mr. Eliot engaged in this great work of preaching unto the Indians upon a very pure and sincere account.’ ”— pp. 298, 299.

Such is the outline of Eliot's life and labors. It would be superfluous in us to show how the outline was filled out. We should have to draw wholly from Mr. Francis ; and we prefer that our readers, such as have not already anticipated us, should draw from him themselves, in justice both to the biographer and his subject. To say that Mr. Francis has performed his task well, would be small praise. The memory of Eliot has been singularly fortunate in finding such a biographer. We doubt if any other literary man amongst us possesses so intimate an acquaintance with New England antiquity, united with such a hearty and reverent sympathy with its peculiar spirit, so keen a relish for its quaint old conceits and phraseology, and at the same time that enlarged and elevated philosophical view, which measures the real value of all men, of all times, by the same standard of everlasting and

unchangeable truth. Few men would have gleaned so much curious and interesting matter from such various and fragmentary sources, and made us so much at home with Eliot and his civilized and savage coteemporaries. A true antiquarian thoroughness of research, combined with the freshness and wisdom of a philosophic scholarship, have raised a worthy monument to the apostle and his noble enterprise. We take the liberty to enrich our pages with some paragraphs from this volume. We need not apologize for the length of the following, concerning the famous Indian Bible. Our author has given a full account of its character and history, of which we copy the conclusion.

"The Indian Bible has become one of those rare books, which the antiquarian deems it a triumph to possess. The copies in private or public libraries are very few. It has acquired the venerable appearance of an ancient and sealed book; and, when we turn over its pages, those long and harsh words seem like the mysterious hieroglyphics in some time-hallowed temple of old Egypt. It failed to answer the pious purpose, for which the translator labored in preparing it. But it has answered another purpose, which was perhaps never in his mind, or, if it were, was doubtless regarded as an inferior consideration. In connexion with his Indian Grammar, it has afforded important aid as a valuable document in the study of comparative philology. Though the language, in which it is printed, is no longer read, yet this book is prized as one of the means of gaining an insight into the structure and character of 'unwritten dialects of barbarous nations,' a subject which, of late years, has attracted the attention of learned men, and the study of which, it is believed, will furnish new facts to modify the hitherto received principles of universal grammar.

"On this account scholars of the highest name in modern times have had reason to thank Eliot for labors, which the Indians are not left to thank him for. While the cause of religion missed, in a great degree, the benefit designed for it, the science of language acknowledges a contribution to its stores. Mr. Eliot translated the Bible into a dialect of what is called the Mohegan tongue, a language spoken by all the New England Indians, essentially the same, but varied by different dialects among the several tribes. By Eliot and others it was called the Massachusetts language.

"There is, besides, a moral aspect, in which this translation of the Scriptures should be viewed. It must be regarded as a monument of laborious piety, of painstaking love to the soul of man. Would the translator have had the spirit to undertake, still

more the perseverance to carry through, a work so wearisome and discouraging, had he not been animated by the deep, steady, strong principle of devotedness to God and to the highest good of his fellow-men? The theological scholar, who translates the Bible, or even one of the Testaments, from the original into his vernacular tongue, is considered as having achieved a great task, and as giving ample proof of his diligence. Yet such a work is easy compared with the labor which Eliot undertook and finished amidst a press of other employments, which alone might have been deemed sufficient to satisfy the demands of Christian industry.

"Among the many remarkable doings of the Apostle to the Indians, this bears the most striking testimony to his capacity of resolute endurance in the cause of man's spiritual welfare. We justly admire the moral courage, the spirit of self-sacrifice, which sustained him in the tasks of preaching, visiting, and instruction, never deterred by the dark squalidness of barbarity, never daunted by the fierce threats of men who knew no law but their passions, never moved by exposure to storms, cold, and the various forms of physical suffering. But when we represent him to our minds, as laboring at his translation of the Scriptures in the silence of his study, year after year, in the freshness of the morning hour and by the taper of midnight, wearied but not disheartened; continually perplexed with the almost unmanageable phraseology of the dialect of the barbarians, yet always patient to discover how it might be made to represent truly the meaning of the sacred books; doing this chapter by chapter, verse by verse, without a wish to give over the toil; cherishing for a long time only a faint hope of publication, yet still willing to believe, that God in his good providence would finally send the means of giving the printed word of life to those for whom he toiled and prayed, — we cannot but feel that we witness a more trying task, a more surprising labor, than any presented by the stirring and active duties of his ministry among the natives.

"It was a long, heavy, hard work, wrought out by the silent but wasting efforts of mental toil, and relieved by no immediately animating excitement. It was truly a labor of love. When we take that old dark volume into our hands, we understand not the words in which it is written; but it has another and beautiful meaning which we do understand. It is a symbol of the affection, which a devoted man cherished for the soul of his fellow-man; it is the expression of a benevolence, which faints in no effort to give light to those who sat in darkness and in the shadow of death; and so it remains, and will ever remain, a venerable manifestation of the power of spiritual truth and spiritual sympathy.*" — pp. 237 – 242.

* "Since the death of the Apostle Paul," says Mr. Everett, "a no-

We quote the following to illustrate the sort of influence which Eliot exercised over his converts. It was the time of Philip's war, when the colonial government deemed it necessary to resort to some severe measures of precaution with respect to the Indians professing to be friendly, as was always the case with the Christian converts, or "praying Indians," as they were called.

"In consequence of the prevalent excitement, the court passed an order, that the Indians at Natick should be forthwith removed to Deer Island, having first obtained the consent of the owner of that Island. Captain Thomas Prentiss, with a party of horse, was appointed to superintend their removal. He took a few men to assist, and five or six carts to carry away such commodities as would be indispensable for the Indians. When he arrived at Natick, and made known to them the pleasure of the court, they sadly but quietly submitted, and were soon ready to follow him. Their number was about two hundred, including men, women, and children. They were ordered to a place called *The Pines* on Charles River, two miles above Cambridge, where boats were to be in readiness to take them to the island. At this place, their spiritual father and ever faithful friend, Mr. Eliot, met them, to say a few kind and consoling words before they embarked. While he sympathized in their sorrows, he exhorted them to be patient under suffering and firm in their faith, reminding them that through much tribulation they must enter into the kingdom of God.

"There is an affecting moral beauty in the scene. That settlement, towards which the heart of the good apostle had yearned alike through seasons of discouragement and of hope; the foundations of which were laid by his own hands and hallowed by his own prayers; where the tree of life, as he believed, was firmly rooted in the wilderness; where, by the patient labor of years, he had made the word of God understood, and had reared civil and social institutions; that settlement, which probably next to his own home he loved better than any thing else on earth, is suddenly

bler, truer, and warmer spirit, than John Eliot, never lived; and taking the state of the country, the narrowness of the means, the rudeness of the age, into consideration, the history of the Christian church does not contain an example of resolute, untiring, successful labor, superior to that of translating the entire Scriptures into the language of the native tribes of Massachusetts; a labor performed, not in the flush of youth, nor within the luxurious abodes of academic ease, but under the constant burden of his duties as a minister and a preacher, and at a time of life when the spirits begin to flag.'—EVERETT'S *Address at Bloody Brook*, p. 31."

broken up, in consequence of a misguided excitement, and its inhabitants are hurried away from their fields and homes into what is little better than an imprisonment. At the hour of their departure, the venerable man, on whose head more than seventy winters had shed their frosts, stands with them on the bank of the river to pour forth his prayers for them, to mingle his tears with theirs, and to teach them the lesson, not of resentment against man, but of submission to God, the lesson of meekness and of strong endurance. The whole company present were deeply affected to see the quiet resignation "of the poor souls, encouraging and exhorting one another with prayers and tears." On the 30th of October, 1675, about midnight, when the tide served, they embarked in three vessels and were transported to their destined confinement on Deer Island." — pp. 277-279.

We cannot allow ourselves to withhold the following just and very beautiful reflections upon the enterprise to which our apostle devoted so much time and energy.

"The question has been, and will be again, asked, What after all was the use of this difficult effort, this hard toil? Was it not a wasted labor? Were the Indians benefited, or was Christianity planted with an abiding power in their wigwams and villages? Did not the whole disappear, like the snow-wreath in the sun? These questions are sometimes put in a sneering and contemptuous spirit, which becomes neither the Christian nor the philosopher. If the natives of our forests derived no permanent benefit from the exertions of Mr. Eliot and others, let it be remembered that these natives vanished from among men, before the experiment could be tried on a large scale, and for many successive years. They dwindled away in presence of the ever-restless enterprise of the New England settlers; and well might they say of "the pale race" around them,

"They waste us, — ay, like April snow
In the warm noon, we shrink away;
And fast they follow, as we go
Towards the setting day, —
Till they shall fill the land, and we
Are driven into the western sea."

I do not say that blame is necessarily to be attached to those, by whom they were crowded out; for, the world over, it is, and has been, generally a law of human progress, that civilized man must overtop and displace uncivilized man. But I say, that it ill becomes us, who have taken possession of the broad and fair lands of New England, to ask in derision, what was the use of all the Christian zeal displayed in behalf of the race that once roamed

over our hills and plains, when we recollect that they disappeared, to make room for us, too soon for the great and final results of that zeal to be fairly unfolded.

"But the question may be asked, on the other hand, Was there no good done? It is true, indeed, that both the red man and his Christianity, such as it was, vanished ere long from the roll of existing things. But while he remained, did the religion, which he had received, do nothing for him? True, it was a very imperfect and rude exercise of faith; his conceptions of what he had learned under the name of Christianity were, as we should expect, coarse and narrow. But was even such a form of moral life useless to him? God has endowed spiritual truth with a power, which, when it has once found its way to the heart, cannot be wholly suppressed or extinguished by any rudeness of apprehension, or any poverty of knowledge.

"Who the line
Shall draw, the limits of the power define,
That even imperfect faith to man affords?"

I cannot readily believe, that any portion of spiritual culture is entirely lost. Somewhere and somehow it has worked, and will work, for good. Even in the comparatively faint moral life kindled among the Indian settlements founded by Mr. Eliot, before they were broken up by war and discord, there was far more of the substantial good that belongs to man in his true attributes, than among all the tribes, who still roamed in vaunted freedom through the forests, unchained by any restraints of order or religion.

"But even if not one of the Indians had been personally benefited by the labors of the apostle Eliot, still those labors, like every great benevolent effort, have answered a noble purpose. They stand as the imperishable record of good attempted by man for man; and such a record, who, that values the moral glory of his country, will consider as a trivial portion of her history? It constitutes a chapter in the annals of benevolence, which every Christian, every friend of man, will contemplate with pleasure, even if his gratification be mingled with the sad reflection, that so much was done for so small results. When the settlers of New England came hither, and built new homes on these shores, they and the natives, the stranger emigrant and the old inhabitant, stood side by side, each a portion of God's great family. Had our fathers never cast one kind regard on these wild men, had they never approached them in any office of kindness or any manifestation of sympathy, had they stood off from them in surly or contemptuous indifference, except when occasion might serve to circumvent or crush them, a melancholy deduction must have been made from the reverence, with which every son of New England loves to regard their character and doings.

"But it is not so. The voice of Christian affection was spoken to the savage. The accents of pious kindness saluted his ear. For him benevolence toiled, and faith prayed, and wisdom taught; and the red race did not pass away, carrying with them no remembrance but that of defeat, and wrong, and submission to overpowering strength. The Christianity of the white man formed a beautiful, though transient, bond of interest with them. The light, which Eliot's piety kindled, was indeed destined soon to go out. But there his work stands for ever on our records, a work of love, performed in the spirit of love, and designed to effect the highest good which man is capable of receiving. Nonantum and Natick will ever be names of beautiful moral meaning in the history of New England." — pp. 301 – 305.

It is always a pleasure to record with honor, instances of self-forgetting benevolence in our fellow-men, and not the less so for its being sometimes chargeable with improvidence. We have to thank our author for preserving a characteristic anecdote in the next extract.

"In the performance of his duties among his congregation and elsewhere, he was eminently remarkable for his free and self-forgetting bounty. The pecuniary resources of a New England clergyman, slender enough at any time, were then scanty indeed. But Mr. Eliot, in the unchecked freedom of his liberality, made the most of the little he possessed, in works of benevolence. To the poor he gave with an open hand, till all was gone; and they looked to him as a father and a friend. The amount of his personal charities in this way alone, at different times, was many hundred pounds. He did not wait for suffering to come in his way, but sought it out diligently. As other men would search for hidden treasures, he searched for opportunities of raising the wretched and relieving the miserable. When his own means were exhausted, he applied to those who were blessed with abundance, and begged of them contributions for the children of want. His bounty, to be so profuse, must sometimes doubtless have been indiscriminate and injudicious. With a benevolence too incautious, he often distributed his salary for the relief of others, before the wants of his own family were supplied.

"On this subject there is a well-known anecdote, which, though probably familiar to many readers, is too characteristic to be omitted. When the parish treasurer was once about to pay him his salary, or a portion of it, knowing his habitual propensity, he put it into a handkerchief, which he tied in several hard knots, in order to prevent Mr. Eliot from giving it away before he reached home. After leaving the treasurer, the benevolent man called at the house of a family who were poor and sick. He blessed them, and told them God had

sent relief by him. His kind words brought tears of gratitude to their eyes. He immediately attempted to untie his handkerchief; but the knots had been so effectually made, that he could not get at his money. After several fruitless efforts to loose the handkerchief, growing impatient of the perplexity and delay, he gave the whole to the mother of the family, saying, 'Here, my dear, take it; I believe the Lord designs it all for you.' — pp. 316-318.

Mr. Francis has two or three chapters on the private life and personal traits of Eliot. We copy a few paragraphs.

"His habits with respect to personal indulgence were of the most simple and severe kind. He had attained a complete mastery over the pleasures of sense, and held them in despotic subjugation. The lessons of self-denial, which he had thoroughly learned and daily practised, and his indifference to outward accommodations, fitted him to endure without complaint the privations, to which he was often exposed in his ministry to the Indians. He allowed himself but little sleep, rising early and beginning his labors in the freshness of the morning. This habit he recommended to others, especially to those who were engaged in intellectual pursuits. He would often say to young students, 'I pray you, look to it that you be morning birds.'

"His food was always the plainest and most simple. Rich viands and highly seasoned varieties, it seems, were not unknown in New England even at that time. For these Mr. Eliot had no relish himself, and but little mercy for the taste in others. When he dined abroad, he partook of but one dish, and that the plainest on the table. He was habitually a water-drinker, and seldom deviated into the use of any other liquor. The juice of the grape he did not denounce, but rarely tasted it himself. 'Wine,' he was accustomed to say, 'is a noble, generous liquor, and we should be humbly thankful for it; but, as I remember, water was made before it.' He thought very justly, that intemperate eating deserved to be severely rebuked, no less than intemperate drinking. In his correspondence with Baxter, he remarks, 'I observe in yours a thing, which I have not so much observed in other men's writing, namely that you often inveigh against the sin of gluttony, as well as drunkenness. It appeareth to be a very great point of Christian prudence, temperance, and mortification, to rule the appetite of eating as well as drinking; and, were that point more inculcated by divines, it would much tend to the sanctification of God's people, as well as to a better preservation of health, and lengthening of the life of man on earth.'

"Extravagance or finery in dress was likely to draw from Mr. Eliot a witty or a serious rebuke. His own apparel was not only

without ornament, but frequently of the most homely kind. It is said that, like John the Baptist, he sometimes had a leathern girdle about his loins; but this, it is likely, was worn only or chiefly during his missionary excursions. In some men, habits like these might justly be supposed to proceed from an affectation of homeliness; for there is a pride of plainness, as well as a pride of finery. But Mr. Eliot was too guileless a man to be suspected of such folly. His negligence of external appearance, and his contempt for the pleasures of the table, were the result of an unaffected love of simplicity, strengthened by a studious life and by intense engagement in absorbing duties.

"Mr. Eliot had a few whims, to which he was pertinaciously attached. One of these was an unsparing hostility to the practice of wearing long hair and wigs. He could not endure it; he regarded it as an iniquity not to be tolerated. The man, and especially the minister of the Gospel, who wore a wig, he considered as committing an offence, not only against decency, but against religion. His zeal about 'prolix locks' was warm, but unavailing. He lived to see the practice prevail in spite of his remonstrances, and at last gave over his warfare against it with the despairing remark, 'The lust has become insuperable!' The readers of New England history will remember, that in 1649 an association was formed, and a solemn protest published, against wearing long hair, by Governor Endicot and the other magistrates.

"In this punctiliousness we see the influence of sympathy with the English Roundheads carried even into trifles. In England, periwigs were permitted quietly to cover the head soon after the restoration of Charles. But for more than thirty years after that time, they were deemed by many a sore grievance in New England. Gradually during that period they were coming into use; but they needed all the authority derived from the practice of such divines as Owen, Bates, and Mede, to find protection at last. The intolerance they experienced from Mr. Eliot was not, therefore, a singularity in the good man; he only persevered in his stern hostility against them longer than many others.

"To the use of tobacco, the introduction of which had caused no little disturbance in New England, he had likewise a strong aversion, and denounced it in the severest terms. But his opposition in this case was as ineffectual, as in that of the wigs. 'In contempt of all his admonitions,' says Allen, 'the head would be adorned with curls of foreign growth, and the pipe would send up volumes of smoke.' " — pp. 320 - 323.

"This aged servant of Christ sat waiting, as it were, in the antechamber of death, quiet and full of hope. He used sometimes pleasantly to say, that he was afraid some of his old Christian

friends, who had departed before him, especially John Cotton of Boston and Richard Mather of Dorchester, would suspect him to have gone the wrong way, because he remained so long behind them. His full share of work seemed to have been done; but even now he could not consent to be idle. He looked around for some labor of benevolence and piety, such as the remnant of his powers might allow him to perform. The care of the ignorant and the neglected was still the ruling passion of his heart. He saw with grief the great want of concern for the moral welfare of the blacks. He proposed to many of the families within two or three miles of his house, that they should send their negro servants to him once a week, to be instructed in religion. In this humble, but truly benevolent work, he rejoiced to occupy some of his last hours; but death intervened before much could be accomplished." — pp. 332, 333.

We have already trespassed largely upon the pages of our author, and will pass on to the closing scene of our apostle's life.

"While death was fast approaching, his mental powers, though dimmed and broken, were still retained. He rejoiced in the thought, that he should soon carry to his friends in heaven good news of the prosperity of the New England churches. When some one inquired how he was, he replied, 'Alas! I have lost every thing; my understanding leaves me; my memory fails me; my utterance fails me; but, I thank God, my charity holds out still; I find that rather grows than fails.' One of his last remembrances lingered sadly among those, to whom he had given so much of his strength and life. 'There is a cloud,' he said, 'a dark cloud upon the work of the Gospel among the poor Indians. The Lord revive and prosper that work, and grant it may live when I am dead. It is a work, which I have been doing much and long about. But what was the word I spoke last? I recall that expression *my doings*. Alas, they have been poor and small doings, and I'll be the man that shall throw the first stone at them all.' When, a short time before his death, Mr. Walter came into his room, he said, 'Brother, you are welcome to my very soul; but retire to your study, and pray that I may have leave to be gone.' Mr. Eliot died on the 20th of May, 1690, aged eighty-six years. The last words on his lips were 'WELCOME JOY!'

"Such was the life and such the end of John Eliot. New England bewailed his death, as a great and general calamity. The churches, whose growth and prosperity had always been among the things which lay nearest to his heart, felt that they had lost a spiritual father, whose venerable presence had been to them a defence and glory. So deep was the sentiment of reverence for his character, that Mather observes, 'We had a tradition among

us, that the country could never perish as long as Eliot was alive.' One, who for a long series of years had filled so large a space with eminent usefulness, on whom the confidence of the best men in church and state had reposed without wavering, and over whose name, age and great services had shed a saintly consecration, could not depart from those, with and for whom he had acted, without leaving a community in mourning. The Indian church at Natick wept the loss of their venerated instructor, as rough men in simplicity of heart would weep for one, who had loved them, who had prayed for them, and guided them to the things of their everlasting peace." — pp. 334 – 336.

We lay down this book assured that every thing has now been done for the memory of John Eliot that lies within the legitimate province of biography. History has now done her utmost for him ; and those who love to know as much as may be known of such a man, and his work, will be fully satisfied. But without disparagement to the interest and thoroughness of this work, and others like it, we think that there is still a great popular want unsupplied with respect to the early times and first heroes and saints of New England. We have heard the idea set forth, and we sympathize with it, that those times and men have become fit themes for the historical novel. While such men as our author lead the way, and with learned accuracy and philosophical investigation set up the landmarks of truth concerning them, we would gladly see some genius follow and clothe them in a fitting garb of romance. We would propose to such an one no light or insignificant task, no vapid story of Indian murder, or Puritan rigor, or wild love, to relieve the ennui of a frivolous and jaded sentimentality ; but, catching and bodying forth the spirit of the time, to take hold of the strong heart of the people, and kindle it with a hallowed and healthful enthusiasm for the old heroic age of the country.

G. P.

NOTICES AND INTELLIGENCE.

The Outcast, and Other Poems. By S. G. GOODRICH. Boston : Russell, Shattuck, & Williams. — In the Preface to the volume before us, the author leads us to infer that he has not served a regular apprenticeship to the muses, and that he lays claim to no higher title than that of an amateur in verse. Had he indulged

in more pretence, we should not have been disposed to find fault with him for so doing. His work is more than respectable; and, though there are some evident tokens of haste, and a few passages which betray a want of finish, yet we cannot but hail the collection as a handsome accession to this department of American literature. The leading poem in the volume, "The Outcast," is in flowing but irregular verse, chiefly octosyllabics, and is intended to portray the workings of remorse in the mind of an individual of a noble and sensitive nature, who, actuated by notions of false honor, has in a moment of reckless excitement made himself in the eye of God and his own conscience, though not of the world, a murderer, having shot his friend in a duel. The interest of the story is well sustained, and the poem abounds in passages of genuine power, and in bursts of impassioned eloquence. The language is in one or two instances exaggerated, but never feeble. It is always rich, expressive, and harmonious. "The Spirit Court" is the title of a poem, half satirical and half didactic, in which the author has happily hit off some of the prominent follies of the day. The "Dream of Youth," the "Fortune-Hunter," and the lines to Lake Superior, are worthy of more than one reading. Had we room to analyze, and to find fault, we doubtless might do so; but the beauties of these poems so far counterbalance the defects, that we are inclined to be extremely lenient towards the latter, in consideration of the pleasure which the former have afforded us. We regret that we have but room for the following extract, which we select rather for its brevity than as an adequate specimen of the varied powers of the author. It also displays his turn for making nature a mirror, to reflect into the heart the beautiful images of religion.

"SONGS OF NATURE.

"I hear the ocean bursting on the shore, —
What melancholy music in that roar!
What wailing voices swell upon the breeze,
What phantoms come and whisper of the seas!
Wild tales they tell of misty ages flown,
Of depths unfathomed, and of shores unknown;
Of ever toiling tides, where tempests frown,
Of trackless deeps, where God alone looks down.
And these, the legends of the speeding wave,
Come to the heart like music from the grave.
Sad is their tone, and answering deep to deep,
The soul gives back an echo to its sweep.

The forest tosses in the autumn gale,
The leaves are scattered, and they shroud the vale.
Voices are on the breeze, — and in its breath
Spirits are singing, but they sing of death.

And who hath tuned these harps of nature ? Who
 Makes the deep bosom feel their music true ?
 Oh, God ! we hear the anthem of the sea
 And land, — and listen, for they speak of Thee !
 They speak of Thee, and man's predestined doom,
 Yet lift the shroud that shadows o'er the tomb :
 They sadden, but they soothe the troubled soul,
 And strike hope's anchor strong, though billows roll."

1. *The Rev. Mr. Loraine's Faith Examined and Changed.* By the Author of "The Sunday School Teacher's Funeral." Boston : James Munroe & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 59. — 2. *Forms of Morning and Evening Prayer, composed for the Use of Families.* By JONATHAN FARR. Boston : James Munroe & Co. 1836. 16mo. pp. 168. — These, like all the publications of Mr. Farr, are intended for use, and not for show. The first little work traces the successive changes of opinion, through which an Orthodox minister, settled over an Orthodox church, is gradually led by a devout study of the Scriptures, in becoming a consistent Unitarian, and indicates the effect which these changes have on the tone of his preaching, on his pastoral fidelity, and ultimately on the spiritual condition of his flock. It is, in some respects, an unfinished sketch ; but parts of it are so ingeniously done, and so feelingly withal, as to create in us a strong desire to hear the rest of Mr. Loraine's history, and to know a little more about "poor Mr. Hawbry's papers." The "Forms of Morning and Evening Prayer," are among the best that have come under our notice, — at once calm and fervent, scriptural and rational ; for which reason we doubt not that they will find general favor among those, who are accustomed to avail themselves of such helps to private or domestic devotion. The volume is very neatly printed and done up, and contains prayers for every day in a fortnight, and eight morning and evening prayers for any day in the week, and a great variety of occasional prayers for families, and for individuals.

Report on the Magnetical Experiments made by the Commission of the Royal Academy of Medicine, of Paris, read in the Meetings of June 21st and 28th, 1831. By M. HUSSON, the Reporter. Translated from the French, and preceded with an Introduction, by CHARLES POYEN ST. SAUVEUR. Boston : D. K. Hitchcock. 1836. 16mo. pp. 172. — As Animal Magnetism is beginning once more, under a modified form, to make some noise in the world, we are glad that such among us as are curious in these matters, will now have an opportunity to become acquainted with the facts and experiments on which the pretended science is founded. Nobody need apprehend any harm from this second translation into English of the famous Report of the French savans ;

for we can hardly conceive it possible for any one to read it over ever so attentively, or ever so cursorily, without perceiving that the evidence adduced in support of the wonderful discovery is poor and weak to the last degree. After reading M. Poyen's little book we suspect that most persons will be content; otherwise, we commend them to Colquhoun's version of the same Report, (8vo. Edinburgh, 1833,) "with an Explanatory Introduction, and an Appendix," as being much more full, amusing, and ridiculous, and therefore more satisfactory.

Orthodoxy in England. — Everybody knows that Orthodoxy in this country has long been a house divided against itself. From the following extract, which makes part of the Summary of Intelligence in the (London) Christian Reformer for May, it would seem that the prospect of things in England is still worse for the party.

"In the religious world all is agitation. The old Bartlett's Buildings' or Christian Knowledge Society, is an arena of faction; the Evangelical clergy nose the bishops and insist upon it that the Church of England is Calvinistic, and must, on pain of perdition, support Calvinism. Dr. Maltby's elevation from Chichester to Durham has alarmed the total believers in the Thirty-nine Articles. Some of the rural clergy are for taking the *cong  d' lire* from the Crown. — Oxford is in an uproar. The new Regius Professor of Divinity, Dr. Hampden, once pleaded for the admission of Dissenters to the University, and once allowed that Unitarians might be Christians. He has since confessed much more than is commonly required for orthodoxy, but his humiliation does not appease the Oxonians, the majority of whom seem to be a compound of Toryism, semi-popery, and fanaticism. — The peaceful Quakers are waging with one another a direful war, and in the battle between old light and new light all is darkness and confusion. — There is a rent in the Wesleyan garment; schism extends through the connexion; John Wesley has had his century. In this dispute a real principle of liberty is involved, and the seceders are, in a sense as yet partially understood by themselves, reformers. — In the Bible Society, the Baptists are beginning to agitate the question whether they can conscientiously belong to an association which sends out translations that turn plain dipping into pouring or sprinkling. This is probably one of the results of the late Baptist Deputation from this country to the United States, where the Baptists have parted company from the other Evangelical sects, in order to have pure Baptist Bibles. — The Tabernacle is rent in twain, and placards announce that the spirit of Whitfield has fled from its old *habitat* in Moorfields. — Cloven, too, are the tongues of the Irvingites; and Boatswain Smith cries out from Aylesbury Gaol, where he has taken apartments amongst the Debtors, that none will come to the help of the Lord against his oppressors, the orthodox Dissenting ministers of the metropolis and their disciples and agents. May not these divisions, accompanied by so many exhibitions of the worst spirit of the lowest of mankind, suffice to teach the pretenders to preternatural light and purity, that they are a little mistaken and are not infallible? This lesson learned and orthodoxy dies."

Glasgow Edition of Dr. Channing's Works. — It is but justice to the publishers of this edition to say, that they are not responsible, as we supposed in the notice in our May number, for originating the mistake of giving as Dr. Channing's, a long article which does not belong to him. It was copied from the London edition of Dr. Channing's writings, published by Mr. Rich in 1834. Messrs. Hedderwick & Son will issue another edition of the Glasgow collection, in which this error, and the others complained of, will be corrected, and the later publications of Dr. Channing, including that on Slavery, will be inserted.

New Publications. — "An Accurate Reprint of the first Edition of the New Testament in English, translated by William Tyndale, in the reign of Henry VIII. 1526," has just been issued from the press of Mr. Bagster, London. It is given in Roman letters, with the ancient orthography, and a fac simile of the original title-page, from the celebrated copy belonging to the Museum of Bristol College, supposed to be the only perfect one of the first edition now in existence. A full and interesting biography of Tyndale is prefixed. Mr. Bagster proposes also, if sufficient encouragement should be given, to republish Coverdale's Bible, 1535, (the first entire English Bible ever printed,) from a copy in the possession of the Duke of Sussex.

The ninth volume of the "Biblical Cabinet," published by Thomas Clark, Edinburgh, has just appeared. It contains the first volume of Rosenmueller's "Biblical Geography of Central Asia," translated by the Rev. N. Morren, A. M. with notes by the translator. The publisher of the "Cabinet" has also favored us with the *first* volume of Menzies' translation of Tholuck's "Exposition of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans," the *first* volume of the same gentleman's translation of Tholuck's "Exposition, Doctrinal and Philological, of Christ's Sermon on the Mount," and the *first* volume of Forbes's translation of Pareau's "Principles of Interpretation of the Old Testament." We hope that the time is not far distant, when *second* volumes of some of these works will be forthcoming.

Gould and Newman, of Andover, advertise as in preparation a translation of Eichhorn on the Apocalypse by A. Kaufman, Jr. Also Rosenmueller on the Psalms, Pentateuch, Isaiah, Ezekiel, &c, translated and edited by C. E. Stowe, Prof. of Bib. Lit. in Lane Seminary, Cincinnati. Perkins & Marvin, Boston, are reprinting, from the second English edition, Dr. Bloomfield's Greek Testament, with English notes, critical, philological, and exegetical.

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